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Recent agribusiness literature has drawn attention to the rapid rise of institutional market 
channels for high-value crops in developing countries. Several driving factors are responsible 
for the transformation of traditional multilayer agribusiness systems into new coordinated 
value chains; these are; agribusiness industrialisation (Cook & Chaddad, 2000; Reardon & 
Barrett, 2000), changes in agribusiness technology (Reardon, Barrett, Berdegué, & Swinnen, 
2009; Saxowsky & Duncan, 1998), trade liberalisation (Pingali, 2007), rising urbanisation, the 
rising per capita income of the middle class, changes in consumer preferences (Reardon & 
Hopkins, 2006), and increased consumer awareness of nutrition (Gulati, Minot, Delgado, & 
Bora, 2007).  
Traditionally, agribusiness transactions are conducted through spot markets. However, these 
markets are increasingly transitioning into vertically coordinated markets, thus transforming 
existing marketing relationships in the process (Peterson, Wysocki, & Harsh, 2001). While 
these new food systems offer fresh fruit and vegetable (FFV hereafter)  growers opportunities 
to improve their incomes, their participation depends on a variety of factors, such as the 
structure and dynamics of these chains, and the institutional settings within which they are 
embedded (Barrett, 2008). Agribusiness literature indicates that institutional channels 
procure goods from large farmers/specialised traders to lower their transaction costs (Singh, 
2009). While there is a very real risk of smallholder exclusion, there are numerous 
opportunities for value participation (Reardon & Hopkins, 2006). This research adopts a New 
Institutional Economics (NIE) framework to investigate smallholders’ participation in 
institutional channels. The NIE framework provides insights into transaction problems among 
supply chain partners (Williamson, 2004). 
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Previous studies on this issue focus on the transformation of food systems in developing 
countries and the impact of institutional channels on farmers’ incomes and poverty reduction 
(Barrett, 2008; Fenwick & Lyne, 1999; Jayne, Mather, & Mghenyi, 2005; Louw, Vermeulen, 
Kirsten, & Madevu, 2007; Weatherspoon, Cacho, & Christy, 2001; Weatherspoon & Reardon, 
2003). However, many studies treat Fresh fruit and vegetable farmers as a homogeneous 
group when, in fact, they appear to be more heterogeneous in nature. This research firstly 
identifies the factors influencing market participation for smallholders in institutional 
channels. Secondly, it determines the mode of market engagement and finally, the role of 
collective action in ensuring smallholder farmers’ participation.  
The study collected data from 200 fresh produce growers (specifically potato and tomato 
croppers) in the Punjab region of India using an interview-survey method. The research 
identifies several factors which impact upon farmers’ participation in institutional channels: 
these are, guaranteed price (contract farming), the operational land size, farmers’ education 
levels, formal sources of credit and technical assistance. This research also suggests that re-
engineering traditional cooperatives into new generation marketing cooperatives will enable 
smallholder farmers to achieve better returns. In particular, this research highlights the need 
for investment into more processing plants, enhance the capacity of existing ones and deploy 
new generation marketing techniques. The role of transaction costs and collective action for 
determining smallholders’ participation in the institutional channels has assessed in new 
geographic location Punjab region of India. The empirical results of this research provide 
policy, methodological and theoretical contributions for various stakeholders.  
Keywords: Fresh produce, market participation, institutional channels, smallholders, 
transaction costs, collective action, quantitative research.  
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While the relative importance of staple food is declining in developing countries, the 
prominence of fresh fruits and vegetables is increasing (Pingali, 2007). Hence, agribusiness 
supply chains are passing through a dualistic transitional phase. On the one hand, institutional 
distribution channels are rising in numbers and importance in big cities. On the other hand, 
the rural population is still very dependant on more traditional marketing channels (Gulati et 
al., 2007). In the current study, the term ‘developing countries’ refers to countries where 
agriculture constitutes a high proportion of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), the population 
is mostly rural, and where there are few opportunities for income generation outside of 
agriculture (McCullough, Pingali, & Stamoulis, 2008). Fresh fruit and vegetables can be 
thought of as high-value crops. They are critical components of transitioning agribusiness 
commodities in developing countries (Hewett, 2012). The transformation of agribusiness has 
significant effects on existing agribusiness markets, FFV growers, government policy, and 
private investment. Further, the growth of high-value commodities requires coordinated 
linkages among supply chain actors throughout the entire value chain.  
Traditionally, agricultural transactions are made through wholesale spot markets where the 
producer’s share of the total value paid by the end consumers is typically low (Singh & Singh, 
2012).  
While the FFV producer’s return is considered low, it is actually much higher than other 
agricultural products, for example, cereal crops. Yet, in some cases, producers end up with a 
net loss, such as that reported by potatoes growers in India (Sandip & Sarkar, 2003). Indeed, 
FFV producers face significant risks due to price and demand fluctuations.    
Agribusiness literature has drawn attention to the rapid rise of institutional channels for FFV 
markets, such as supermarkets, hotels, restaurants and value-adding food processing in 
developing countries (Gulati et al., 2007; Michelson, Reardon, & Perez, 2012; Reardon & 
Berdegue, 2002; Reardon, Timmer, Barrett, & Berdegué, 2003). While these transformations 
are occurring, fresh produce markets are still dominated by traditional spot markets such as 
2 
found in India, Vietnam, Honduras, Chile and Madagascar (Berdegué, Balsevich, Flores, & 
Reardon, 2005; Blandon, 2006; Reardon & Timmer, 2007; Singh, 2008). Typically, traditional 
spot markets are characterised by poor performance, high price volatility, significant 
marketing costs, a large number of intermediaries, inefficient logistics, and asymmetric 
information flows (Cadilhon, Moustier, Poole, Tam, & Fearne, 2006; Murray-Prior et al., 2005). 
Moreover, traditional spot markets are often just price-driven. As such, chain participants 
often engage in risky behaviour to maximise their self-interests (Martin & Jagadish, 2006).  
In contrast, institutional channels focus on achieving scale economies (Singh & Singla, 2011), 
meeting higher quality requirements, ensuring continuity of supply, food safety, and 
extending shelf-life (Dabas, Sternquist, & Mahi, 2012). These factors are believed to increase 
producers’ overall production and marketing costs but provide better margins. Institutional 
channels offer an opportunity for international retail chains, as well as regional and 
smallholder agribusiness entities, to cash in on opportunities as both quality and reliability rise 
(Reardon & Berdegue, 2002). While Institutional channels have transformed agribusiness 
markets in developing countries, they have done so at different rates, and to varying extents, 
across regions and countries (Reardon & Gulati, 2008).  
However, Reardon et al. (2003) argue that while agribusiness markets are transforming from 
traditional to modern institutional distribution in developing countries, institutional channels 
are still inefficient and imperfect. The reason for these imperfections are temporal and 
localised price variations at various geographic locations, where the price is the sole 
mechanism for marketing agribusiness products. Furthermore, in the context of FFV, due to 
short shelf-life and poor/limited/non-existent logistics infrastructure, marketing and 
distribution is very challenging for smallholder FFV producers. 
Agribusiness literature explores a variety of issues, including the types of fresh produce 
procurement practices that agribusiness markets use (Minten, Randrianarison, & Swinnen, 
2009; Miyata, Minot, & Hu, 2009; Neven, Odera, Reardon, & Wang, 2009) and whether 
smallholders actually participate in emerging institutional channels (Barrett, 2008; Blandon, 
Henson, & Cranfield, 2009; Omiti, Otieno, McCullogh, & Nyanamba, 2007; Sebatta, Mugisha, 
Katungi, Kashaaru, & Kyomugisha, 2014). Others ask salient questions such as: is participation 
in institutional channels economically beneficial for smallholders (Barrett et al., 2012; Wollni 
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& Zeller, 2007), and what are the entry barriers for institutional channels? (Alene et al., 2008; 
Hewett, 2012; Minot, 2011; Poulton, Kydd, & Dorward, 2006) 
Agribusiness literature further highlights a variety of factors that constrain fresh produce 
growers in participating in institutional channels. One factor is the size of available and 
operational land under cultivation. While large farmers have an advantage due to scales of 
economy, it is challenging for smallholders to scale up due to the marketing and transaction 
costs involved (Alene et al., 2008; Blandon, 2006; Ruben, Boselie, & Lu, 2007). Several studies 
have revealed several barriers to entry for smallholders including; the lack of information on 
prices (Markelova, Meinzen-Dick, Hellin, & Dohrn, 2009), high unit transaction costs due to 
the small volume of marketable surplus (Dorward, 2001; Minot, 2011), significant costs 
associated with meeting quality and food safety standards (Dolan & Humphrey, 2000; Pingali, 
Khwaja, & Meijer, 2007; Vorley, Lundy, & MacGregor, 2009), a lack of access to agricultural 
extension services (Pingali et al., 2007; Shepherd, 2007), investment constraints related to 
efficient plants and machinery (Poulton et al., 2006), access to formal credit (Ayaz & Hussain, 
2011; Minot, 2011), poor road infrastructure (Minten et al., 2009; Singh, 2009) and high 
chances of product damage and spoilage pre and post-harvest (Rienekens, 2011). Institutional 
channels focus on creating economies of scale, continuous orders, higher quality standards, 
and graded quantities; thus the chances of smallholder FFV growers’ exclusion are high due 
to low physical, legal, capital or regulatory infrastructure (Kirsten & Sartorius, 2002; Reardon 
& Barrett, 2000; Reardon et al., 2003). Hence, the possibility of many smallholder farmers 
participating in value-added institutional channels remains low. 
Conversely, a few researchers have reported that for some fresh produce, smallholders may 
have a competitive advantage over larger producers (Singh, 2009), especially in the case of 
exclusive FFV products that require specialised supervision and attention. Increasing demand 
for organic FFV products is one example that requires particular skills and the use of 
specialised labour and knowledge of local climate conditions. To leverage this, the significance 
of providing education, skill-based training, and technical assistance is thus of utmost priority 
for policymakers. Opportunities for smallholder FFV growers to raise their economic viability 
depends on access to, and participation in, institutional value chains for both domestic use 
and export (Meinzen-Dick, DiGregorio, & McCarthy, 2004; Poulton et al., 2006). Several 
studies have suggested that institutions play a vital role in smallholder farmers’ participation 
in new market opportunities (Alene et al., 2008; Hellin, Lundy, & Meijer, 2009; Kaganzi et al., 
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2008). The collectivisation of agricultural products by smallholders remains a widely discussed 
institutional governance arrangement that enables the collectivesed smallholders to better 
compete in institutional channels. More recent studies report that if small and medium-sized 
farmers successfully pool their resources to mitigate the pressure of scale economies, they 
too can participate in institutional channels (Barham & Chitemi, 2009; Devaux et al., 2009; 
Hellin et al., 2009; Markelova et al., 2009). Agribusiness researchers note the importance of 
vertical coordination among buyers and FFV producers in the form of ‘contract farming’ as it 
enables smallholders to participate in institutional channels (Barrett et al., 2012; Key & 
Runsten, 1999; Minot, 2011). Yet the rate of involvement of smallholders in appropriately 
structured collectivised arrangements remains low in developing countries. Indeed, the issues 
identified above raise serious questions about whether smallholders will ever be able to 
participate in institutional channels and improve their lot.  
1.2 Defining key terms 
 Market participation 
The term ‘market participation’ is widely used in agribusiness literature. It is both a cause and 
a consequence of economic development. Markets offer primary producers the opportunity 
to specialise for comparative advantage and thereby enjoy welfare gains from trade (Al-
Hassan, Sarpong, & Mensah-Bonsu, 2006). In agriculture literature, there is a lack of universal 
definitions of market participation or access. Moreover, different researchers use different 
indicators to measure market participation/access.  
Generally, market participation refers to growers’ access to points where they can sell their 
marketable surplus to buyers to make a profit (Barrett, 2008). In the context of fresh produce, 
physical access to the markets is even more significant as fresh produce has a short shelf-life. 
Remoteness and distance to market, including transportation costs and time spent travelling 
to the selling points, are essential factors in market participation (Feleke & Zegeye, 2006). The 
cost involved in moving fresh produce between the location of production to exchange point 
also affects market price. Chamberlin and Jayne (2009) refer to market access as the farmers’ 
proximity to the market in the nearest town or district where farmers can sell their products 
without incurring extra transportation costs.  
Other aspects derived from those who define market participation are; FFV growers access to 
farm inputs, agribusiness services, and their ability to make a profit (Salami, Kamara, & 
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Brixiova, 2010). In developing countries, markets provide farmers with opportunities to 
generate income, alleviate poverty, and decrease hunger rates in developing countries 
(Alwang, Siegel, & Jorgensen, 1996). Market signals should direct FFV growers on what to 
grow, both in terms of quality and quantity, according to consumers’ needs. Access to market 
information is thus essential for ensuring that fresh produce growers receive a stable income. 
In developing countries, access to information is considered an essential element of market 
participation. The link between the market and production points is another aspect of market 
participation. In developing countries, intermediaries such as ‘middlemen’ or ‘wholesalers’ 
play a crucial role linking producers with the market as they have access to market information 
and are often in a position to determine what price producers should sell their supplies at 
(Abebe, Bijman, & Royer, 2016). 
In this study, the term market participation refers to the context where FFV growers are in a 
position to sell their produce at the nearest selling point at a feasible price with minimal post-
harvest losses.  
 Smallholder farming 
This research focuses on smallholder farmers who grow FFV. The term ‘smallholder’ is also 
difficult to define because it is conceptualised differently according to specific geographical 
locations, socioeconomic conditions, levels of technology, types of agribusiness markets, and 
available resources (Arias, Hallam, Krivonos, & Morrison, 2013). As such, the term 
‘smallholder’ is often defined and used inconsistently, referring, inter alia, to farmers who 
occasionally sell products for cash as a supplement to other sources of income; to those who 
regularly market a surplus after their consumption needs have been met; and to those who 
are small-scale commercial farmers, with a primary focus on production for the market 
(Kirsten & Van Zyl, 1998). Smallholders are also defined as those who own a small plot of land, 
use family labour, grow one or two subsistence crops and have minimal marketable surplus 
to sell. For example, Fenwick and Lyne (1999) view smallholders as households whose farming 
revenue comprises only a small portion of their gross income.  
In order to ensure effective policy, it is crucial to define the term precisely. Predominantly, 
‘yes’ or ‘no’ criteria have been found to generalise the term smallholder (often implicit, 
sometimes explicit) as the size of the operational landholding and the level of production 
(marketable surplus after home consumption) for the market. Other criteria also consider the 
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use of hired labour, the level of working capital invested in crops, and the level of farm 
machinery owned/used. The size of operational land is considered a common criterion for 
defining smallholders. However, there are a wide variation in measurements or what is 
considered a ‘small’ landholding (anywhere from 0.05 ha to 124.00 ha). Others consider 
farmers’ socio-economic condition, their geographic location, and the country’s existing 
market structure (Hassanullah, 1991). For example, Sidhu (2016) considers large farmers as 
those who farm more than 10 ha. The idea of using operational land as the only criterion to 
define smallholders is problematic (Chowdhury, 1987). Determining the size of operational 
land is challenging due to poor land records, family types, absentee landlordism, and other 
tenure issues. Indeed, it is virtually impossible to include all contingencies in a single definition. 
In developing countries, smallholders that rely mainly on family labour are the backbone of 
agricultural production (Fan, Brzeska, Keyzer, & Halsema, 2013). Table 1.1 shows various 
research studies that use operational land to define smallholder farmers. As the table 
indicates their definitions vary widely. 
Table 1.1 Categorisation of different farm sizes for smallholder farmers 
Authors & Year Country/Region Smallholder Farmer 
Group  
Ferris et al. (2014) Various African countries 1-2 Hc 
Sitko and Jayne (2014) Zambia  0.1-4.99 Hc 
Lowder, Skoet, and Raney 
(2016) 
World data  less than 2 Hc 
Dhillon, Singh, and Dhillon 
(2006) 
Punjab India  0-5 Hc 
Jagwe (2011) Burundi, democratic of Congo and 
Rwanda 
Less than 10 Hc 
 
Besides, the importance of smallholder farming in the livelihood of the rural population has 
been referenced empirically by various agribusiness researchers. In Kenya, smallholder 
farmers contribute 75% of the total agriculture production and 50% of the total market output 
(Omiti et al., 2007). Lowder et al. (2016) conducted a study using agricultural census data. 
They found that globally, 570 million farms are operated by smallholders. In short, they 
demonstrate that smallholder farms/cultivate 75% of the world’s agricultural land. The study 
also discovered that in most low and lower-middle-income countries (for those that had data 
available from the 1960s to the early 2000s), operational landholding size is decreasing. In 
contrast, during this same period, average farm sizes increased in some upper-middle-income 
countries, and nearly all high-income countries. For example, in Guatemala, the farmers 
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supplying institutional channels had larger farms (9.3 ha) and cultivated areas (4.6 ha), 
compared to those supplying traditional markets (7.8 ha and 2.5 ha, respectively) (Hernández, 
Reardon, & Berdegué, 2007). In Kenya and Zambia, the average land holdings in the small farm 
sector range from between 2.5 and 3.0 hectares, while in Rwanda and Ethiopia, they are only 
approximately one hectare. In short, farm size figures mask significant variations (Jayne et al., 
2005).  
In the current study region (Punjab, India), farmers are categorised based on land-owning 
status. For example, Dhillon et al. (2006) followed by Vatta and Sidhu (2010) categorise 
farmers in the following way: 1. Landless: no land in the farmer’s name, 2. marginal: less than 
1 ha, 3. small: 1-2 ha, 4. Semi-medium: 2-4 ha, 5. Medium: 4-6ha, 6. large: above 6 ha. Similarly 
Singh and Singla (2011), use acres as a parameter to categorise farmers as small (2.5 to 5 acres) 
semi-medium (5 to 10 acres) medium (10 to 25 acres) and large (above 25 acres). Sidhu (2016) 
study on marketing systems and agricultural development in the Punjab region, defines small 
as up to average 2.5, medium up average to 5.5 and large 5.5 and above in hectares. Most 
recently, Chandrasekhara Rao and Bathla (2016, p. 211) consider three operational land 
categories in their comparative study of institutional and traditional markets in India; small (0-
5 acres), medium (5.1-10 acres) and large (above 10 acres). After considering the above 
reviews and the geographic conditions of the study area, this research defines smallholders as 
those who own 1-5 hectares of land or less.  
1.3 Research problem 
Growing high-value crops, especially FFV, is a feasible way to improve agricultural 
productivity, raise farmers’ income and absorb agricultural surplus labour in rural areas 
(Barrett, 2008; Fenwick & Lyne, 1999; Jayne et al., 2005; Louw et al., 2007; Weatherspoon et 
al., 2001; Weatherspoon & Reardon, 2003). Despite the emergence of institutional channels 
for FFV markets in developing countries, the availability of data and analyses of their 
magnitude and impact on smallholder’s fresh produce growers are still at an early stage. The 
heterogeneity of FFV growers and their participation in viable markets are continuing issues 
for developing countries.  
Indeed, the question of smallholders’ market participation has been discussed by various 
researchers in the context of different demographics and food commodities in developing 
countries and finds that smallholder farmers face significant challenges for entering 
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institutional channels. (Alene et al., 2008; De Janvry, Fafchamps, & Sadoulet, 1991; Fafchamps, 
1992). Agribusiness literature contends that participating in institutional channels increases 
farmers’ economic viability and their income (Miyata et al., 2009; Neven et al., 2009). In 
general, there are two significant determinants of market participation; 1. incentives 
associated with participating in institutional channels, and 2. smallholders’ ability to meet 
institutional channel requirements related to quality, quantity, and food safety (Reardon et al. 
(2009). 
From an incentive point of view, previous research suggests that participation in institutional 
channels results in smallholders receiving a higher net premium price (Boughton et al., 2007). 
Likewise, Reardon et al. (2009) report that farmers who supply institutional channels are paid 
higher prices compared to those who supply products to wholesalers in traditional spot 
markets. Similarly, Neven et al. (2009) report that institutional channels pay farmers 10-20% 
more than what they usually receive in traditional markets in Kenya. Further, Blandon et al. 
(2009) find that nearly 60% of smallholder farmers supplying institutional channels were paid 
higher prices vis-à-vis spot markets in Honduras. Schipmann and Qaim (2011) also find that 
institutional channels in Thailand paid smallholder farmers (those selling sweet peppers) a 
higher price. 
Nevertheless, previous studies show that farmers who supply institutional channels incur 
higher production costs associated with maintaining the quality, quantity, and post-harvest 
viability of their products (Fischer & Qaim, 2012). There is a much higher rate of rejection in 
institutional channels. Smallholder farmers must consider these risks before deciding to sell 
their produce through institution markets. Blandon et al. (2009) reveal that the perceived risk 
of low quality and high rejection rates significantly negatively influence smallholders’ 
decisions to supply institutional chains in Honduras. Smallholders also consider the 
transaction cost of marketing, including logistics and communication, in their decision to 
participate in these channels (Rao & Qaim, 2011). The distance to the marketplace is also a 
significant factor in determining farmers’ decisions to participate in these channels. Miyata et 
al. (2009) note that distance to the marketplace strongly influences farmers’ decision to 
participate in institutional channels. Relatedly, access to the road network is also a significant 
variable determining farmers’ participation in these channels (Rao & Qaim, 2011). 
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Similarly, smallholders’ capacity (scale) to supply institutional channels play a vital role in 
participating in these channels. Smallholders first must consider their human capital assets 
before agreeing to participate in these channels. For example, the age of household head, the 
number of family members participating/engaged in farm activities, and their levels of 
education, their farming experience, and off-farm income are some of the human capital 
assets which determine smallholders’ ability to fulfil the conditions laid out by institutional 
channels (Rao & Qaim, 2011). Along with human capital assets, smallholders’ ability to fulfil 
the channel’s requirements related to physical farm assets is also a consideration. For 
example, farm ownership, farm size, farm machinery, access to irrigation, are a few of the 
physical assets that reflect a farmer’s capacity to supply institutional channels. A lack of access 
to these physical farm assets contributes significantly to the fresh produce farmers’ failure 
and/or reluctance to participate and receive higher returns (Barrett, 2008; Burke, 2009). 
Indeed, the literature suggests that farmers with more physical farm assets have greater 
access to institutional channels. In Kenya, institutional channel farms are, on average, five 
times larger in overall farm size than traditional channel farms (9–18 ha vs 1.6–2.4 ha per farm 
depending on the crop) (Neven et al., 2009). Further, in India, Singh (2008) asserts that 85% 
of farmers are small or marginal landholders and are widely excluded from institutional 
channels. Furthermore, institutional channels (supermarkets) source 60% to 70% of their 
procurement needs from wholesale markets rather than directly with smallholder farmers. 
Dhillon et al. (2006) study of contract farming in Punjab found that medium (up to 10 acres) 
and large farmers (more than 15 acres) participate more in institutional channels as opposed 
to smallholders (0-5 acres). The above discussion reflects the importance of the empirical 
study on smallholders who are generally ‘locked out’ of participating in institutional channels. 
Other factors that enhance smallholders’ capacity to supply these channels, including 
membership in various institutions and participation in collective capital schemes, such as 
having shared agricultural assets (Reardon et al., 2009). Interestingly previous studies on 
collective action and market participation have found that these factors help smallholders 
achieve lower per-unit transaction costs so that they can indeed supply institutional channels 
(Hellin et al., 2009; Markelova et al., 2009). 
Although various studies have investigated transformations in food systems in developing 
countries and the emergence of institutional channels and their impact on farmers, a gap 
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remains, specifically, what factors drive smallholders to participate in these channels? The 
current study is significant because much of the extant research sees fresh produce farmers 
as a homogeneous group and does not fully consider their differences. This is necessary to 
understand their specific problems and design effective solutions. Furthermore, the lack of 
empirical survey-based studies on factors that hinder or facilitate market participation needs 
addressing to enhance our overall understanding of the phenomenon. In line with 
agribusiness literature, this research outlines, from the smallholders’ perspective, what drives 
participation in institutional channels vis-à-vis traditional channels in developing countries. It 
aims to provide recommendations designed to ensure better economic viability for 
smallholder farmers. In particular, the current study considers farmers’ incentives, risk factors, 
and capacities to participate in institutional channels. 
1.4 Study objectives 
Research objectives for the current study focus on what factors smallholders consider when 
deciding to participate in institutional channels, and as well as the economic rationale for 
doing so. The sections above have highlighted various factors related to changes in consumer 
preferences, transitioning food systems, different procurement practices, agribusiness 
markets, and barriers to entry for smallholder farmers. Keeping these in mind, this study has 
formulated the following primary research objectives: 
1. Identify the factors that influence market participation of FFV growers in 
institutional channels. The context is the state of Punjab (India). 
2. Identify which mode of market engagement is more economically viable for 
FFV growers. 
3. To determine the role of collective action on the market participation of FFV 
growers in institutional channels. 
4. Provide recommendations to enhance market participation and maximise the 
returns for FFV growers. 
1.5 Research contributions  
This research makes two major contributions. First, the current study empirically supports the 
assumptions of New Institutional Economics (NIE). This study finds that vertical coordination 
helps smallholders to increase their economic viability and access allied agricultural services. 
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Smallholders are better off financially contracting with institutional channels, especially food 
processing firms. Theoretically, asset specificity, uncertainty, and frequency attributes of 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) motivate smallholders to prefer to sell to institutional 
channels when they have an opportunity to obtain an assured price and gain access to 
technical assistance and input support. 
Additionally, this study also finds that the collective action assumptions are only partially met. 
Interestingly, the farmer's membership of cooperatives is significant for market participation 
in institutional channels; the experience with cooperatives over the years was found not to be 
significant. Even though the collective action by farmers offers limited services, the current 
study shows that collective action by farmer groups positively supports smallholders’ 
participation in institutional channels. The study also finds that production services (inputs 
and credit) have the highest impact and are the most popular in terms of services offered by 
cooperatives. Further, collective action, even informal farmer groups based on socio-religious 
influence, should also be considered. Indeed, the findings show that smallholders are socially 
and religiously connected and that this collective solidarity helps them to participate in 
institutional channels. 
Additional empirical results suggest that various factors impact on a farmers’ ability to 
participate in institutional channels. These factors include; the level of education, the area 
under FFV production, off-farm income, assured price through contract farming, proximity to 
market, membership in cooperatives, formal sources of credit, and technical agricultural 
support. Similar to other results, this research suggests that higher levels of education are 
essential for smallholder farmers to capitalise on changes to the food systems. Thus 
policymakers must focus on the provision of education and technical assistance to enable 
farmers to adopt new technology and emerging/new changing business models. Also, there is 
a need to enhance the capacity of the food processing sector. This needs to occur at the 
government level and will create off-farm job opportunities for smallholders, which is 
significant for their participation in institutional channels. 
The various factors associated with the production and marketing of FFV, such as; uncertainty, 
asset-specific investment, and frequency, search costs, negotiating, and monitoring supply 
chain partners, all involve various costs. The current study suggests that smallholders are more 
likely to participate in institutional channels if they are offered contracts with guaranteed 
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prices. The current study suggests policymakers to conceptualise the impact of current and 
future trends in the organisation of food systems to identify the incentives, opportunities and 
constraints they pose, now and in the future, from the smallholders’ perspectives.  Finally, the 
need for new generation cooperatives that provide marketing services along with their credit 
and input supply will enable farmers to participate in institutional channels and ultimately 
improve their livelihoods. 
1.6 Thesis structure  
This thesis is organised into eight chapters. While the first chapter has briefly described the 
research problem, background and objectives, the second chapter outlines the study’s 
theoretical perspective and provides a review of the relevant literature. More specifically, it 
explains the NIE framework using Transaction Cost( TCE) and Collective Action (CA) theories. 
The third chapter establishes the context and motivation for conducting this research. This 
chapter discusses the driving factors of changing food systems and the emergence of new 
markets in developing economies. It also elaborates on the procurement drivers in 
institutional channels and the different modes of market engagement. Chapter 4 provides an 
overview of the geographic scope of the study and explains the research framework and 
hypotheses development.  
The fifth chapter describes the research philosophy, research design, the process of survey 
formulation, the data collection and analytical methods. It also explains the sample selection, 
techniques, the survey protocol and the statistical tests (ANOVA and mean difference) used 
to analyse the data. The sixth chapter provides an overview of the results, a description of 
agribusiness in the sampled region such as the FFV growers’ socio-economic characteristics, 
their human capital and physical farm assets. The chapter also includes the testing of the 
research hypotheses and summarises the results. The seventh chapter discusses the research 
objectives in relation to the NIE framework and agribusiness literature. It also provides 
detailed recommendations for policymakers to enhance market participation and maximise 
FFV growers’ returns. The eighth and final chapter summarises the research findings, provides 
suggestions for future research and outlines the study’s contributions to theory and policy. 
1.7. Chapter summary  
This chapter has established the study’s background and has outlined the research problem. 
It has explained how in developing countries, agribusiness systems are undergoing a process 
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of transition, from wholesale spot markets to coordinated institutional channels. This 
transitional phase has been impacting the economic viability and livelihood of primary 
producers, especially smallholders who grow fresh fruits and vegetables. The chapter has 
outlined the challenges and opportunities for smallholder farmers in relation to their 
participation in institutional channels using New Institutional Economics (NIE), which include 
Transaction Cost (TCE) and Collective Action (CA) theory.  
This chapter has also provided definitions for key terms using the agribusiness literature such 
as smallholders and market participation. It has also critically examined the research problem 
and different determinants of smallholder farmers’ participation in institutional channels in 
order to establish a context for the study’s research objectives. Finally, the chapter has 





Theoretical framework and literature review 
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter one introduced the background, definitions of terminology, research problem, and 
outlined the current study’s objectives. It discussed how FFV markets in developing countries 
are transforming from subsistence farming to commercial and explained how the evolution of 
institutional channels had added costs at different stages of the supply chain. This chapter 
introduces the theoretical foundation of the thesis which is used to explain actor behaviour 
and the smallholders' role in business transactions 
New Institutional Economics (NIE) provides a way to examine dyadic and actor relationships 
such as between smallholders and other actors in agribusiness markets. The NIE framework 
(section 2.2) provides insights into transaction problems among supply chain partners. These 
connections may range from arm’s length transactions to vertically integrated ones. The NIE 
approach is considered an appropriate theoretical framework due to factors associated with 
FFV production and marketing such as; market uncertainty, asset-specific investments, 
opportunism, frequency of searching, negotiating, and monitoring supply chain partners, all 
involving transaction costs. Key theories within NIE is that of Transaction Costs Economics 
(TCE) and Collective Actions (CA). 
While TCE focus on different supply chain relationships and appropriate governance 
arrangements gave different levels of asset specificity and uncertainty, CA theory discusses 
potential solutions for combating the challenges mentioned above by invoking collaborative 
forms of governance. CA theory suggests institutional arrangements in terms of collective 
groups, help smallholders reduce their high transaction costs, and meet institutional channel 
requirements. 
2.2  Theoretical approaches and empirical evidence 
Fresh produce agriculture in developing countries has been transforming from subsistence to 
commercial over time, and the evolution towards institutional channels has added costs and 
barriers into multiple stages of the supply chain (Reardon & Timmer, 2007). In agribusiness, 
when transaction costs increase as a result of the buyer/supplier relationship, smallholders 
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should avoid business transactions despite the potential of gain for both parties (Alene et al., 
2008). The agribusiness literature suggests that collective action provides one way to lower 
transaction costs. The NIE framework provides a way to understand complicated business 
transactions, such as the relationships between small FFV farmers and institutional supply 
chains. As it is especially interested in the different governance relationships, from arm’s 
length to vertical integration, the NIE framework also provides insight into the transaction and 
relational problems among supply chain partners. We thus examine Transaction Cost 
Economics and the Collective Action frameworks to gain insight into smallholders’ 
participation, or not, in higher-order agribusiness markets. 
 Transaction Costs 
Transaction costs are a key feature of agribusiness markets. TCE has been widely applied to 
agribusiness research (Bhattarai, Lyne, & Martin, 2015b; Blandon, 2006; Key & Runsten, 1999; 
Pingali, Khwaja, & Meijer, 2005; Sartorius & Kirsten, 2007; Staatz, 1987). The TCE approach 
offers insight into the relationship between smallholders and institutional FFV markets. The 
theory has been used to understand these transactions as it can help shape fresh produce 
procurement modes. 
Spot markets             Specifications                   Relation based         Equity-based             Vertical  
                                        contract                               alliance                        alliance               integration  
                                                 
Characteristics of “indivisible hands” coordination  
 
Self-interest  
Short term relationship 
Opportunism  
Limited information sharing  
Flexibility                                                                                                               Mutual relationship  
Independence                                                                                                      long term relationship  
                                                                                                                                 Shared interest 
                                                                                                                                 Open information sharing 
                                                                                                                                 Stability    
                                                                                                                                  Interdependence  
                                                                                                
                                                                                                 Characteristic of managed coordination                              
Figure 2.1 Exchange quantum of transactions in agribusiness   
Source: (Peterson et al., 2001) 
 
Figure 2.1 shows the exchange quantum in agribusiness transactions. The diagonal line 
represents the mix of invisible-hand and managed coordination characteristics found in each 
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of the five alternative strategies for market exchange, The area above the diagonal indicates 
the relative level of invisible-hand characteristics and the area below the diagonal indicates 
the relative level of managed characteristics. The exchange quantum in the figure reflects that 
Low-cost frequent transactions are best suited for market exchanges, while less frequent, 
more expensive with higher levels of specificity are best transacted in-house through vertical 
integration. Thus, TCE proposes a range of governance arrangements that start with arms-
length to vertical integration as the exchange relationship range. Williamson (1996) later 
discussed ‘hybrid’ type relationships that are equivalent to high trust partnership type 
relationships. 
Coase (1937) introduced transaction costs into economic analysis. These costs include; the 
costs associated with information and the search for supply partners, the bureaucratic cost of 
maintaining a purchasing office, screening and monitoring costs by third-party arrangements, 
and the cost of negotiation, coordination and enforcement of contracts. Considering Coase’s 
work, Hobbs (1996) further divided transaction costs into information, cost into the 
negotiation, cost into control and monitoring, and cost of adaptation.  Table 2.1 shows that 
the transaction costs can be divided following the phase of the transaction. 
Table 2.1 Transaction costs in dependence of the phase of the transaction 
Transaction cost  Where they occur  
Costs of information Search and acquisition of information about potential transaction 
partners and their conditions 
Costs of negotiation Intensity and time consumption of negotiations, contract formulation 
and reach an agreement 
Costs of control and 
monitoring  
Ensuring of compliance of agreed dates, quality, quantity, price and 
eventually confidentiality 
Cost of adaptation  Enforcement of changes in dates, quality, quantity and price due to 
changing conditions during the agreement period 
Source: (Hobbs, 1996) 
Further, Williamson (1985, p. 52) considers three transaction-specific issues; asset specificity, 
uncertainty and frequency. From an agribusiness point of view, these three concepts can be 
understood as follows: 
• Asset specificity defines the degree to which assets can be redeployed for alternative 
use. Firms or individuals may be exposed to the risk of being taken advantage of if an 
investment is only relevant for that specific transaction. This is particularly true in the 
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producer-buyer relationship; producers often make transaction-specific investments 
(relationship-specific investments), thereby becoming exposed to what is called the 
‘hold-up’ problem. Here, one of the actors seeks to renegotiate the contract using the 
threat of losing the specific investment as leverage. Asset specificity refers to the 
producer’s investment decisions, such as the selection of inputs, allocation of land to 
specific crops, physical assets, knowledge, channels of distribution used in the 
transactions. 
• Uncertainty in the agribusiness context refers to incomplete information about prices 
and market signals that mean that farmers often do not gain optimal prices for their 
efforts and default to selling into traditional markets. This price and quality uncertainty 
means losses that forces producers to accept variable prices at harvest time.  From a 
buyers’ point of view, farmers may behave opportunistically by not supplying the 
specified quality or quantity. Hueth, Ligon, Wolf, and Wu (1999) suggest that in 
general, uncertainty regarding the condition of fresh produce leads to lower prices for 
producers. Specifically, environmental uncertainty and risk in agribusiness are closely 
associated with the form of production, yield, price variability and quality loss. The 
perishability of fresh produce and limited storage options mean that the supply chain 
is highly inelastic (Sexton & Zhang, 1996). 
• The frequency with which transactions occur can also affect the way that transactions 
are organised, and hence their associated transaction costs. Often the greater the 
frequency of the transaction, the better the parties understand each other, share 
information and trust develops. However, the seasonal nature of fresh produce 
production reduces the possibility of frequent transactions. Indeed, institutional 
chains demand high-quality standards with specific product and transaction 
characteristics. Institutional channels also require consistent and frequent deliveries 
of FFV products, which make spot markets inappropriate for them, especially in the 
case of some particular commodities where constant monitoring is needed (Boehlje, 
1999). The frequency of transactions forces buyers and suppliers to coordinate their 
activities to mitigate transaction costs. 
Transaction costs are also associated with several forms of selling to institutional channels. 
These transaction costs associated with FFV marketing can be classified into observable and 
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unobservable transaction costs (Ratnadiwakara, de Silva, & Soysa, 2008; Staal, Delgado, & 
Nicholson, 1997). Observable transaction costs include marketing costs, and distribution costs 
such as transport, handling, packaging, storage, and spoilage. Unobservable transaction costs 
include the cost of searching for information, bargaining and the enforcement of contracts. 
Ostrom, Schroeder, and Wynne (1993) think of business transaction costs in terms of ex-ante 
and ex-post costs. Ex-ante costs include searching for a partner, negotiating, and information 
costs, while ex-post costs cover governing, monitoring, sanctioning and renegotiation costs 
associated with conflict resolution. 
With the emergence of institutional channels, new transaction costs have arisen. For example, 
the food processing sector has been rapidly transforming agribusiness into a consumer-
oriented channel. As Reardon and Barrett (2000, p. 196) note, industrialisation involves the:  
“…(a) the rise in the food processing sector and the introduction of effective 
logistics and distribution (b) increased vertical coordination between agribusiness 
firms and growers (c) and significant changes in agribusiness technology and 
market structures”. 
Another viewpoint states:  
Agribusiness-industrialisation is the application of modern industrial 
manufacturing, production, procurement, distribution, and coordination concepts 
to the food and industrial production chain. (Boehlje, 1996, p. 30) 
The above definitions of agribusiness industrialisation highlight the adoption of business 
arrangements among different supply chain partners. Cook and Chaddad (2000) see 
agribusiness industrialisation as a rapidly growing globalised and industrialised system. In this 
system, various supply chain participants, such as primary producers, wholesalers, retailers 
and processors, all have specific roles to play.  
Institutional channels demand fresh produce that meets higher quality and other 
requirements. As such they tend to source their produce from reliable sources who can 
guarantee quantity, quality, frequency and timing (Blandon et al., 2009), incurring higher 
channel transaction costs of searching, negotiation and monitoring costs. The transaction 
costs associated with fulfilling these requirements imply a need to develop contractual 
relationships between fresh produce growers and institutional channels buyers to safeguard 
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the transaction (Barrett et al., 2012; Reardon & Berdegue, 2002). As a result of these 
requirements and new costs, it is primarily only larger farmers who are able to participate in 
institutional channels (Singh, 2008).  
Specifically, institutional channels have quality, food safety compliance, quantity, and 
frequency of supply requirements (Kirsten & Sartorius, 2002). The mode of procurement 
differs between the spot market and other forms, such as vertical coordination (Boehlje, 
1999). Buyers and sellers must share information according to the evolving needs and 
preferences of consumers. Therefore, smallholders clearly face high infrastructure and 
transaction costs to sell into institutional channels (Barrett, 2008; Jayne et al., 2005). 
Furthermore, the grading of products and contract terms used also causes uncertainty for 
smallholders in terms of estimating sales or how much product will be rejected. To participate 
in the institutional channels, smallholder needs specific investment that enables them to 
produce enough and meet the quality requirements. As a result of these high transaction 
costs, farmers often default to selling their produce into traditional markets because it has 
minimal requirements. Moreover, framers are generally familiar with the other actors 
(buyers/wholesalers) at their local markets (Dolan & Humphrey, 2000; Pingali et al., 2007; 
Vorley et al., 2009). In short, mounting transaction costs explain why some farmers forego the 
potential benefits of selling through institutional channels. 
Makhura (2001a) argues that transaction costs reflect the character of the market but 
embedded in the characteristics of individual households and their economic environment. 
Blandon (2006, p. 47) elaborates transaction costs relevant to smallholders’ participation of 
in institutional channels. Table 2.2 shows the transaction cost(s) associated with agribusiness 
transactions.  
Table 2.2 Transaction cost (s) in agribusiness 
 Uncertainty  Specific asset  Frequency  
1 Production risk  Irrigation  Month of production  
2 Quality risk  Greenhouse Frequency of delivery  
3 Information asymmetry  Collection and distribution centres   
4 Price volatility  Logistics   
5 Payment mechanism  Technical assistance   
6 Trust in relationship    
7 Grading    
Source: (Blandon, 2006).  
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 Collective action theory  
NIE contends that certain forms of collective institutions can help lower individual farmer’s 
transaction costs. Williamson (2004, p. 597) proposes four levels of societal analysis related 
to institutions. They are composed of formal rules, informal constraints, and the enforcement 
characteristics of both." The levels include: 1) informal institutions, such as customs, 
traditions, norms, and religions; 2) institutional environment, which includes formal rules of 
the game, such as property rights (political environment, judiciary, bureaucracy; 3)  
governance, which includes 'the play of the game,' specifically contractual arrangements;  and 
4) resource allocation and employment (prices and quantities; incentive alignment).  NIE, as 
the branch of economics that focuses on institutions, is particularly interested in levels two 
and three that include institutional environment and institutions of governance.  
NIE is a branch of economics that considers the rules of governance through the contracting 
game (institutions and the playing of games) (North, 1995). These institutions can be formal 
or informal or both. Formal institutions make rules, such as policy, judicial and bureaucratic 
rules, inherently related to collective action as people also form these rules. Informal 
institutions are typically formed by people living in one geographic location who create 
informal institutions, share common customs, traditions and often religious practices.   
The most common forms of collective action are through informal networks, cooperatives and 
strategic alliances (Blandon, 2006).  The ‘network’, form of collective actions, is known as a 
simple association of individuals who communicate with one another for mutual benefits 
(Holmlund & Fulton, 1999). These individuals establish informal network relationships and 
help each other in various circumstances, like times of natural disasters or when there is a 
need to share resources. Examples of informal institutions include family, friends, neighbours 
and religious bodies. Information sharing is central to economic activities, and as such, these 
informal networks share information and produce a shared pool of knowledge and 
experience. In terms of smallholders, they can establish a network among themselves to deal 
with institutional channels by sharing knowledge and expertise (Holmlund & Fulton, 1999).    
Farmers’ cooperatives are an example of a standard form of collective action. Gertler (2004, 
p. 18) defines cooperatives as “…associations of people voluntarily united to meet their 
everyday economic, social and cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly-owned and 
democratically-controlled enterprise”. Table 2.3 provides a summary of various studies on 
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collective action in different parts of the world and shows how cooperation among farmers 




Table 2.3 Review of collective action in agribusiness 
Author and Year Country/region Key Objective Method  Key findings  
(Barham & 
Chitemi, 2009) 
Tanzania Collective action initiatives to improve 




Groups with strong internal institutions, 
functioning group activities, good assets, gender 
composition of groups also affect group marketing 
performance 
(Devaux et al., 
2009) 
The Papa Andina Use of collective action to foster pro-
poor innovation in market chains 
Participatory 
method  
Collective action can reduce the transport costs in 
the final product value  




Collective action can benefit high-
value vegetables and maize producers 





Thailand, India, Syria and 
Vietnam 
How collective action can provide a 
more understanding of how market 
chains operate 
Case study  Collectively, farmers can utilise agrobiodiversity 
(Markelova et al., 
2009) 
Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, 
Uganda, Thailand, India, 
Syria, Vietnam, Tanzania   
How the collective impacts 
smallholders’ market access  
Review of case 
studies and 
literature 
Collective action can bring advantages for 
smallholder marketing, in terms of natural 
resource management 
(Narrod et al., 
2009) 
Kenya & India  How collective smallholders can 
achieve food safety requirements  
Case study 
method  
Collective actions can play a crucial role in creating 
a farm to fork linkages 
(Woldie & 
Nuppenau, 2008) 
Southern Ethiopia Memberships in cooperatives in 




Access to central-market price information and 
trade relationship enables farmers to stick to their 




At the organisational level, collective action can be defined as the activities of a group of 
people either directly on behalf of an organisation, or for the shared interest or benefit of 
group members (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2004). Collective action refers to actions taken by a 
group either directly or indirectly in pursuit of members’ perceived shared interest  (Sandler, 
1992). Collective action theory argues that where groups are formed, members jointly benefit. 
Levins (2001) emphasises that one of the key benefits of collective action is the strengthening 
of farmers’ collective arrangements to gain market power by pooling resources to negotiate 
with buyers of fresh produce, inputs and machinery suppliers.  
Institutional channels prefer to work with large farmers or groups who produce the best 
quality products at the lowest possible cost (Kirsten & Sartorius, 2002). Collective actions 
lower the barriers for smallholder farmers to participate in these channels. For example, 
Markelova et al. (2009) contend that collective action increases smallholders’ market access 
by reducing imperfections in the market. Collective actions lower the per-unit transaction cost 
buy significantly reducing the number of smallholder farmer exchanges. Collective action 
empowers smallholders to access information, meet quality standards enforced by 
institutional channels and gain scale economies by pooling financial and labour resources 
(Moustier, Tam, Anh, Binh, & Loc, 2010). Collective action also empowers smallholders to 
access new domestic or international markets, which would otherwise be out of reach 
(Devaux et al., 2009). It also enables smallholder farmers to comply with food safety 
standards, access information and market signals to become competitive (Minten et al., 2009; 
Vorley et al., 2009).  
Conversely, in many cases, the formation of collective farmer organisations also adds 
additional transaction costs in the form of subscription fees for smallholders that many find 
they can not afford. These additional fees may impede or discourage farmers from joining 
collective groups (Stockbridge, Dorward, Kydd, Morrison, & Poole, 2003). Some have reported 
that in the case of staple commodities the supply chains usually have low transaction costs 
anyway, and the reductions gained by collective action and farmer organisations do not 
compensate for their high subscription fees (Berdegué Sacristán, 2001). 
The above discussion provides an insight into the use of collective action theory in the current 
study. The above review suggests that collective action can create economies of scale for 
smallholder farmers in the production and marketing of agribusiness produce. Also, the 
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farmers' group can achieve efficiencies through access to cheaper inputs, and collectively they 
can lower the marketing cost. The implementations of food safety standards, requirements of 
traceability, post-harvest cold storage, specific transportations are other issues hinder 
smallholders’ participation in institutional channels. With the collective actions and 
coordinated behaviour of groups towards shared goals, these hindrances can be lowered.   
2.3 NIE and the buyer-supplier relationships 
Supply chain relationships are vital for building and maintaining strong professional 
connections between buyers and suppliers (Baihaqi & Sohal, 2013). These connections are 
critical for perishable FFV product supply chains. Transaction cost economics focuses on the 
cost involved in making transactions, and how these costs are shaped the buyer-supplier 
relationship. Williamson (2004) discusses three generic modes of market engagement; arm’s-
length (spot transactions), hybrids and vertical integration.  
Referring back to Arm’s length transactions, these are a widely used method of procuring raw 
material from spot markets (Prajogo, Chowdhury, Yeung, & Cheng, 2012), especially in 
agribusiness. The traditional procurement systems involve buying through the spot market 
from food wholesalers. Usually, in arm’s-length transactions, farmers have low control over 
price, and transactions happen frequently and immediately (Chen, Sohal, & Prajogo, 2013). 
One key reason for these actions is that transaction cost barriers are a significant reason why 
resource-poor smallholders choose arm’s-length transactions in developing countries (De 
Janvry et al., 1991). While price and freshness are considered the key requirements in spot 
market transactions, Farmers often have no other options but to sell at the auction price. In 
other words, they have the ‘produce and then sell’ approach in spot market transactions. 
Reardon et al. (2009) consider arm's-length transacting to be a poor way of co-ordinating 
activity and transmitting market information between buyers and sellers. Agribusiness 
literature also discusses the contract farming model of market engagement in the context of 
smallholder farmers’ market participation in institutional channels (Barrett et al., 2012; 
Birthal, Joshi, & Gulati, 2005; Key & Runsten, 1999; Miyata et al., 2009; Sartorius & Kirsten, 
2007). While traditional markets usually operate using arm’s-length transactions, institutional 
channels focus on several alternative modes of exchange relationships with suppliers to 
procure FFV (Peterson et al., 2001).  
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Alternatives to arm’s length transactions, contract farming is another form of exchange 
relationship for the production and supply of agricultural produce. The essence of such 
contracts is that there is a commitment to provide a specific agricultural commodity (tomatoes 
for example), at a particular time, for a particular price and at a particular quantity, required 
by a known buyer. Further, contract farming involves a pre-agreed price, quality, quantity or 
acreage (minimum/ maximum) and time (Singh, 2009). As such, contract farming is a form of 
vertical coordination that falls in between spot markets and vertical integration through 
ownership. TCE suggests that because contracting involves costs, it is economically justifiable 
only when:   
• the buyer is a large firm (a processor, exporter, or supermarket chain), 
• significant quality variations characterise the product, perishability is technically tricky 
to produce, and has a high value-bulk ratio, 
• the destination market is willing to pay a premium for a specific product or production 
attributes that can be ensured only by high coordination between farmers and buyers, 
and, 
• the policy environment is conducive. 
The specific terms and conditions of the contract determine the share of benefits, costs, and 
risks of coordination between the parties. The contract should also include the timing of 
payments, price setting, extension and input provisions, quality and quantity, and dispute 
resolution information. Johal (2018) argues that contract farming allows farmers to produce 
high risk, high-value perishable crops that they would otherwise avoid due to price and 
overproduction risks. Contract farming also provides retailers and processing firms with some 
level of security compared to buying from open markets, and it also facilitates the 
development of trust over the longer term. 
Contract farming enables smallholder farmers to access critical inputs and extension services. 
Buyers will often provide quality seeds, inputs and pesticides at below-market prices, along 
with technical support and extension services as part of the contract (Singh, 2009). Often, 
smallholder farmers who participate in contract farming also have assured access to credit in 
advance from buyers (Swinnen, 2005). However, there are mixed views about contract 
farming as a mode of market engagement in developing countries. There is some evidence 
that smallholders are typically excluded from contract farming due to high unit transaction 
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costs (Pingali et al., 2005), and that institutional channels prefer large farmers due to their 
economies of scale. Agribusiness literature suggests that in general large companies procure 
fresh produce from larger farmers and not from smallholders due to significant variations in 
volume, quality and delivery (Berdegué et al., 2005; Pingali et al., 2005; Reardon et al., 2009).  
Apart from arm’s length and contracting out solutions, Macneil (1980) introduces another 
form of engagement based on trust and commitment in reciprocal transactions with the same 
buyer, otherwise known as Relational Exchange theory. In these types of arrangements, 
contracts may be present even in highly collaborative exchanges. If they are, they tend to be 
ignored, and the relationship develops more through trust and commitment until something 
goes wrong. If no contract is present, exchanges take place through verbal or ‘handshake’ 
agreements based on trust and reciprocity. These verbal contracts often prevail in developing 
countries where the legal framework is not mature or strong enough to enforce formal 
contracts by law. The dual marketing options of fresh produce (either sold in traditional 
markets as raw commodities or for processing at institutional channels), triggers parties to 
form verbal contracts rather than enter into a formal contract. It allows the seller to play-off 
both markets to get the better price, but this is highly detrimental to trust and commitment 
type long term relationships. In these more informal relationships, the trust and commitment 
of both parties are fundamental elements of this relationship and develop over the longer 
term, thus reducing transaction risks and costs. This collaboration between markets and 
suppliers (farmers) plays a vital role in traditional markets where farmers sell through 
commission agents who also provide farmers’ credit and inputs needs. 
In addition to the above discussion, agribusiness literature relevant to the impact of the NIE 
framework has been widely discussed by many authors examining different perspectives. One 
of these perspectives focuses on understanding the role of TCE and smallholder farmers’ 
limited market access (Holloway, Nicholson, Delgado, Staal, & Ehui, 2000; Kirsten & Sartorius, 
2002). The role of TCE on smallholder farmers market access has been established 
theoretically and empirically by Key and Runsten (1999) and Barrett (2008). Furthermore, 
agribusiness researchers have identified various endogenous and exogenous factors that 
affect the market selection of fresh produce growers in Asia, Africa and Latin America. 
Endogenous factors are related to farm and farmer characteristics; for example, resource 
endowments (social, physical, human, and financial capital), the dependency ratio, household 
size, and the household head’s age and gender (Von Braun & Kennedy, 1994). 
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Conversely, researchers have identified endogenous factors affecting market participation. 
These are; low-yielding environments, the lack of essential farm assets and high transaction 
costs that present obstacles for the integration of smallholders into the market economy 
(Omiti et al., 2007). Pingali et al. (2007) include household-specific factors that influence 
transaction costs such as social networks and human assets: that is, age, gender and 
education. The authors argue that the existence of social networks might offer smallholders 
opportunities in the form of scarce agricultural tools and machinery. Age, gender and 
education can impact on transaction costs in different ways. While the period in terms of past 
years in farming activities are relevant to farm experience, gender is related to better access 
to land and credit, whereas the level of education matters in reducing the cost of searching 
for information. The current study considers the theoretical components of TCE and CA 
theories as well as various endogenous factors affecting market participation of smallholders’ 
farmers into institutional channels.  
2.4 Chapter summary  
This chapter has examined the theoretical perspectives of the research approach. It has 
discussed Williamson’s (1975, 1979, 1985a) new institutional economics framework and 
collective action theory (Olson, 1965). These theories have been used to identify issues for 
fresh produce growers, in particular, hindrances and enablers for participation in Institutional 
channels. Indeed, the above discussion has outlined the relevance of NIE for the current study. 
Hence, when considering transaction cost economics, the following conclusions are drawn; 
• TCE, explains relations between buyers and sellers in terms of the cost of carrying out 
transactions, including finding a buyer, negotiating a price, delivering the commodity,  
and obtaining payment, as well as the risks associated with the transaction, including 
the risk of being cheated (Williamson, 2004).  
• The cost off carrying out a transaction can be considerable because of imperfect 
information, and sellers must spend time finding potential buyers and negotiating over 
the price. Often the seller has more information about the quality of the product, but 
the buyer has better information about the market demand. This information 
asymmetry prevents markets from operating efficiently.  
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• Limited ability to process information: Even if the buyer and seller had all the relevant 
information, they would not have the time or capacity to analyze it thoroughly, a 
problem sometimes called bounded rationality. 
• Dishonesty: The buyer and seller can never fully trust each other since each has some 
short-run incentive to misrepresent the truth and violate the terms of there 
agreement. It referred to as the risk of opportunistic behaviour.  
• Transaction-specific investments: The risk of opportunistic behaviour is even more 
significant when the buyer or seller must make investments that are only useful for 
carrying out a transaction with the other party because of assets specificity.  
•  Through collective action, smallholders can gain economies of scale, increase 
bargaining power and lower transaction costs associated with dealing with 
institutional channels. Logically, smallholder farmers are incentivised to choose the 
most appropriate market channel based on the lowest transaction cost for themselves. 
Collective action theory argues that when groups are formed, members jointly benefit. 
Levins (2001) emphasises that strengthening farmers, collective arrangements gain 
more significant market power by pooling their resources to negotiate with buyers of 
fresh produce, inputs and machinery suppliers.   
Having discussed the theoretical perspectives, the following chapter explains how 
agribusiness markets act in different regions. The chapter also discusses the operation of 
effective food systems, different market structures, procurement models, and the various 




Agribusiness markets and smallholder participation: A review of the 
literature 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 provides the theoretical perspectives necessary to assist in the understanding of 
the various processes and transformations occurring in FFV supply chains. It also helps explain 
how smallholder farmers overcome significant challenges to participate in institutional 
channels and increase their economic viability. This chapter outlines how agribusiness markets 
differ across regions and provide the context for this study. It reviews the research on effective 
food systems, market structures, procurement modes, and the constraints that influence 
smallholders’ participation in food supply chains.  
The functions of production and consumption of food are often geospatially separated. While 
production activities generally occur in rural areas, consumption primarily happens in urban 
areas. Agricultural marketing is the process that overcomes this separation, allowing produce 
to be moved from an area of surplus to one of need (Rapsomanikis, 2015). While food is a 
basic physiological need for the survival of all living entities, the volume of food consumed 
varies along with food types, such as cereals, meats, dairy, and vegetables. Affordability and 
availability contribute to these variations, as developed, developing and underdevelopment 
countries are characterised by different food choices and systems (Pingali, 2007). The 
following section describes the different food systems from around the globe and provides a 
context for the current study.  
3.2 Differences between food systems  
Food systems include all the processes and infrastructure involved in feeding a population. In 
terms of farming, it begins with planting and ends with harvesting. Further steps in food 
systems include processing, packaging, labelling, logistics, marketing, and sales to end 
consumers (McCullough et al., 2008). There are many different food systems around the 
world; in particular, different procurement models for fresh produce can characterise these 
systems. Ericksen (2008) describes a food system as a chain of activities from ‘farm to fork’ 
with particular emphasis on processing and marketing, and the multiple transformations of 
food that these systems entail. Maxwell and Slater (2003) describe food systems, according to 
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their model of a food’s lifespan from origin to plate, as either traditional or modern. 
McCullough et al. (2008) characterise food systems according to their country typology as 
either; traditional, structured/modernising or modern/integrated.  
Traditional food systems comprise a significant portion of agriculture in a country’s GDP 
where; the population is rural, the agricultural economy is traditional, and there are few 
opportunities for income outside agriculture. In traditional food systems, supply chains are 
typically short, and food does not travel far from their place of production (McCullough et al., 
2008, p. 11). Agribusiness transactions are primarily arm’s-length spot markets where farmers 
bear the costs associated with market imperfections, such as irregular charges by 
intermediaries (Maxwell & Slater, 2003). Agricultural growth reduces rural poverty by 
providing work for rural labour forces and via market linkages of traditional export 
commodities (McCullough et al., 2008). Traditional food systems are usually managed 
centrally by state-sponsored bodies and boards such as the Agricultural Produce Marketing 
Committee (APMC) in India (Singh, 2009) in an attempt to reduce the impact on farmers of 
market imperfections.  
In contrast, structured/modernising food systems comprise a moderate share of agriculture 
in the country’s total GDP (for example, between 10-30%). Here the population is moving to 
urban locations in varying degrees and the percentage of the workforce involved in agriculture 
varies considerably (anywhere from 15-50%) (McCullough et al., 2008). 
Structured/modernising food systems largely depend on the urbanisation of the rural 
population, and the rising income of the middle class. Structured food systems exist 
somewhere between traditional and industrialised economies (McCullough et al., 2008, p. 17). 
A feature of these systems is that the agricultural economy is quickly modernising, offering 
more diverse opportunities for the population in the processing industries and high-value 
crops in domestic markets. Agribusiness institutions have been transforming over time are 
usually still in a transitional state. India, China, Honduras, and Mexico are examples of 
economies that have, or are at a stage of transition, in becoming structured/modernising food 
systems (Blandon et al., 2009; Schwentesius & Gómez, 2002).    
In modern or integrated food systems, the agricultural contribution to the country’s GDP is 
low (usually less than 10%). The population is largely urbanised, and approximately only 15% 
of the workforce is involved in agriculture. In a modern agribusiness system, target customers 
 31 
include both domestic and international. Modern food systems create job opportunities for 
the rural population through value-added products (in food processing). These jobs create a 
middle-class urban population that is reliant on processed meals. These modern food systems 
also rely on machinery and benefit from economies of scale. Marketing and temperature-
controlled logistics provide additional flexibility in the value chain. Finally, modern food 
systems are characterised by differentiated products with short shelf-lives, flowing through 
well-coordinated value chains the provide end consumer value. Governments and the industry 
bodies set basic food safety and traceability standards which they must meet (Kinsey & 
Senauer, 1996). It is also proposed that these more advanced food systems, while delivering 
value to consumers, also facilitates higher returns to farmers/producers. Table 3.1 shows the 
characteristics of these three different food systems. 
Table 3.1 The characteristics of different agribusiness food systems  
Indicators  Traditional  Structured/ modernising Modern/integrated  
Agricultural 
share in GDP 
A high share of 
agriculture  
(more than 30%) 




Over 50% Between 15-50% Less than 15% 
Urbanisation  Rural  Mixed   Urbanised  
nature of the 
agricultural 
economy 







High % share of labour 
in manufacturing  
Agriculture’s 
role in poverty 
reduction   
Agricultural growth 
stimulates poverty 
reduction by providing 
market linkages   
High levels of opportunities 





Government regulations  Public/private partnership Regulatory frames 
 
Source: McCullough et al. (2008, p. 10) 
 
In traditional markets, agribusiness transformations are slow, and high-value institutional 
channels are rare. Moreover, their presence is limited to the rural areas, and long-life staple 
foods are a more significant part of their offerings compared to fresh produce. Table 3.2 
following explores the market indicators of different food systems.  
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Table 3.2 Trends in the food systems from primary producers to consumers  
Trends Traditional  Structured/modernising Industrialised  
Consumption  Growing awareness 
about dietary 
diversification  
Shift to ready to eat, 
processed food  
Higher value, 
processed food  
Structure of retail Spot market on a small 
scale  
The rising presence of 
supermarkets, but a low 
proportion of FFV  
Widespread 
supermarkets  
Value-adding   Some degree of 
processing industry  
Local and international 
food processors   
Large processing 
industry for domestic 
market and export   




partners   




Specialised wholesalers  
Production systems  Diversified, a low 
input system  
Intensive input use, 
specialisation of 
cropping systems  
More focus on 
conservation  
Food safety   No traceability  Traceability to some 
extent, private standards  
HACCP systems, 
private safety 




Relationships  Relationship rules  Contracts, ICT systems 
for efficient response   
Source:  McCullough et al. (2008) 
Table 3.2 highlights the transitioning trends of different food systems from farm to fork. 
Awareness about dietary diversification remains at an initial stage in the traditional food 
systems, and the retail structures rely on spot markets and on a small scale. There is a lack of 
traceability for FFV products, and buyer/supplier relationships rely on the informal reciprocity 
of repeated transactions (Cadilhon et al., 2006).   
In structured/modernising economies, farmers primarily produce for domestic markets. In 
these food systems, both subsistence and export-oriented agribusiness systems co-exist side-
by-side. Agribusiness literature notes that more urbanised economies, those in central and 
eastern European and Latin America (Mexico and Honduras) for example, have more 
significant opportunities for FFV marketing (Blandon et al., 2009; Schwentesius & Gómez, 
2002). Different models of procurement of fresh produce also coexist, either through 
government-regulated structured markets or institutional channels which rely on direct 
procurement through contracting. Indeed, due to rising urbanisation, international and 
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domestic food processors contribute to value-adding processed food in modernising 
economies.     
3.3 Driving factors of transition in agribusiness food systems 
At the macro level, several driving factors are responsible for changes in agribusiness systems. 
It is noted that; agribusiness industrialisation (Cook & Chaddad, 2000), changes in agribusiness 
technology (Saxowsky & Duncan, 1998), trade liberalisations (Pingali, 2007; Reardon et al., 
2003), rising urbanisation, the rising per-capita income of the middle class, changes in 
consumer preferences (Reardon & Hopkins, 2006), increased awareness of nutrition are 
considered the significant factors in these changes. Finally, changes in macroeconomic policies 
are all significant factors of food system transitions. The next section discusses each of these 
factors in turn.  
 Changes in agribusiness technology 
In modernising economies, farmers face challenges due to the distance and remoteness of the 
rural areas where they farm. Access to information and agribusiness technology is essential 
for facilitating inclusion in institutional channels. Rapid technological innovation and 
adaptation have transformed agribusiness food systems, but a lack of information technology 
often makes the transaction costs prohibitively high (Saxowsky & Duncan, 1998). The use of 
modern technology leads to higher yields, less post-harvest losses and products which are of 
a higher quality. Access to modern agribusiness technology means that fresh produce growers 
are able to grow high-value crops that meet processing standards (Reardon & Barrett, 2000). 
New information and communication technologies (ICT) enable supply chain partners to 
coordinate their activities even when remote from the decision-making point (Salin, 1998). 
These include various communication devices such as smartphones, radios, televisions, 
computers, and the internet. Mobile phones significantly reduce communication and 
information costs for the rural poor in developing countries. This not only provides new 
opportunities for rural farmers to obtain access to information on agricultural technologies 
but also to use ICTs in agrarian extension system (Aker, 2011). Along with hardware 
technology, software technology in terms of ios or android applications helped farmers to 
provide information about support regulatory compliance, equipment optimization, farming 
simulator games, information management, agronomy references, product tracking, pest 
identification, emissions accounting, or benchmarks for marketing compliance claims (Eichler 
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Inwood & Dale, 2019). In addition to it, new production and harvesting technologies, advanced 
irrigation systems and temperature-controlled logistics also provide new ways for FFV growers 
to enter institutional channels (Collins, 2006).   
 Trade liberalisation and globalisation 
The globalisation of agribusiness products has a significant impact on changing agribusiness 
systems. The globalisation of markets has increased the vertical coordination and mutual 
dependence among food supply chain partners for the production and distribution of food 
products globally. It has been enhanced with the adoption of structural adjustment 
programmes by various developing countries, characterised by an inflow of foreign direct 
investment, exchange of technology and information, technical assistance and the integration 
of agribusiness systems (Abbott, Boehlje, & Doering III, 2001). For example, in the early 1990s, 
India liberalised the market for foreign direct investment, resulting in an easing of regional 
trade barriers. This change created opportunities for international food supply chain retailers, 
as well as local agribusiness chains, to create and fill new gaps in the market (Reardon & 
Berdegue, 2002). 
While traditional food systems still dominate the procurement of FFV from traditional 
wholesale spot markets, trade liberalisation and globalisation have increased the 
opportunities for primary producers, particularly in terms of retail, value-adding and 
processing to engage in institutional channels (Reardon & Berdegue, 2002; Singh, 2009). 
 Changes in consumer preferences 
A significant issue in modern agribusiness is that of changing consumer preferences. Increases 
in per-capita income positively affect the disposable income of households in developing 
countries (Pingali, 2007). This extra income allows consumers to shift from staple foods to 
those with higher levels of nutrition, such as fresh produce and dairy products (Reardon & 
Barrett, 2000). Another factor responsible for changes in consumer preferences is the 
increased number of women in the workforce (Gulati et al., 2007). A reduction in the time 
available for cooking at home has resulted in increased demand for differentiated processed 
food products and ready-to-eat meals which have become increasingly popular in developing 
countries.  
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Besides, consumers are more concerned about what they are consuming as their awareness 
widens to include the origin of the food they are eating and concerns about food safety. The 
result of these changing consumption patterns, alongside increased food safety concerns, is 
an ideal setting for supermarkets to prosper using the more robust institutional channels 
(Reardon & Berdegue, 2002). Indeed, Pingali (2007) states that more structured economies, 
such as India, are moving away from staple foods as the growing demand for safer and 
differentiated food products cannot be satisfied using purely traditional markets. These 
products require a modern, integrated food system, that relies upon the development of 
institutional channels.  
 Government investment in extension services 
Government investment in the development of infrastructure plays a vital role in providing 
smallholders with a pathway to market access. Furthermore, a farmer’s attitude to risk 
determines the extent of their participation in modern food systems (Von Braun & Kennedy, 
1994). Government investment in research and innovation and the establishment of 
agricultural institutions/universities and extension centres in distant rural areas all enhance 
FFV’s investment and farmer’s risk-taking capacity (Minot & Ngigi, 2004). The government’s 
securing of access to irrigation through improved canal systems, improvements in 
temperature-controlled logistics and communication infrastructure; road access to rural 
markets, improved credit services, and other public goods such as better education, health, 
and sanitation services are significant contributors to the emergence of institutional 
agribusiness food systems (Pingali et al., 2007) 
 The urbanisation of the rural population 
The increasing urbanisation of the rural population negatively impacts the traditional food 
system. Wilkinson (2012) states that the size of the urban middle class determines the nature 
of retail markets. With increasing opportunities for employment in urban cities, landless and 
marginal rural farmers have been converting to urban labour in many developing countries 
(Singh, 2004). 
Conversely, the increasing number of women in the workforce has had a positive effect on 
changing food systems. The rising disposable income of the middle class, the emergence of 
convenience shopping and the availability of processed meals are factors that mean that food 
systems are moving away from traditional systems to new ready-to-eat meal options (Birthal 
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et al., 2005; Gehlhar & Regmi, 2005; Louw et al., 2007). Also, the household head’s 
opportunity cost is higher if they perform paid work other than cooking at home because 
he/she can invest that time in productive means  (Gulati et al., 2007). The next section of this 
chapter discusses agribusiness markets that dominate developing countries and their 
transition into modern food systems.  
3.4 Transitioning agribusiness markets and food systems  
Changes in food systems are related to market coordination, where agricultural inputs and 
food distribution systems are aligned with information, technology, logistic arrangements, 
and food safety standards (McCullough et al., 2008). Agribusiness products move through the 
supply chain, utilising different marketing channels. These channels can be categorised based 
on frequency, the type of products traded, the scale of transactions, the kind of marketing 
functions performed, and the types of consumers targeted. Channels can be distinguished 
from each other based on market intermediaries involved in moving the FFV products from 
farm to fork. The total length of the marketing channel depends on the size and location of 
the market, the nature of the FFV products and the consumer demand patterns (McCullough 
et al., 2008). The next section discusses different agribusiness marketing channels in 
developing countries  
 Traditional market channels  
As previously discussed, traditional markets are part of traditional food systems, characterised 
by the dominance of price-driven exchanges, unorganised supply chains involving several 
intermediaries and limited market infrastructure. There are various forms of traditional 
agribusiness markets for FFV products in developing countries. The agribusiness scholars have 
attempted to define the features of traditional markets, and one of the key features noted is 
that of government regulations. The effects of such regulation have been studied in Chile by 
Dirven and Faiguenbaum (2012), Agriculture produces marketing committee (APMC) in India 
by Singh (2012b), and agricultural marketing services (AMS) in Bhutan by Tobgay and 
McCullough (2008). Further, traditional markets can be categorised based on various 
marketing functions, such as the frequency with which they are held, the types of products 
traded, and the marketing functions performed (Singh, 2009). Considering factors, such as the 
nature of FFV products, production patterns and demographics, the current research divides 
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traditional agribusiness markets into two broad categories: wholesale markets and traders at 
the farm gate. These are described next.     
3.4.1.1  Wholesale markets  
In developing countries, food products reach the consumer through a complex network, 
involving production, assembly, sorting, reassembly, distribution and retail stages. The 
wholesale markets provide the linkage between the producer (farmer) and the retailer that 
enables farmers to sell their goods and traders to purchase them. Wholesalers assemble, 
grade and sort produce. They provide a connection between primary producers and 
supermarkets (Reardon & Berdegue, 2002). Specialised wholesalers conduct food safety 
checks and perform hazard analysis. They also meet supermarkets’ critical control point 
requirements. These are challenging in the case of traditional wholesalers, as they rely on size, 
colour and other outwardly observable FFV attributes (Berdegué et al., 2005). The wholesale 
markets are significant contributors to FFV procurement in developing countries. For example, 
in Chile, 65% of all FFV products are traded in traditional wholesale markets (Dirven & 
Faiguenbaum, 2012).   
Without wholesale markets and wholesaler agent, the retailer would need to purchase 
directly from farmers, that would involve completing many minor transactions with numerous 
smallholder farmers. Due to the existence of wholesale markets, the number of transactions 
are reduced, and the marketing process is simplified (Bathla, 2015). In India, wholesale 
markets can only be established with the permission of state governments. Each state has a 
State Agriculture Marketing Board (SAMB). These, in turn, form market (mandi) boards at the 
district level. In India, there are 6,983 wholesale agricultural produce markets and about 
22,000 primary rural markets. Out of these, 6,738 operate under the APMC act (McCullough 
et al., 2008).  
At wholesale markets, FFV prices are determined via open auctions run by registered 
commission agents. In this marketing model, the farmer has no choice but to sell his/her 
produce at the current or spot price. In the wholesale market, the price of goods can vary 
widely. Due to the perishable nature of FFV, farmers only have a short period between 
harvesting and selling (Singh, 2009). Consequently, farmers who use this process to sell their 
goods do not pay much attention to what happens to the product once it leaves the farm gate. 
This process is different from new agricultural practices where farmers can see further down 
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the value chain and consumers who want to know where their products come from (Boehlje, 
1999).   
FFV production involves both production and marketing risks. The perishability of fresh fruits 
and vegetables means that there is a very limited opportunity (time and space) for producers 
to store and transport their products, compared with other staple food products. Without 
temperature-controlled logistics, producers are vulnerable and must accept whatever price is 
offered in the traditional markets (McCullough et al., 2008). Also, unlike the intensely graded 
food systems, the traditional markets are comprised of fragmented and temporary links. In 
short, they are characterised by a general lack of integration between the partners. Traditional 
markets also lack adequate infrastructure and/or facilities such as water and sanitation 
(Fonseca & Njie, 2014). Post-harvest losses are much higher in traditional wholesale markets 
(Aulakh & Regmi, 2014; Kader, 2004). Furthermore, food safety and traceability are 
compromised or non-existent in traditional markets (Berdegué et al., 2005; Bertolini, 
Bevilacqua, & Massini, 2006; Henson, Masakure, & Boselie, 2005).  
On a positive note, traditional spot markets have advantages for the consumers in terms of 
price, freshness and localisation. However, to obtain better economic returns, fresh produce 
growers need to have greater levels of production and better marketing skills in order to 
participate in institutional channels 
3.4.1.2  Traders at the farm gate  
In developing countries, the second primary type of traditional market is that of selling 
products at the farm gate. In this supply chain, traders, either licenced wholesalers or 
commission agents, procure FFV products from producers at the farm gate. This market 
channel is common in less developed and developing economies due to the predominance of 
price-driven, wholesale push markets, where farmers sell in open auctions that have inherent 
price volatility.  It may be one reason why smallholders in Bhutan prefer to sell FFV directly to 
traders at the farm gate where selling to traders at the farm gate proportionately contributed 
between 28% to 89% in the four regions of the country (Tobgay & McCullough, 2008).   
Another reason for the popularity of this channel is that many smallholders are in isolated 
rural areas where there are poor roading and general infrastructure. As Tobgay and 
McCullough (2008) found in Bhutan, many farmers lack access to cold storage. Likewise, 
Fafchamps and Hill (2005) note that in Uganda, most farmers do not have access to 
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temperature-controlled logistics. Other reasons for selling at the farm gate include, failing to 
meet quality standards, high rates of rejection and delayed payments by procurement firms 
(Key & Runsten, 1999). Other scholars have found that eligibility conditions related to 
minimum land holdings imposed by buyers to mitigate uncertainty and frequency of raw 
material also contribute to this phenomenon (Kirsten & Sartorius, 2002). High transaction 
costs (transport, packing and loading/unloading costs) borne by farmers who sell at traditional 
wholesale markets, means that selling at the farm gate may be a more attractive option 
(Fafchamps & Hill, 2005).  
In India, APMC regulated wholesale markets and traders at the farm gate were significant 
marketing channels for the procurement of potato crops (Singh, 2008). Farmers sell to traders 
at farm gate because the transaction costs of transport, packing and loading are borne by 
traders who recover their damages by offering a lower price than the prevailing rate at the 
wholesale market. Despite a lack of formal agreements between traders and FFV growers, 
these supply chains work due to trust built up over years of trading. Selling at the farm gate 
often pays less; however, for farmers, it may be the only option for those who cannot afford 
to transport their crop to the market. The next section discusses agribusiness marketing 
channels that fall under the category of newly emerging institutional channels.  
 Institutional channels  
Institutional channels rely primarily on vertical coordination to procure differentiated 
products for food processing. As there are high transaction costs associated with the 
procurement of differentiated products from traditional spot markets, institutional channels 
impose food quality and safety standards, that cost smallholder. In response, fresh produce 
growers use vertical coordination to deal with institutional channels. Indeed, Reardon and 
Barrett (2000) highlight the need for vertical coordination among supply chain partners as 
there are substantial spillover of the benefits for global agribusiness markets in developing 
countries. In the current research, supermarkets, including domestic retail chains and value-
adding food processors, are identified as the primary institutional channels.  
3.4.2.1  Supermarkets and domestic retail chains  
While there are various institutional channels, supermarkets are the most visible and 
important. Supermarkets have a smaller number of intermediaries and procure goods through 
several logistically efficient networks (Gulati et al., 2007). The growth of supermarkets in 
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different regions across many developing countries has been documented by various 
researchers (Hernández et al., 2007; Reardon & Berdegue, 2002; Reardon et al., 2003).  
Supermarkets offer consumers competitive prices and the convenience of being able to 
purchase different food products under one roof. In developing countries, there are numerous 
variations of retail food stores that are considered to fall within the supermarket category. 
Stores range from multi-product retailers with two to three cash registers to large 
hypermarkets with areas covering approximately 150m2 or more (Singh, 2012c). Along with 
internationally owned chains, in developing countries, there are also domestically owned 
retail chains. In India, many farmers participate in these new domestic retail chains without 
even knowing it. These domestic retail chains procure some of their fresh produce from the 
traditional wholesale markets (Singh, 2008), while others have verbal contracts with farmers. 
In addition to purchasing directly from farmers, supermarkets procure FFV from other 
suppliers, including dedicated wholesalers, specialised traders, and large contracted farmers 
(Neven et al., 2009; Rao, Brümmer, & Qaim, 2012; Rao & Qaim, 2011). These methods provide 
supermarkets with a way to gain scale economies.  
Conversely, in some developing countries, supermarkets have micro-contracts with 
smallholders that, combined with extensive farm assistance and supervision programmes, 
help them to integrate into institutional channels (Minten et al., 2009). More recently, 
supermarkets are turning towards direct procurement from primary producers where 
consumers are willing to pay more for fresh, local, seasonal FFV. Some studies reveal that 
traditional wholesale markets in developing countries still sell FFV and bulk commodities from 
smallholders with a marketable surplus (Chen & Stamoulis, 2008).  
Agribusiness markets in developing countries are passing through a dualistic transitional 
phase. On the one hand, supermarkets are increasing in numbers in big cities; at the same 
time, the rural population still relies on the traditional retail sector of ‘mum and pop’ shops 
and street vendors. It is necessary then to discuss the fresh produce growers’ mode of 
engagement and how they engage with markets in this changing agribusiness environment.   
 3.4.2.2. Food processing 
The second form of institutional channels is the food processing sector. Food processors are 
known for transforming farm outputs into products that meet consumer demands, for 
example, ready-to-eat meals. Examples of food processing include the preservation of fresh 
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fruits and vegetables, either by freezing, puréeing or juicing, the milling of grains and the 
making of confectionery, potato chips, French fries and bakery products (Chen & Stamoulis, 
2008). Processed food products are achieving a more significant value share in global 
agribusiness compared to raw FFV products (Wilkinson, 2012). Yet, the expansion of the food 
processing sector is at a much slower pace in developing countries when compared to higher-
income developed countries (Alexandratos & Bruinsma, 2012). However, food processing is 
an essential process in a structured/modernising food system. On the one hand, it creates jobs 
for landless and marginal farmers; on the other hand, it fulfils the demands and requirements 
of urban consumers. Food processing also helps reduce post-harvest losses and increase food 
availability by increasing the shelf life of fresh food products that cannot be consumed 
immediately (Dani, 2015). 
Food processors can be classified as either domestic or international entities according to their 
size and processing capacity. Small processors face challenges due to the high stocking fees 
charged by the more prominent retailers (Chen & Stamoulis, 2008). Further, a significant 
challenge for food processing is obtaining a ready supply of raw materials and maintaining 
links with downstream supply chain entities. As such food processors invest in technology and 
infrastructure and adopt new procurement practices to ensure they have adequate raw 
materials (Singh, 2009).  
Some scholars argue that quality standards for raw FFV materials used by processing firms are 
not as strict as those for supermarket chains (Fafchamps, Hill, & Minten, 2008). With lower 
compliance costs and less seasonal price variability, scale economies are less prohibitive. Thus 
food processing channels may be more accessible to smallholders. For example, Narrod, Roy, 
Avendano, and Okello (2008) report that quality standards are much lower in the case of 
canned green beans compared to fresh green beans in Kenya. Figure 3.1 (following) shows an 
example of the predominant models of agribusiness supply chains prevailing in India.  
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Figure 3.1  A model of agribusiness supply chains in the context of developing countries 
Source: Mishra, Mahesh, and Kolluru (2016) 
In the above figure, Model 1 represents the generic traditional agribusiness supply chains, 
where FFV products move through five stages before they reach end consumers. These five 
stages do not add much if any, the value in the supply chain. Instead, each stage adds to the 
cost of goods in the form of profit margins, inventory costs and movement of goods. This 
model highlights the numerous non-value-added stages in the supply chain that results in, 
lower returns for the farmer, inefficiencies in the supply chain, a higher percentage of food 
waste, and an end price that is passed on to the consumer.  
Model 2 represents the semi-institutional agribusiness supply chain model, which is a more 
contemporary model. In this model, many of the non-value-adding stages are eliminated 
before the product reaches the end consumer. The significant benefits of this model are 
reductions in food losses, the FFV products reach quicker to the consumers and they receive 
better quality products.   
Model 3 is an example of an institutional agribusiness supply chain model, where institutional, 
retail chains and food processors directly procure FFV products from farmers and deliver to 
end-users. While there is a minimal scope for intermediaries in the transactions between 
farmers and institutional buyers, quality, grading and traceability issues pose some barriers 
for primary producers wanting to participate in these channels (Henson et al., 2005). Model 3 
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is common in industrialised economies and influences the agribusiness markets in developing 
countries. This model is an institutional arrangement, which offers farmers high returns and 
lower costs (Schipmann & Qaim, 2011).  
3.5 Impact of the transitioning of food systems on market channels 
The immediate effect of the transition of food systems in developing countries was the 
occurrence of shared information for buyers and suppliers in agribusiness markets (Blandon, 
2006; Boehlje, 1999; Young & Hobbs, 2002). Yet, the most significant impact of these 
transformations in developing countries are the changes to preexisting procurement patterns. 
Table 3.3 shows the characteristics of traditional and institutional channels.                                                 
 Table 3.3 Impact of the food systems transitioning on market channels 
Source: (Blandon, 2006; Fulton, 2001; Maxwell & Slater, 2003) 
With the emergence of supermarkets and new food processing practices in developing 
countries, there is a notable shift in the procurement of FFV from primary producers (Blandon 
et al., 2009). These changes have impacted the existing procurement system in three 
significant ways (Reardon & Berdegue, 2002); 
• The introduction of private standards for quality and food safety. The private standards 
are enforced to assure quality and safety in a competitive market. Consumers expect 
Characteristics  Traditional channels Institutional channels 
Products types Bulk production; Similar 
products/minimal value-adding in 
raw commodities 
Market-driven differentiated 
products/food processing  
Commodities 
structure  
Fragmented supply chain; Spot 
markets 
Vertical coordination; collaboration; 
integrated supply chain   
Farmers’ interface  Farms carry out many activities Specialisation; separation of 
production stages 
Marketing  Many middlemen  Direct procurement by the lead firm 
or processor or marketing firm 
Type of risk  Price and production risk Relationship risk; food health and 
safety; private standards: quality-
based rejections 
Producers concern  Concern about monopoly pricing Concerns about access to 
information 
Source of control  Money and ownership of assets are a 
prime source of control 
Information as a prime source of 
control 
Financing  Moneylenders, traders, 
relatives and friends mostly 
for production 
Financing within and outside the 
chain through the contract 
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a great deal from the food system: safety quality, variety, convenience, and service. 
Ultimately consumer demand is now considered the main driver in the food systems. 
The private standards ensure that the suppliers are meeting the specific criteria to 
deliver the best quality and safe products to customers(Fulponi, 2007). The private 
standards sometimes replace public standards, especially for food safety. They are also 
used to differentiate products and build a trading and brand reputation, both in terms 
of quality and safety (Berdegué et al., 2005; Fulponi, 2007; Henson et al., 2005).  
• A shift from spot market relationships in traditional wholesale markets to the use of 
vertical coordination mechanisms. The latter includes explicit contracts or implicit 
contracts such as preferred supplier lists, and market inter-linkages such as linking 
output procurement to the provision of credit or inputs.  
• A shift from local procurement by each store, to centralised procurement, using 
distribution centres, coupled with a shift to procurement catchment areas broadening 
from local to sourcing via national, regional, and global networks. 
The next section discusses FFV supply chains post-transition and the institutional channels’ 
modes for procuring FFV in various developing countries.   
3.6 FFV procurement and smallholders: International experience 
As discussed in agribusiness literature, there are several modus operandi for institutional 
channel procurement. Unlike traditional models, institutional chains adopt contractual 
arrangements with buyers to minimise the number of intermediaries in the chain (Christopher 
& Peck, 2004). Here, the transaction cost is one reason why farmers consider contract farming 
(Blackburn & Scudder, 2009). Indeed, the coordination of supply chain partners to improve 
the control of production is a crucial factor in the establishment of large-scale retail networks 
(Minten, Randrianarison, & Swinnen, 2005; Reardon et al., 2003). In countries like India, most 
significant retailers source their produce almost exclusively from medium and large-sized 
farmers (Reddy, Murthy, & Meena, 2010; Singh & Singla, 2011). Conversely, smallholder 
farmers are typically excluded due to the enforcement of contracts, high transaction costs, 
quality standards, business attitudes, delayed payments, high rates of product rejection and 
weak bargaining power (Reardon et al. (2009).  
A question of great importance, especially in academic circles, is how to make farming 
economically, socially and environmentally sustainable, especially for smallholders who 
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constitute 83% of the farming population of India (Singh, 2012b). To help address this concern, 
Reardon, Timmer, and Minten (2012) examined 3,500 stakeholders. They concluded that 
transformational modernisation in the food value chains across Bangladesh, China and India 
is underway, though at varying paces. Singh and Singla (2011) criticise the role and 
organisation of various food value chains currently at work in India in terms of their net socio-
economic impact on smallholders. They suggest different policy and institutional steps to fine-
tune the current policies and practices to ensure the inclusion of smallholders in what they 
call ‘Modern Food Value Chains in India’. Table 3.4 shows the international procurement 
practices of institutional channels. 
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Table 3.4 Procurement practices of international institutional FFV channels  
Author & Year Country            Modes of Procurement 
   
Minten et al. (2009) Madagascar Micro-contracts with smallholders combined with extensive farm assistance and supervision programmes 
Miyata et al. (2009) China  Procure with contract and non-contract growers of apples and green onions in Shandong Province 
Neven et al. (2009) Kenya  Centralised procurement into distribution centres, creating preferred supplier systems 
Rao and Qaim (2011) Kenya  Direct supply and specialised traders supply to supermarkets 
Rao et al. (2012) Kenya  From local wholesale markets and directly from farmers as well 
Schwentesius and Gómez (2002) Mexico Directly from primary producers through their centralised distribution. Collection networks  
Michelson et al. (2012) Nicaragua  rely on a network of traditional wholesalers and preferred smallholders groups and two producer 
cooperatives. Walmart uses contractual relationships 
Singh and Singla (2011) India  70% direct procurement through their collection centres  
Réviron and Chappuis (2005) Switzerland  Partnerships with intermediate companies and collective organisations for procurement  
Boselie, Henson, and 
Weatherspoon (2003) 
Various  Traditional multilevel and fragmented marketing systems 
Dolan and Humphrey (2000) UK UK importers source produce from a range of exporters 
Pritchard, Gracy, and Godwin 
(2010) 
India  Farmers sell through traders rather than to supermarkets  
Berdegué et al. (2005) Latin America Supermarkets use centralised purchases and use of implicit contracts and specialised/dedicated wholesalers 
Moustier et al. (2010) Vietnam  Farmer organisations have written contracts with supermarkets 
Singh (2009) India  The supermarket collection centres source disproportionately from medium and large farmers 
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Table 3.4 summarises the procurement modes of major institutional channels, the main 
characteristics are noted as; 
• direct, uncontracted purchases from farmers;  
• procurement from wholesalers, who either work directly with farmers or through 
wholesale markets;  
• procurement through independent procurement companies (dedicated suppliers) 
who often work with farmers approved by the supermarket chains (preferred 
suppliers);  
• purchasing through government-sponsored distribution centres;  
• purchasing through informal farmer groups, farmer associations or cooperatives;  
• buying through large farmers, who procure and assemble FFV from local smallholders. 
3.7 Smallholders’ participation in institutional channels: Opportunities 
and challenges   
Institutional channels generally focus on creating economies of scale, hence, there is a high 
chance of smallholder exclusion. Yet, some academics suggest that smallholders that have 
gained access have actually benefited from institutional channels through income gains, 
higher and stable prices, an increase in farm employment and technology adoption (Michelson 
et al., 2012; Michelson, 2013; Minten et al., 2009; Miyata et al., 2009; Neven et al., 2009; Rao 
et al., 2012; Rao & Qaim, 2011). Indeed, Miyata et al. (2009) find that in China, participation 
in institutional channels raises smallholders’ incomes compared to contract and non-contract 
smallholders. They also found that farmers contracted to supermarkets have higher incomes 
compared to those who sell at the traditional wholesale market. In Madagascar, Minten et al. 
(2009) find that supermarkets have micro-contracts with smallholders, combined with 
extensive farm assistance and supervision programmes. The study finds higher welfare, 
income stability and intensive farm assistance gains by smallholders, in addition to the 
supervision programmes that enable farmers to meet supermarkets’ complex quality 
requirements. Neven et al. (2009) find positive impacts of smallholder farmers in  Kenyan 
smallholders where they receive higher wages and employment. Rao and Qaim (2011) also 
find that farmer participation in supermarket channels leads to higher incomes due to the 
demands of hired labour. In another study, Rao et al. (2012) find that by participating in 
supermarket supply chains, farm productivity is increased by 45% due to the adoption of 
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production technology required by the supermarkets. Further, Michelson et al. (2012) find 
prices to be more stable for farmers participating in supermarket procurement programmes 
in Nicaragua. Singh and Singla (2011) report that farmers who supply goods to institutional 
channels realise higher profits, higher yields and higher prices compared to farmers who 
supply traditional wet markets, due to the technical assistance that results in higher quality 
produce. Similarly, Bellemare (2012) also identifies an increase in household income and finds 
positive impacts on farmers’ livelihoods due to participation in supermarket channels in 
Madagascar. Blandon et al. (2009) report that in Honduras, 57% of the farmers supplying the 
supermarket channel received higher prices than wholesale spot markets, compared to only 
26% of farmers supplying spot markets.  
Conversely, other studies on smallholder participation in institutional channels find mixed 
results. Singh (2012b) finds smallholder exclusion by supermarket procurement in Punjab 
(India) where supermarkets tend to rely on large landholders. Likewise, Shepherd (2005) notes 
that supermarkets prefer large farmers. Schwentesius and Gómez (2002) note that although 
supermarkets in Mexico pay the suppliers higher prices than traditional market suppliers, the 
suppliers’ net benefit was offset by strict quality standards and practices. In Thailand, Boselie 
et al. (2003) find considerable risks to smallholder producers through strict quality 
requirements and specific production practices that sometimes resulted in higher rejection 
rates. Louw, Vermeulen, and Madevu (2006) reveal that the practice of supermarket supply 
scheduling sometimes results in deliveries from different suppliers arriving at the same time 
creating an oversupply on specific days. Consequently, smallholders are forced to sell at lower 
prices to ensure the clearance of stock due to its perishable nature. Ruben et al. (2007) also 
report that smallholders in Thailand often deliver fresh produce to supermarkets in non-
standardised crates, in small lots, often in non-refrigerated trucks, with high variations in 
quality and quantity which all lead to higher ordering and invoicing costs. 
Indeed, Hernández et al. (2007) examination of supermarket procurement practices in 
Guatemala finds that smallholders benefit from their participation in institutional chains. 
However, they incur some additional transaction costs that traditional farmers do not. 
Chowdhury, Gulati, and Gumbira-Sa'id (2005) investigation of the Indonesian institutional 
procurement systems finds that high fixed transaction costs and the need to implement 
quality grades and standards are significant barriers to participation. Pritchard et al. (2010) 
report on three districts in Karnataka in India reveals that quality parameters used by 
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institutional channels exclude the smallholders. A similar study in India by Mangala and 
Chengappa (2008) notes that smallholders are excluded by Spencer’s supermarket. 
Réviron and Chappuis (2005) report that despite significant improvements in the chain’s 
organisation, costly investments in quality control and storage facilities, smallholder exclusion 
remains high in Switzerland. Similar results have been found in other countries such as 
Guatemala (Berdegué et al., 2005), Mexico (Reardon et al., 2009), and Kenya (Rao & Qaim, 
2011). Further, in Kenya, Dolan and Humphrey (2000) find supermarkets procure only 18% of 
their fresh produce needs from smallholders, compared with 40% from contracted farms and 
42% from large commercial farmers. However, they identify some exceptions; in these cases, 
smallholders have a competitive advantage over larger producers, due to their low costs 
(related to their use of family labour and intensive local knowledge). An example of this 
includes tomato farmers in Guatemala and guava farmers in Mexico (Reardon et al., 2009), 
and also Nicaragua (Michelson et al., 2012). The next section discusses the constraints faced 
by smallholders selling via institutional channels.  
 Challenges related to participation in institutional channels 
The literature reviewed above reveals mixed findings relating to smallholder participation in 
institutional channels. While some studies find smallholders obtain higher returns for 
participation, others show how challenging it is for them to participate in this channel. Buyers 
use a variety of modes of engagement: Vertical coordination, collaboration and integrated 
supply chains. The next section identifies the different modes of engagement that 
smallholders can adopt when attempting to participate in institutional channels.  
The literature discusses the challenges smallholders face in transitioning from traditional 
farming to high-value crops to ensure better economic viability. The review identifies 
numerous factors that affect farmers’ prospects in the value chain and establishing market 
linkages, such as; a lack of information on prices and access to new technologies (Markelova 
et al., 2009), small land holdings (Jayne et al., 2005; Louw et al., 2006), high transaction costs 
due to small volumes of marketable surplus (Minot, 2011; Poulton et al., 2006), high quality 
and food safety standards costs (Dolan & Humphrey, 2000; Pingali et al., 2007; Vorley et al., 
2009), private standards (Fulponi, 2007; Minten et al., 2009), poor access to agricultural 
extension services (Pingali et al., 2007; Shepherd, 2007), investment constraints related to the 
installation of costly machinery (Poulton et al., 2006), credit constraints (Ayaz & Hussain, 2011; 
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Minot, 2011), poor road infrastructure (Minten et al., 2009; Singh, 2009), and high chances of 
product spoilage (Rienekens, 2011). In summary, Table 3.5 highlights those factors affecting 
smallholder farmers’ market participation as identified in the literature. 
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Table 3.5 Key barriers affecting the market performance of FFV growers  
Key factors                                                   Specific details 
Farm size Institutional channels avoid working with farmers who have less than 2 ha of land (Barrett, 2008; Jayne et al., 2005). 
Farmers who sell to institutional channels are five times larger than traditional farmers, 9-18 ha compared with 1.2 - 2.4 ha (Neven 
et al., 2009) 
In traditional markets, most smallholder farmers are constrained by their ability to supply markets due to their farm size and access 
to resources (Minot, 2011; Poulton et al., 2006; Poulton & Lyne, 2009) 
Link to credit and extension 
services  
To invest in change, farmers need farm credit 
Large farmers have better access to formal sources of credit  (Ayaz & Hussain, 2011; Minot, 2011). 
Ability to own resources Owning warehouse and agricultural machinery increases economic viability   
The issue of assured irrigation  
Farmers who sell to institutional channels typically have access to irrigation, whereas most smallholders, especially those growing 
field crops, operate in rain-fed environments (Agrawal, 2001; Barham & Chitemi, 2009). 
Variable production cost High prices, availability, and financing for inputs are significant barriers to their use (Ferris et al., 2014) 
The cost to establish production for  many types of crops can require a farmer’s entire savings and loan potential 
Farmers with access and the ability to buy technologies (such as improved seed or fertiliser), and who can manage water resources 
have sizeable advantages over farmers who are unable to use such technologies 
Family labour provides smallholders with a comparative advantage because it minimises production costs in the case of crops which 
need a lot of attention   
Transaction costs Increasing consumer demand for high quality, safe, value-added food, requires a fixed compliance cost (Poulton, Dorward, & Kydd, 
2010; Poulton et al., 2006). 
Price volatility Fresh produce is perishable by nature and is considered high risk due to a loss of aesthetics and quality  
Price driven market participants prefer opportunistic self-interest rather than the whole chain (Ragasa et al., 2013). 
Lack of storage and processing facilities means that producers cannot find alternative markets and are forced to sell at low prices 
in wet markets 
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Access to roads and 
ownership of transport 
Proximity to markets reduces variable transaction costs in horticultural markets and is associated with fixed transaction costs  
Access to roads and transport is typically a function of location: more remote and poorer farmers have less market access than 
those farmers living in areas with more investment (Minten et al., 2009; Singh, Singh, & Kingra, 2009) 
Age and education level Education levels are highly correlated with market access  (Bathla, 2015). 
Collective actions  Collective efforts are advantageous for obtaining extension services. Groups are more likely to achieve common goals and lower 
individual farmers’ per-unit transaction costs. Group member support helps farmers to learn together, stick to plans, and sell 
collectively (Devaux et al., 2009; Kaganzi et al., 2009; Markelova et al., 2009). 
Use of information and 
communication 
technologies 
Smallholder farmers often lack access to, and rational use of, adequate market information, struggle to meet buyers’ food safety 
and quality control requirements and are seldom able to provide standardised products continuously (Gulati et al., 2007; Markelova 
et al., 2009). 
Specification of grades and 
standards 
Leading supermarket chains impose private standards   
 fresh, produce suppliers. Pr ference for large farmers (Kirsten & Sartorius, 2002). 
Supply chain visibility  Better proximity to buyers leads to lower marketing risks for smallholder farmers who have less of a marketable surplus.    
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3.8 Chapter summary 
In summary, smallholder FFV growers’ modes of engagement with markets depend on their 
production capacity, location, and individual characteristics. It is also affected by the scale of 
operations of the purchasing firms. If FFV growers have a limited marketable surplus, they 
usually rely on arm’s length transactions with traditional wholesale markets. Likewise, if 
institutional channels have strict quality standards and food safety mechanisms, FFV growers 
are required to use modern technology and must have access to information to increase their 
existing capacity (Reardon & Barrett, 2000).  
Coordination of supply chain partners to improve the control of production is a crucial factor 
for supplying large retailers (Minten et al., 2005; Reardon et al., 2003). Institutional channels 
favour pre-arranged contractual agreements with farmers to minimise the number of 
intermediaries in the chain (Christopher & Peck, 2004). Here, reducing transaction costs is a 
key motivating factor in these new supply chains (Blackburn & Scudder, 2009).   
Although modern retail supermarket chains have contractual relationships with large farmers, 
they still procure a large amount of fresh produce from traditional wholesale markets (Singh 
& Singla, 2011). McCullough et al. (2008) discuss the interaction between traditional and 
institutional channels in modernising food systems. In modern chains, primary producers 
supply fresh produce to specialised supermarket buying centres. After the produce is sorted 
and packaged, it is dispatched to a hub and later transported to respective stores, finally 
reaching the customers. In some situations, the hub directly procures produce from traditional 
markets via commission agents who make a connection with primary producers. In terms of 
the focus of this research, several studies have found that Indian fresh produce markets have 
yet to be affected by the supermarket revolution (Fafchamps et al., 2008; Gulati et al., 2007).    
The main point highlighted in this chapter is the rapidly changing food systems and the 
evolution of more formal institutional channels. In developing countries, food systems are 
transforming quickly for a variety of reasons. As food systems change, so too have the 
requirements for suppliers. Farmers in developing countries are incorporating these changes 
into their production and marketing methods. Yet, the impact of these changes and the 
participation of FFV growers in institutional channels depends on the structure and dynamics 
of the chains, the institutional settings within which they are embedded, and the terms of 
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farmers’ integration. The next chapter formulates the research framework and hypothesis 






The theoretical framework discussed in Chapter 2, and agribusiness literature discussed in 
Chapter 3, provide insight into the various factors that drive smallholder participation in 
institutional channels. As previously discussed, smallholders’ participation in institutional 
channels depends on multiple factors. Hence, the hypotheses formulated for this research are 
derived from transactions cost (Coase, 1937; Hobbs, 1996; Williamson, 1979) and collective 
action (Olson, 1965) theories, as well as the agribusiness supply chain literature. The previous 
chapter discussed various exogenous factors that drive the transition of food systems in 
developing countries. These factors include:  
• The urbanisation of the rural population and rising middle-class incomes (Reardon & 
Barrett, 2000; Reardon & Hopkins, 2006). 
• Changes in macroeconomic policies, trade liberalisation and government investments 
in extension services, the improvement of transportation and communication 
infrastructure, the upgrading of credit services and rural markets (Minot & Ngigi, 2004; 
Von Braun & Kennedy, 1994).  
• Changing lifestyles and increased female participation in the workplace. While women 
usually assist with agricultural production and food preparation, their movement into 
the paid workforce means that many have less time to devote to these activities 
(Pingali, 2007; Reardon & Barrett, 2000; Reardon et al., 2003). 
• Access to agribusiness technology that allows for the use of different foods and food 
preparation methods (Cook & Chaddad, 2000; Reardon & Barrett, 2000). 
• Industry-level access to better food packaging and logistics technology (Reardon et al., 
2009; Saxowsky & Duncan, 1998) 
• Changing consumer preferences and awareness of food safety (Von Braun & Kennedy, 
1994).  
In developing countries, these changes have led to transformations in consumers’ food 
demands:  
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• The quantity of food per person and overall demand from urban food markets is 
increasing faster than in rural areas (Delgado, 1999). 
• The composition of the food basket is different, as better-off consumers often shift 
away from grains and consume more high-value products such as fruits and 
vegetables, dairy products, meat, fish and pre-prepared meals. The changing 
requirements of urban consumers lead to a restructuring of food supply chains (Gulati 
et al., 2007). The final food supply chain arrangements are not only shaped by these 
demand factors, but also by conditioning factors such as geography, and more 
processed foods for convenience. 
• There is a demand for more choices per product and a greater variety of food products 
in general (Holloway et al., 2000). 
• In developing countries, urban customers are increasingly concerned about food 
quality and safety issues, especially as these tend to be a more significant problem with 
non-staple foods (Kirsten & Sartorius, 2002). Urban consumer demand is transmitted 
through the marketing sector or supply chain to the rural producer. This chain ensures 
that primary agricultural products are delivered to the customer in the right form, at 
the right time, and the right location (Henson et al., 2005). 
According to the consumers’ changing requirements and growers’ profit margins, these 
transformations affect the overall cost structure associated with food production. There are 
several costs involved in this process; food handling costs, transaction costs, and potentially 
rent (profit margins). These differ per product, as the cost of transportation, handling, 
processing, storage, and traceability depends on the product characteristics. The degree of 
perishability often affects material costs, as higher losses, as well as higher risks, are reflected 
in the final price of perishable goods (Singh, 2008). On top of the substantial delivery costs 
(transport and handling), marketing margins (rent) also reflect charges and the risks incurred 
in the process of conducting transactions between different agents who have imperfect 
information (Alene et al., 2008). 
Supply chain partners incur higher exchange costs due to transaction cost factors; these 
include uncertainty, asset-specific investment and frequency, the act of searching, negotiating 
and monitoring the supply chain partners (Hobbs, 1996). Furthermore, fulfilling specifications 
such as grading, consistent supply and seasonality make the situation even more challenging 
for small producers. However, Collective Action theory provides a way to mitigate the 
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challenges mentioned above (Barham & Chitemi, 2009; Devaux et al., 2009; Hellin et al., 2009; 
Kaganzi et al., 2009; Markelova et al., 2009; Narrod et al., 2009; Staatz, 1987). This theory 
suggests that institutional arrangements, such as farmer cooperatives, enable smallholders to 
reduce high transaction costs and meet product specifications enforced by institutional 
channels. Cooperatives organisations help smallholders move up the relational continuum 
that ranges from spot market exchanges to full vertical integration where all stages of 
marketing, transactions, and production are linked through ownership rather than through 
market exchanges (Swinnen, Colen, & Maertens, 2013). Coppoeratives organisations then act 
as a surrogate to vertical integration.  
The above factors influence the rising share of institutional channels in existing food supply 
chains. Vertical coordination mechanisms may result in significant cost savings for purchasing 
firms. Likewise, economies of scale may also potentially lead to lower prices for consumers 
(Chowdhury et al., 2005). However, the growth of institutional channels depends on feasible 
policy factors as well as the specific structure of FFV supply and demand (Swinnen et al., 2013) 
The current study investigates various factors that drive smallholder farmers market 
participation in institutional channels. These factors include individual characteristics of 
smallholder farmers such as the gender, age, education, and experience of the farmer, as well 
as farm characteristics, such as land, machinery and production costs. Secondly, various other 
marketing, institutional and infrastructure variables, such as the role of collective action and 
institutions in farmers’ market preferences, are also postulated to affect smallholder 
participation. Hence, the following five research questions are formulated to address the 
research’s objectives: 
• RQ1: What is the impact of human capital assets on smallholder FFV growers’ 
participation in institutional channels?   
• RQ2: What is the impact of physical farm assets on smallholder FFV growers’ 
participation in institutional channels?   
• RQ3: What is the impact of transaction costs on smallholder FFV growers’ 
participation in institutional channels?  
• RQ4: What is the impact of collective action on the market participation of 
smallholder fresh produce growers in institutional channels?  
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• RQ5: What is the impact of institutional characteristics on FFV growers’ 
participation in institutional channels? 
Having formulated the research questions, the next section of this chapter provides an 
overview of the geographic scope of the study.  
4.2 The geographic scope of the study  
The study was conducted in the Punjab state of India known as the land of five rivers, due to 
the rivers that flow in the region. The State’s land is known for its agricultural fertility and 
assured irrigation that makes agricultural production almost climatically risk free. The state is 
also known as the food basket of India; it was an experimental state for the green revolution 
during 1970-80 when India was facing severe food shortages. Until recently, agriculture has 
been the primary occupation of most Punjabi residents. However, today Punjab agriculture 
has become highly capitalised and resource-intensive. Punjab has the highest yield for two 
crops, rice and wheat when compared to other Indian states (GOP, 2016). After the green 
revolution, the yield for wheat and rice increased and brought Punjab farmers out of poverty. 
They had higher in per capita income compared to other Indian states (Singh & Singh, 2016). 
After the reorganisation of the state in 1966, political instability and the short tenure of the 
state government led to civil, political and religious unrest in the region. However, the state 
ensured the food security of the nation by producing wheat and rice at a guaranteed minimum 
support price offered by the national government.  
In the mid-1970s, the economic benefits of the green revolution had neutralised, and other 
states were turning to industrial development. The political turmoil leads to an armed struggle 
in the early 80s and the demand for a Sikh homeland (Singh & Singh, 2016). This conflict 
affected the economy badly, and when other states were transitioning into industrial 
economies, Punjab was still relying on agriculture as a primary occupation. Over this period, 
Punjab’s ranking dropped on various parameters of development compared to other Indian 
states. Due to this political unrest, Punjab did not benefit from the economic transformation 
introduced in India in 1991. Public and private investments in food processing went to 
neighbouring states (Singh, Bhangoo, & Sharma, 2019).  
Due to the plain geographical landscape, the agriculture land is mostly under irrigation. 
Farmers have access to irrigation mainly through government-managed canal and 
groundwater. In 2016, the net area irrigated by government canals was 1,201,000 hectares 
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and 2,936,000 hectares irrigated by well/tube wells (GOP, 2016). Rainwater from the 
monsoons (from mid-July to mid-August), also helps farmers in paddy plantations.  
In 2011, the total population of Punjab was 27 million, of which approximately 17 million 
(62.52%) live rurally, and ten million (37.48%) live in urban areas. According to the 2011 
census, 1.935 million cultivators were involved in agriculture (GOP, 2016). Punjabi is the 
primary language spoken in the state.  
Agriculture plays an essential role in the state’s economy. It constitutes 30% of the state’s 
GDP. Most of the population live in villages where the main occupation is agriculture. As per 
the 2011 census, 37% of the total workforce depends on agriculture (GOP, 2016). The state 
has a 75.8% literacy rate. Figure 4.1 shows that the 2014 – 2015 share of agriculture in gross 
state value-added was 17%.  
 
Figure 4.1 Sectoral distribution of Gross State Value Added during 2014-2015 in Punjab 
Source: GOP (2016) 
Punjab is a landlocked border state and shares a border with Pakistan. In terms of the Indian 
side, it borders Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Rajasthan and Haryana. The state has 
a long history of divisions. In 1947, when India gained independence from British rule, the 
state was divided between two countries, East and West Punjab based on religion. The Muslim 
population migrated to Pakistan, while the Hindu/Sikh community moved to Punjab. This 
division resulted in an unprecedented geographical transfer of 10 million people. Half a million 
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In 1966 the state of Punjab (India) was divided again based on language: two new states, 
Haryana and Himachal Pradesh were formed. At present, the state has a geographical area of 
5,0362 sqkm, of which 48,265 sqkm is rural, and 2,097 sqkm is urban. 
The state has 22 districts, 87 tehsils and 149 blocks. A tehsil (also known as tahsil, taluka or 
taluq) is an administrative division in the Indian subcontinent that is usually translated to 
"township”. In the year 2015-2016, the net sown area under agriculture was 4,137,000 
thousand hectares (Singh & Singh, 2016). Agricultural land in Punjab is favourable to more 
than one planting per season, often two harvests per year are achievable. Wheat and paddy 
are the major cereal crops grown in rotation during the year. Punjab is the second-largest 
producer of wheat and the third-largest producer of rice in India.  
Despite being the most significant contributor of cereal crops, when it comes to FFV, Punjab 
is a relatively minor producer in India. The net cultivated FFV area is less than 2%. The state 
produces less than 2.5% of the total vegetables grown in India (Ghosh, 2013). FFV is not a 
prefered agricultural option due to the production and marketing risks associated with it. In 
contrast, cereal production has become economically non-viable for smallholders. Another 
reason why farmers prefer cereal crops is the assured minimum support price offered by state 
and national procurement agencies. Together, fruits and vegetables constitute only 3.64% of 
the gross cropped area in Punjab, compared to 8.3% at the nation-wide level (Gulati, Roy, & 
Hussain, 2017). Figure 4.2 shows the net FFV cultivated area in Punjab. The subtropical 
location leads to variations in temperature during the year. Punjab experiences three main 
seasons: a hot season (from mid-April to the end of June), the rainy season (from early July to 
the end of September) and the cold season (from early December to the end of Februry). The 
monsoon season provides most of the rainfall in Punjab.  
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Figure 4.2 Area under fresh fruits and vegetables in the Punjab state of India 
Source: GOP (2016) 
Agribusiness researchers have recommended diversification to enhance the share of other 
crops, but despite this, the area under FFV cultivation in Punjab has increased only marginally 
(Johl, 1986; Singh, Singh, et al., 2009; Singh, 2004). The procurement of wheat and paddy by 
state agencies for a minimum assured price is considered a significant factor in farmers are 
continuing to grow these crops. There is no similar mechanism for FFV production and 
marketing; thus, most do not want to take this risk.  
Due to the climate, potatoes are the primary vegetable crop in Punjab, accounting for 60% of 
total FFV production (Singh & Singh, 2016). Table 4.1 shows crop-wise percentages for the 
cultivated area to total cropped area in Punjab for the years 2010-11 and 2013-14. Table 4.1 
shows that the percentage area covered by wheat and paddy remains similar over these two 
time periods (2010-11 and 2013-14). While potato is a significant crop in the state of Punjab, 
in India, the state is only a minor producer after Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal and Gujarat. 
Several districts in Punjab, including Jalandhar, Hoshiarpur, Kapoor Thala, Ludhiana and 
Bhatinda grow potatoes. These districts account for over 66% of the area under potatoes in 
Punjab. Jalandhar, an irrigated river plain with an impressive level of urbanisation, leads the 
Punjab districts, accounting for 23% of the potatoes grown. 
 
2010-11 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16
Fruits 69813 74897 76592 77751 79086
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Table 4.1 Crop wise percentage of cultivated area in Punjab in 2010-11 and 2013-2014 
Rank Crop Percentage of total 
cropped area 2010-11 
Percentage of total 
cropped area 2013-14 
1 Wheat 44.53 44.72 
2 Paddy 35.92 36.30 
3 Cotton 6.13 6.13 
4 Maize 1.69 1.67 
5 Total Oil Seeds 1.40 0.60 
6 Potato 1.06 1.01 
7 Sugarcane 0.89 1.13 
8 Pulses 0.27 0.24 
Source: GOP (2016) 
While potato is a major FFV commercial crop, peas and tomatoes are also essential 
commercial FFV crops in Punjab. Four Punjabi districts, Amritsar, Ropar, Jalandhar and 
Hoshiarpur, are major tomato growers. Due to the importance of the potato and tomato 
crops, and also their different product characteristics and credence attributes for consumers, 
this study has selected these two vegetable supply chains as the basis of the study. In the 
literature review, it was found that these two crops are commonly grown across the Jalandhar 
and Amritsar districts (See Figure 4.3), and as such, these two regions were selected as the 
sampling districts.  
 
 
Figure 4.3 Map of the study regions 
Source: The Map of Punjab (2018) 
Besides potatoes and tomatoes, there are many other varieties of vegetables grown in the 
study area. The average landholding size of farmers in Punjab is 3.7 ha, while in the Jalandhar 
Study Regions  
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district, the average holding size is 4.6 ha. Similarly, the average landholding size is 3.07 ha in 
Amritsar (GOP, 2016). The chosen districts were stratified further into blocks. Two blocks of 
Jalandhar Bhogpur and Jalandhar west (Kartarpur) were chosen for the current study; 
similarly, two blocks of Amritsar, Jandiala and Majitha were chosen. The block is often the 
next level of administrative division (for development purpose, whereas tehsil is next to the 
district for revenue purpose). The blocks consist of revenue villages, and the Punjab state 
overall has a total of 146 blocks.  
In countries like India, the agribusiness markets and food processing are still in the early stages 
of development (McCullough et al., 2008). While the agribusiness markets are transitioning 
from traditional spot markets to coordinated institutional chains, these changes provide new 
opportunities for smallholder farmers to participate in and compete for better livelihoods and 
economic viability. The current study aims to identify the drivers of smallholder to participate 
in institutional channels. The next section outlines the development of the hypotheses and 
related factors that hinder or facilitate smallholder participation in institutional channels.  
4.3 Hypothesis development  
A hypothesis is a specified, testable expectation about the empirical reality that follows from 
a more general proposition. Hypotheses testing belongs to the hypothetico-deductive 
scientific research method, where assertions about possible outcomes are deduced from the 
extant knowledge/literature. Then data is gathered, and statistical tools applied to test 
hypotheses. However, it must be remembered that no method, including obtaining statistical 
results from hypothesis testing, is the absolute final answer to a research problem (Martin & 
Bridgmon, 2012). Research is designed to test the hypothesis. In other words, research will 
support (or fail to support) a theory only indirectly by testing specific hypotheses derived from 
theories and propositions (Babbie, 2013). Similarly, Snedecor and Cochran (1967, p. 3) state 
that “…the basic idea in statistics assist us in thinking clearly about the problem, provide some 
guidance about the conclusions that must be satisfied if sound inferences are to be made, and 
enable us to detect many inferences that have not good logical foundations”. 
The next section includes the development of the research hypothesis in relation to the 
research’s theoretical underpinnings and agribusiness literature.  
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 Human capital assets 
The first group of hypotheses posit that higher levels of human capital assets will positively 
influence smallholders’ participation in institutional channels. Each hypothesis examines a 
particular aspect of human capital assets, beginning with the age of fresh produce growers, 
followed by the percentage of family members involved in farming activities, their education 
levels and technical education related to farming. 
4.3.1.1  Farmer’s age  
The age of the farmer variable represents the FFV farmer’s age in years. Younger farmers are 
expected to be more adventurous and take more risks than older farmers (Simmons, Winters, 
& Patrick, 2005). As the farmer ages and has more experience, s/he will have a greater ability 
to adapt to new and more demanding market conditions (Alene et al., 2008). Hence, human 
capital assets, the age of the FFV grower, can influence marketing channel decisions.  
Jagwe (2011) also reports that age is a critical variable in market participation, but in this case, 
in terms of younger family members as a form of labour. Kumar, Roy, Trapathi, Joshi, and 
Adhikari (2016) report that age has a positive and significant impact on ginger farmers’ 
participation in institutional channels through contract farming in Nepal. Like them, Osebeyo 
and Aye (2014) observe that the age of the head of the tomato growers’ household had a 
positive impact on market participation in Nigeria. Similarly, Slamet, Nakayasu, and Ichikawa 
(2017) find that younger farmers are more likely to participate in institutional channels in 
Indonesia. Lawal, Saka, Oyegbami, and Akintayo (2004) find that a farmer’s age has a 
significant influence on their decision to adopt improved maize seeds in Southwest Nigeria. 
Likewise, Lawal et al. (2004) find that human capital assets, such as a grower’s age, the 
household head’s levels of education and the number of family members involved in farming 
have a positive influence on a farmer’s decisions to adopt improved varieties of cassava seed 
in Ghana. Taking into consideration prior research, the first hypothesis states that: 
H1: Smallholder FFV growers who are older will be less likely to participate in an 
institutional channel than those who are younger. 
4.3.1.2  Education level of FFV growers 
The relationship between education and a farmer’s ability to access institutional channels has 
been discussed in the agribusiness literature (Ali, Abdulai, & Rahut, 2017; Asante-Addo, 
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Mockshell, Zeller, Siddig, & Egyir, 2017; Ghimire & Huang, 2016; Hewett, 2012; Lawal et al., 
2004; Slamet et al., 2017). It is believed that educated farmers will be better able to use the 
information they receive to lower their transaction costs. Education provides farmers with 
skills need to make more informed decisions and a greater ability to analyse complex market 
situations.  
It is argued that a higher level of education provides FFV growers with critical thinking skills, 
and thus, they are more likely to join collective action groups (Fischer & Qaim, 2012). Fresh 
produce growers with higher levels of education are hence better prepared for participation 
in institutional channels.  
Generally, educated farmers have more positive attitudes towards the adoption of new 
agribusiness technology and allied agricultural services, such as farm insurance and farm 
credit. Various studies have found that fresh produce growers who sell to supermarkets have 
higher levels of education compared to those selling in traditional channels. For example, 
Makhura (2001b) report that in South Africa, educated households have better access and 
utilisation of market information (and at a lower cost), compared to non-educated 
households. Neven et al. (2009) find that farmers who supply institutional channels in Kenya 
have secondary school education compared to those using traditional channels who only have 
primary school education. Bishu, Lahiff, O’Reilly, and Gebregziabher (2018) find that a farmer’s 
education level positively affects their decision to participate in cattle insurance as a risk 
management strategy in northern Ethiopia. Asante-Addo et al. (2017) reveal a positive 
association with the household head’s level of education and the adoption of microcredit 
programmes in Ghana. Similarly, Osebeyo and Aye (2014), find that when tomato grower 
household heads’ have higher levels of education, they are more likely to participate in 
institutional channels in Nigeria. Ghimire and Huang (2016) find that age and the household 
head’s level of education both have a positive impact on a farmer’s decisions to adopt new 
varieties of rice in Nepal. Giné and Yang (2009) find that a farmer’s education level is positively 
correlated with insured loans and fewer default costs in Malawi. Kumar et al. (2016) report 
that a ginger grower’s education level has a positive association with participation in 
institutional channels through the adoption of contract farming in Nepal. Zhu and Wang 
(2007) present similar findings for tomato growers in China, as do (Arumugam, Mohamed, 
Chiew, & Mohamed, 2011) in the case of fresh produce in Malaysia. 
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Similarly, Slamet et al. (2017) report that farmers who have higher levels of education are 
more likely to participate in institutional channels in Indonesia. Lawal et al. (2004) find that 
the household head’s level of education has a positive influence on their decision to adopt 
new, improved seed varieties of cassava in Ghana. Minten et al. (2009) reveal that educated 
households have a better awareness of business opportunities associated with global retail 
chains in Madagascar.  
The effect of education levels on farmers’ decisions has been examined in relation to other 
crops. For example, Ali et al. (2017) find that educated cotton grower farmers in Pakistan are 
more likely to sell at markets compared to less-educated individuals who tend to sell at the 
farm gate.  
Conversely, a few studies find a negative and insignificant relationship between education 
levels and the adoption of contract farming in institutional channels. Miyata et al. (2009) 
report no effect of education on apple and green onion growers’ participation in contract 
farming with supermarkets in China. Another reason might be that young people with higher 
levels of education are not interested in working in the agricultural sector due to the physical 
nature of the work. Rather, they try to find jobs in the better-paying service sector.  
Similarly, Guo, Jolly, and Zhu (2005) note that farmers’ education levels have no relationship 
with their choice of contract farming. Ramaswami, Birthal, and Joshi (2006) also report no link 
between education levels and smallholders’ market participation, in the case of Indian poultry 
growers. Blandon et al. (2009) also did not find a relationship between education levels and 
smallholders’ decisions to sell produce to supermarkets in Honduras. Simmons et al. (2005) 
observe that the household head’s level of education was not statistically significant in 
selecting seed corn contracts in Indonesia. Taking this literature into consideration, hypothesis 
2 states that, 
H2: Smallholder FFV growers with higher levels of education will be more likely to 
participate in institutional channels than those with lower levels of education.  
4.3.1.3  Farming experience  
Farming experience can be divided into two forms. First, experience in agricultural technology 
adoption (ETA). This refers to the time a farmer spends using improved technology. Second, 
general farming experience (GFE), which refers to the time a farmer has spent farming, or the 
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number of years s/he has been making independent production decisions (Ainembabazi & 
Mugisha, 2014). Fresh produce farming consists of a variety of production and marketing risks 
(Singh, 2009). Generally, the farming experience is measured using the household head’s age. 
It is expected that the older the household head, the more experience s/he will have with 
farming technology and practices. The current study believes the longer a farmer has been 
farming, the greater his/her level of participation in institutional channels. This is an expected 
outcome because older farmers tend to have more farming experience and greater levels of 
awareness about changing weather patterns, the use of fertilisers and pesticides and 
production issues. Also, younger generations are less interested in farming. As noted above, 
they tend to find employment in urban areas, especially in the service sector. In short, the 
more experience a farmer has, the greater the possibility that s/he will participate in 
institutional channels. 
Different risks such as adverse weather conditions, pest control, land preparation, nursery 
raising, adequate use of fertilisers, harvesting techniques and marketing affect FFV 
production. Farmers gain experience in agriculture practices over the years, which enables 
them to lower various production and marketing risks. The knowledge and skills farmers gain 
over the years help them increases their bargaining power (Jagwe, 2011; Omiti et al., 2007; 
Poole, 2017). Keeping the prior literature in mind, it hypothesised that: 
H3: Smallholder FFV growers with more years of farming experience are more likely to 
participate in institutional channels than those with less farming experience 
4.3.1.4  Family members involved in farming activities 
Agriculture is a labour-intensive activity that requires both hired farm labour and family 
labour. Family members play a vital role in the supervision and monitoring of hired labour. In 
this research, a family unit involves grandparents, parents and children aged 18 and above. It 
is expected that household family labour increases the probability of participating in more 
labour-intensive market channels; for example, labour-intensive activities such as sorting, 
grading and packing. This variable is captured using the total number of members in a 
household(Boughton et al., 2007; Rao & Qaim, 2011). 
Makhura (2001b) finds that households are more likely to participate in the markets when 
most of the family members are involved in production activities rather than being 
dependants. Lawal et al. (2004) find that family members involved in farming have a positive 
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influence on a farmer’s decision to adopt new, improved seed varieties of cassava in Ghana. 
Further, family members’ involvement in farming activities provides a financial edge in terms 
of saving money on hired labour. In short, family labour lowers hired labour costs; that means 
they can maximise returns on fresh produce (Gani & Hossain, 2015). When high-value crops 
require special attention to maintain the quality, smallholders may hold a competitive 
advantage over larger producers. This advantage is due mainly to their low labour costs that 
are made possible by the use of family labour and their essential local knowledge.  
This research assumes that greater availability of household labour will increase the 
probability of participating in more labour-intensive market channels, such as sorting, grading 
and packing required for institutional channels. Therefore, it hypothesised that,  
H4: Smallholder fresh produce growers with a higher percentage of family members 
involved in farming activities will be more likely to participate in institutional channels 
than those with a lower percentage.  
 Physical farm assets 
Farm-related assets have a significant impact on resource utilisation and marketable surplus 
(Abu, Osei-Asare, & Wayo, 2014). For this group of hypotheses, it is assumed that low levels 
of available physical resources, such as input materials for production and other input 
supplies, will constrain a smallholder’s participation in institutional channels. For example, 
Fischer and Qaim (2012) note that the high cost of accessing physical farm assets hinders 
farmers’ chances of growing high-value crops in Africa. Secondly, most farmers do not own or 
have access to, farm machinery that would enable them to transport FFV products from their 
farms to the marketplace. This means that they often lose more food and have higher 
rejections due to poor quality. A farmer’s proximity to the primary market impacts upon prices 
and participation in various channels (Von Braun & Kennedy, 1994). The next section explores 
the hypotheses developed to capture physical farm assets’ impact upon FFV smallholders’ 
market participation. 
4.3.2.1  Percentage of operational land for growing FFV 
 
Operational land is a significant factor in farmers’ market decisions. This is particularly true of 
institutional channels, or those who require regular and periodical shipments of FFV. Similarly, 
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food processors require a regular supply of FFV to maintain the continuity of raw material for 
production.  
The primary reason that FFV growers are excluded from institutional channels is the 
uncertainty of supply due to smallholder farmers’ low marketable surplus. Transaction costs 
incurred by institutional channels, involved in dealing with many suppliers, means that they 
are more likely to favour sourcing from larger farms. Agricultural censuses and household 
surveys in developing countries often show that cash crop orientation depends on operational 
land (Fafchamps, 1992). There is an essential fixed transaction-cost component in the cost of 
exchanges between farms and companies, such as administrative costs, costs for time spent 
communicating, negotiating and monitoring contracts, and costs related to the storage and 
transportation of goods. In high-value supply chains, these transaction costs can be extremely 
high because buyers must monitor FFV growers’ production practices to ensure food safety 
and quality. All this makes it more costly for buyers to deal with smallholders than a few larger 
suppliers (Swinnen et al., 2013). We expect that as operational land increases for FFV 
production: (1) farm households will have higher levels of wealth; (2) with higher wealth there 
is a reduction in farmers’ uncertainty and risk aversion, (3) with less risk aversion; farmers are 
more willing to adopt new market channel opportunities. Keeping the prior literature in mind, 
hypothesis 5 states that, 
H5: Smallholder FFV growers using a higher percentage of operational land for fresh 
produce are more likely to participate in institutional channels than those with smaller 
areas of operational land for fresh produce 
4.3.2.2  Ownership of farm machinery and transportation 
 
Agricultural production is highly specialised due to variations in weather conditions and soil 
types (Hodges, Buzby, & Bennett, 2011). Farming technology plays an essential role in 
production specialisation because it has a significant effect on efficiency. Resource 
endowment is commonly understood as the area of land, labour, capital, and 
entrepreneurship that farmers use for agriculture practices. Agricultural machinery, credit, 
access to irrigation and farm labour are some of the essential resources farmers require (Key 
& Runsten, 1999). Agricultural machinery, including tractors, trolleys and tillers, are necessary 
for cultivating and preparing the land for plantation.   
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In this research, farm machinery denotes access to tractors and trolleys. A tractor is a primary 
vehicle for tillage, land preparation and transporting fresh produce to the market. While 
trolley is a farm vehicle with wheels that farmer used to transport agriculture produce such as 
wheat, rice and vegetables to the market place (Sidhu & Vatta, 2012). Farm productivity not 
only depends on access to quality seeds, fertiliser and irrigation, but also farm machinery (Key 
& Runsten, 1999). Access refers to ownership, via rental, or sharing use through cooperatives 
or neighbours. Fresh produce agriculture requires a certain level of land preparation, weeding 
and harvesting. Post-harvesting marketing requires fresh produce to be promptly dispatched 
to the market to ensure the quality and aesthetics of the produce. Having access to machinery 
provides farmers with an advantage. It allows them to minimise losses and lower rejection 
rates. Hence hypothesis 6 states that, 
H6: Smallholder FFV growers who have access to farm machinery will be more likely to 
participate in institutional channels than those with no access. 
4.3.2.3  Variable production costs  
Variable production costs are those costs associated with the volume and different types of 
crops produced. Smallholder farmers are more likely to have high per-unit transaction costs 
due to small volumes of marketable surplus. Traditionally, smallholders grow fresh produce 
with the help of family labour and rely on traditional agricultural techniques. Farmers incur 
different costs such as seeds, fertilisers, pesticides, fungicides, weeding, spraying, land 
preparation, pruning, and top dressing to produce marketable commodities. Post-farm gate 
costs such as packaging costs, new technology, transportation through the supply chain, cool-
chain, adopting food safety standards and arrangements for a regular supply of FFV raw 
material. All of these costs increase the total production cost (Minot, 2011; Poulton et al., 
2006).  
When supermarkets reject a significant part of the delivered product, farmers tend to sell the 
rejected product in spot markets, thus surrendering the opportunity for a larger share of the 
final value. If a delivery is rejected/part rejected, it increases farmers’ transportation and 
labour costs (Singh, 2008). Cadilhon et al. (2006) show that despite being offered higher prices 
by institutional channel, the risks, standards and extra costs incurred by farmers are barely 
offset by the profit.    
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Farmers coordinating with new chains incur higher transaction costs than farmers who sell 
into traditional spot markets. As such,  Conversely, supply chains face increased transaction 
costs when dealing with a large number of smallholders due to higher levels of variability. As 
a result, institutional channels favour large farmers, collective groups and institutional 
arrangements to minimise their overall transaction costs (Pingali et al., 2005; Singh, Kaur, & 
Kingra, 2009). Also, the product specifications, grading and private standards established by 
institutional channels impose higher ex-ante costs on smallholder FFV growers. The imposition 
of grades and standards may put smallholders at risk of not being able to meet buyers’ 
specified requirements (Berdegué et al., 2005).  In these circumstances, individual smallholder 
farmers incur high  ‘variable’ production cost to participate in institutional channels. Hence, 
hypothesis 7 states,  
H7: Smallholder FFV growers with highly variable production costs are more likely to 
participate in institutional channels than those with lower variable production costs. 
4.3.2.4  Off-farm income  
Off-farm (non-farm) income refers to the portion of farm household income from off-farm 
employment, including non-farm wages and salaries, pensions, and interest income earned by 
farm families. In the agribusiness context, Lanjouw (1999) defines off-farm income as all the 
activities associated with waged work or self-employment in income-generating activities that 
are not agricultural but are located in rural areas. Thus, off-farm income activities might 
include manufacturing (that is, agro-processing) and may be accumulative (that is, setting up 
a small business), adaptive, switching from cash crop cultivation to commodity trading, and 
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Figure 4.4  Farm household income sources in developing countries 
Source (Developed by author) 
Off-farm activities involve participation in paid work outside the participant’s own farm. These 
activities play an increasingly essential role in sustainable development and poverty reduction, 
particularly in rural areas (Rao & Qaim, 2011). Income from off-farm work supplements on-
farm income and helps to expand economic activity and employment opportunities in rural 
areas. For the agricultural sector, income from off-farm activities is an alternative source of 
income which may be used to finance agricultural production. In short, income diversification 
has the potential to increase farm investment leading to higher productivity. Off-farm 
activities also reduce smallholder farmers’ income uncertainty (Anang & Yeboah, 2019). 
Agribusiness literature states that, as a livelihood strategy, income diversification is a global 
phenomenon. According to Reardon, Berdegué, and Farrington (2002), off-farm income 
contributes 40% of total income in Latin America, while in sub-Saharan Africa, non-farm 
income constitutes between 30% and 42% of total household income. According to Davis 
(2003), the estimated share of off-farm income to total household income for Asian countries 
ranges between 29% and 32%. Thus, off-farm income provides farmers with a ready source of 
cash (they do not have to wait for credit), which they can use to buy inputs and pay expenses 
such as repairs to farm machinery. Alene et al. (2008) find that off-farm income is positively 
and significantly related to both the adoption and the use of fertilisers. These factors maximise 
overall farm productivity, and higher productivity is positively related to participation in 
institutional channels. Hence, hypothesis 8 states that, 
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H8:  Smallholder FFV growers with off-farm income are more likely to participate in 
institutional channels than those with no off-farm income. 
 Marketing characteristics 
The NIE framework highlights the transaction costs associated with the process of exchange. 
The extent of business transactions determines the form of the relationship between 
producers and buyers. Coase (1937) argues that economic transactions are not governed only 
by price. Rather, there are other costs associated with business transactions, including; the 
time spent searching for partners or information costs, negotiating costs, supervision costs, 
and enforcement costs (Ruben et al., 2007). By considering three principal aspects of TCE: 
asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency, business transactions might occur at spot 
markets, vertical coordination (contracts) and control over supply chain by the buyers. The 
use of spot market transactions can increase transaction costs for marketing because of supply 
chain partners’ opportunistic behaviours. Vertical coordination is one way of lowering the 
risks associated with high transaction costs.  
Similarly, the lack of information prevents supply chain partners from making rational 
decisions (Williamson, 1979). Thus, analysing transaction costs allows us to observe different 
modes of engagement, from choice based spot transactions to various forms of vertical 
coordination (Peterson et al., 2001). The ‘contract form’ of business transactions occur under 
the presence of contributory favourable transaction costs (Williamson, 2004). Indeed, 
information asymmetry in business transactions cause uncertainty and leads to opportunism 
and bounded rationality between producers and buyers. Formalised (contractual) 
relationships can minimise uncertainty and opportunistic behavioural risks associated with 
these transactions (Miyata et al., 2009). However, Williamson (2004) indicates that moral 
hazard and adverse selection can lead to incomplete contracts. 
To participate in institutional channels, FFV growers need information about the market and 
buyers. In addition, they need a priori information about product and buyers’ specifications. 
Solving this information asymmetry gap adds ex-ante costs. If these costs are high, 
smallholders may be excluded from participating in these new markets. Similarly, the ex-post 
costs are associated with governing, monitoring, authorising, and conflict resolution costs 
during the operation of the relationship that are often re-negotiated with supply chain 
partners (Ostrom et al., 1993). Specifications, grading and private standards established by 
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institutional channels impose higher ex-ante costs on smallholder FFV growers. The imposition 
of grades and standards may put smallholders at risk of not being able to meet buyers’ 
specified requirements (Berdegué et al., 2005).   
The marketing of fresh produce depends on multiple factors. Access to market price 
information, the visibility of the buyer, proximity to the primary market, grading and food 
standard specifications, and mode of market engagement are significant. Transaction costs 
associated with the marketing of FFV occur at different stages of this process. Costs including, 
contacting and negotiating with the buyers, post-harvest handling, maintaining the products’ 
aesthetics and quality, obtaining price information and packaging and transport to market are 
essential for selling FFV. It is also necessary to discuss the farmers’ mode of market 
engagement; for instance, how farmers engage with the market, either through spot 
transactions, word-of-mouth, or establishing contacts with buyers. The following variables are 
relevant to transaction costs that influence FFV growers’ access to institutional channels.  
4.3.3.1  Market information and knowledge  
Selling produce to institutional channels incurs several transaction costs. Smallholder FFV 
growers may be uncertain if they will be able to meet quality and quantity demands. Ex-ante 
transaction costs associated with searching for, and negotiating with buyers, significantly 
affect a farmer’s ability to access new markets. Indeed, the search for markets entails a 
significant information cost. Transaction costs also involve obtaining access to existing 
markets, along with the ability to find the best prices. Farmers require information on market 
signals, prices, trends, changing preferences, consumer or quality requirements (Lee & 
Whang, 2000; Murray-Prior et al., 2005). Kizito, Donovan, and Staatz (2012) state that holding 
other factors constant, access to market information by staple crop farmers in Mozambique 
is associated with a higher probability of market participation (up to 34%). 
Conversely, asymmetric and incomplete information can discourage smallholders from finding 
the best marketing option for fresh produce. This leads to increases in transaction costs due 
to having to search for new buyers or dealing with previous bad decisions. Transaction cost 
theory describes the ‘bounded rationality’ factor, the idea that in decision-making, an 
individual’s choices are limited by the information s/he have, the cognitive limitations of their 
minds, and the finite amount of time they have to make a decision (Simon, 1957). For example, 
an agribusiness firm may have excellent knowledge of markets and make less ‘bounded’ (risky) 
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decisions, while smallholders possessing only limited knowledge, make more ‘bounded’ 
decisions and are exposed to exploitation due to the application of asymmetric knowledge 
(Winters, Simmons, & Patrick, 2005).  
Along with market information, the mode of information dissemination is also essential for 
smallholders’ participation in institutional channels (Chalemba, 2017). Singh and Singla (2011) 
find that institutional channels pay farmers in cash based on the daily morning market price. 
Using survey research in northern Ghana, Zanello and Srinivasan (2014) suggest that the 
principal role of radio broadcasts and mobile telephones is to provide a broader knowledge of 
market price signals. Information facilitates timely and accurate decision making, thus 
reducing risks and costs. 
In addition to the significance of the mode of information, the use of the information such as 
price, demand and selection of market depends on the farmers’ level of education and 
knowledge. Dhillon et al. (2006) conclude that the adoption of contract farming with food 
processing companies in Punjab is more prevalent among more educated farmers. The effect 
of technology, such as the internet and mobile phones, depends upon a producer’s ability to 
use these devices. The use of collective means of information sharing is also affected by 
farmers’ education level (Neven et al., 2009).  
There is a strong need for chain coordination utilising the flow of shared information among 
chain partners, coordination of processes from ‘farm-to-fork’ with efficient marketing 
arrangements. This is because the primary producer’s economic viability relies upon effective 
supply chain linkages with the end market (Boehlje, 1999). All forms of buyer-seller 
relationships rely on information exchange as a critical relationship connector and coordinator 
(Cannon & Perreault Jr, 1999). Smallholder farmers are challenged by various constraints in 
developing countries, such as a lack of information on prices and technologies (Markelova et 
al., 2009). Therefore, it hypothesised that, 
H9: Smallholder FFV growers with (a) access to and (b) usage of market information 
will be more likely to participate in institutional channels than those without these. 
H10: Smallholder FFV growers who monitor prices with (a) higher frequency and (b) 
using multiple sources will be more likely to participate in institutional channels than 
those who do not. 
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4.3.3.2  Buyer visibility  
Visibility is the ability to determine the on-going location of products, to trace products back 
to their origin and the production methods used (Aung & Chang, 2014). Visibility describes the 
interaction of primary producers with buyers and interaction with end customers. If primary 
producers know buyer requirements, for instance, the quality, quantity, frequency, changing 
trends and food safety requirements, they can then plan production more accurately. 
Moreover, closer proximity with buyers leads to lower marketing risk for smallholder farmers 
who have less marketable surpluses (Makhura, 2001a).    
Product traceability and point of origin are also required under various safety standards 
(Bertolini et al., 2006). Food supply chains in developing countries are significantly affected by 
environmental, demand and supply risks. The environmental risk may affect a particular value 
stream (for example, product contamination), or any node or link through which the supply 
chain passes, for example, as the result of an accident, direct action, extreme weather or 
natural disasters (Christopher & Peck, 2004). Higher visibility in food supply chains, especially 
for smallholder farmers, will materially assist in their participation, hence: 
H11: Smallholder FFV growers who have greater visibility of their supply chain will be 
more likely to participate in institutional channels than those who cannot. 
4.3.3.3  Proximity to the market 
Proximity (geospatially) to the market is a transaction cost variable that involves negotiation 
costs. The transport costs involved in transporting the goods from the farm to the market or 
delivery point is a major constraint for smallholder FFV growers. In rural regions, smallholders 
are generally dispersed over broad areas, and the infrastructure connecting farms with 
markets is often poor (Markelova et al., 2009). The potential effects of transport costs on the 
cropping choices of smallholder farmers have been investigated by a surprisingly small 
number of agricultural economists (Barrett, 2008; Goetz, 1992; Jayne, 1994). The marketing 
of FFV also includes transportation costs, waste costs, and waiting time. The physical distance 
(in kilometres) to the nearest market is a significant factor that affects farmers’ selection of a 
market. The perishability of FFV means that most farmers prefer to sell their goods at the 
nearest market because temperature-controlled logistics are not always available, meaning 
that farmers cannot guarantee their products will arrive at institutional channels in a good 
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state. The element of waste associated with transportation may contribute to a farmer’s 
decision to sell his/her produce at local markets and not participate in institutional channels. 
However, institutional channels often have their own transport assets to collect fresh produce 
from the farm gate, thus facilitating deliveries, but this is not often the case for smallholder 
producers (Singh & Singla, 2011). Longer distances to the market increase farmers’ 
dependence on intermediaries to sell fresh produce in traditional markets. Masuku, Makhura, 
and Rwelarmira (2001) consider long-distance markets as a constraint for smallholder farmers 
because it increases the total cost of selling their FFV. Given these considerations, hypothesis 
9 states that,  
H12: Smallholder FFV growers who are closer to their primary market will be more likely 
to participate in institutional channels than those who are not. 
4.3.3.4  Specification of grades and standards   
  
Specification of grades and standards are relevant to ex-post transaction costs for marketing 
(Ostrom et al., 1993). In particular, standards are rules of classification and measurements 
established by recognised and consistent use or by regulation. Quality (for example, the 
appearance, cleanliness, or taste), safety (for example, pesticide or artificial hormone residue, 
or the presence of microbes), authenticity (for example, a guarantee of the product’s 
geographical origin or use of traditional processes) are the main components of these grades 
and standards (Giovannucci & Reardon, 2000). Institutional channels adopt stricter grading 
and higher standards as a strategic move to gain differentiation (Moustier et al., 2010). For 
example, Central American supermarkets impose quality standards on fresh produce suppliers 
to differentiate their products from traditional products and markets (Berdegué et al., 2005). 
These stricter grading and quality standards constrain smallholders from participating in 
institutional channels. Further, consumer expectations are changing in fresh produce supply 
chains in developing countries (Boehlje, 1999). In addition to demanding lower prices, 
consumers are more aware of safety, quality, variety, convenience and service concerns 
(Fulponi, 2007). Increasingly, they are also demanding that production and processing 
methods be environmentally sustainable, animal-friendly and that companies obey 
recognised labour and social standards (McCluskey, 2007).  
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Indeed, Collins (2006) argues that institutional channels use quality as a tool for gaining a 
competitive advantage. However, the implementation of quality systems to meet the required 
standards is very expensive for smallholders. Ménard and Valceschini (2005) also mention the 
quality and quality standards as tools which enable institutional channels to compete with the 
informal sector by claiming superior product attributes. Due to the use of centralised 
procurement systems by institutional channels, other requirements in terms of daily deliveries 
and formalised transactions can also result in the exclusion of most small-scale farmers 
(Moustier et al., 2010). Implementing and standardising processes according to the 
requirements of institutional channels represent high upfront costs for those wanting to 
participate (Kirsten & Sartorius, 2002; Pingali et al., 2007). The strict quality and grading 
standards of institutional channels create significant barriers to entry for smallholders. 
Keeping this in mind, hypothesis 13 states that,  
H13: Smallholder FFV growers who can meet quality standards will be more likely to 
participate in institutional channels than those who do not. 
4.3.3.5  Mode of market engagement 
Transaction cost economics depicts a firm’s mode of engagement with suppliers from spot 
transactions to vertical coordination through ownership. Contrary to traditional spot markets 
that focus on a single commodity, institutional channels focus on differentiated commodities 
and graded products that is not possible to achieve through spot transactions (Young & Hobbs, 
2002). Traditional agribusiness assumes that there are no transaction costs in spot market 
transactions because individual farmers select potential buyers. In contrast, Williamson (2004) 
argues that NIE based vertically coordinated transactions relies on favourable transaction 
costs through contractual certainty. Due to price and demand certainty (favourable 
transaction costs) and smallholders’ bounded rationality, the contract mode of market 
engagement is considered the best choice for access to institutional channels from the farmers 
as well as buyers perspective. Hobbs (1996) suggests that supply chain cooperation and 
information symmetry enhance the chances of producers and buyers lowering their 
transaction costs. The success of smallholder participation in institutional channels through 
vertical coordination has been discussed by various researchers (Bellemare, 2012; Miyata et 
al., 2009). 
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literature shows that in general, farmers relationships with buyers can be characterised into 
three major buyer/seller relationship archetypes. Contract farming refers to the production 
and supply of agricultural produce under advanced contracts. The essence of such contracts 
being a commitment to provide an agricultural commodity of a specific type (and quantity), at 
a pre-determined time, at a pre-determined price to a known buyer. It involves four things; a 
pre-agreed price, quality standard, quantity or acreage (minimum/maximum) and the time of 
deliveries (Singh, 2009). Contracted farmers obtain inputs and production services from the 
buyers (Abebe, Bijman, Kemp, Omta, & Tsegaye, 2013). Farmers often receive advanced credit 
from buyers whose final payments are settled after the sale (Barrett et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, contract farming often requires farmers to use new technology and learn new 
skills in order to meet industry standards and quality requirements (Kirsten & Sartorius, 2002). 
Contract farming mitigates price risks as buyers specify prices in advance (Singh, 2009). In 
essence, contract farming represents a new mechanism for small farmers to sell FFV into 
institutional channels. Bathla (2015) reports that farmers contracting with retail companies in 
the Haryana state of India gain higher prices/profits, through lower transportation cost and 
marketing cost, timely payments and transparency. Other researchers have confirmed that 
the existence of a guaranteed market reduces the transaction costs associated with searching 
for potential buyers, thereby encouraging participation (Minot, 2011; Pingali et al., 2005; 
Ruben et al., 2007). Hence, hypothesis 14 states that,  
H14: Smallholder FFV growers with a formal contract, will be more likely to participate 
in institutional channels than those without. 
4.3.3.6  Membership and experience with cooperatives  
The mode of market participation is a significant factor for fresh produce growers in terms of 
economic viability and guaranteed markets. Smallholder performance can be heavily 
influenced by their participation in institutional channels and membership with cooperatives 
(Barrett, 2008). Collective action through farmer groups is a valuable social asset for 
smallholders who continue to face challenges in accessing both input and output markets. 
Collective action refers to actions taken by a group either directly or indirectly in pursuit of 
members’ perceived shared interests. These arise when people work together to accomplish 
a goal that involves their common interest (Sandler, 1992). For example, cooperatives provide 
their members with education and technical assistance to ensure that they meet changing 
market requirements. The International Cooperative Alliance, the body representing co-
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operatives worldwide, considers technical training and education as significant principles for 
the success of the cooperative movement (Lyne & Collins, 2008). 
Without joint action, FFV growers are often worse off because of volatile prices, per unit 
marketing costs, less effective logistics and asymmetric information flow (Cadilhon et al., 
2006). Individually, smallholders are unable to meet the entry cost for the institutional 
channels (Reardon & Barrett, 2000). Neven et al. (2009) have similar findings in the case of 
smallholders who supply FFV to supermarkets in Kenya. Agribusiness researchers have 
categorised the services provided by farmer organisations, and these are; organisational 
services, production services and marketing services (Hellin et al., 2009; Markelova et al., 
2009; Narrod et al., 2009). Farmer groups organise themselves in such a way that they can 
establish profitable relationships with buyers. This assumes that institutional arrangements 
can lower the transaction costs associated with negotiating with multiple buyers. Prior 
literature provides evidence that collective action among farmers provides support and 
enables fresh produce growers to participate in institutional channels (Berdegué Sacristán, 
2001; Boselie et al., 2003; Henson et al., 2005; Minten et al., 2005). Mahagrapes is an example 
of collective action in India, where organised small grape growers participate in the export 
market by fulfilling stringent quality requirements under several cooperatives (Roy & Thorat, 
2008). Further, farmers also benefit from production services offered by farmers’ 
organisations.  Cooperatives are able to access cheaper inputs through collective bargaining, 
which they can then offer to farmers at an unexaggerated price. Jagwe (2011) report that 
cooperatives in Burundi help provide inputs and that there is a relationship between farmers’ 
group membership and participation in the banana market.  
Scarcity of capital and financial management are also challenges for developing countries’ FFV 
growers. Asante-Addo et al. (2017) report that cooperative membership enables small FFV 
growers to participate in credit rationing programmes. Bellemare (2012) points out that 
household heads who are members of peasant organisations are 55% more likely to 
participate in contract farming than households whose heads are not members of such 
organisations. Lawal et al. (2004) find a positive influence of cooperative membership on the 
adoption of an improved variety of cassava by Ghanaian farmers.     
Institutional channels pose strict quality, grades and standards on sellers to gain a competitive 
advantage over rival firms. Moustier et al. (2010) report that in Vietnam, smallholder FFV 
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growers are side-lined because of supermarkets’ strict quality requirements. Hence, power 
relationships between institutional channels and smallholders tend to be highly asymmetric 
and primarily favour the resource-endowed large farmers or institutional suppliers, and large 
retailers or wholesalers (Kirsten & Sartorius, 2002; Vorley et al., 2009).  
However, collective action can help small producers to be more competitive (Markelova et al., 
2009). Shared interest through collective action can counter the power and policies of 
intermediaries (Narrod et al., 2009). Roy and Thorat (2008) show that grape collectives in India 
have successfully lowered their transaction costs and given them more bargaining power. 
Devaux et al. (2009) report a similar finding, where the collective actions of smallholders 
created new markets for potatoes growers in remote highland areas of ‘Papa Andina’. 
Similarly, Wollni and Zeller (2007) reveal that coffee cooperatives in Costa Rica facilitate small-
scale growers’ participation in speciality markets delivering higher prices. 
Further, as Narrod et al. (2007) report, collective actions enable farmers to pool resources so 
that they can meet food safety standards. Also, the shared resources by pooling resources for 
a common goal facilitate smallholders’ economic viability, livelihood and responding to 
adverse events such as disasters. Holloway et al. (2000) note that producer cooperatives are 
useful in overcoming access barriers to assets, information, services and markets for FFV 
production. Okello, Narrod, and Roy (2007) also find that in Kenya, Ethiopia, and Zambia, 
green bean growers organised in farmer groups were able to enter European markets. Hence, 
cooperative arrangements lower farmers’ transaction and information costs, asymmetric 
power structures, and facilitate smallholder participation in institutional channels (Barham & 
Chitemi, 2009; Kaganzi et al., 2009). Therefore, it is hypothesised that: 
H15a: Smallholder FFV growers who participate in collective action will be more likely 
to participate in institutional channels than those without membership. 
 H15b: Smallholder FFV growers with more collective action experience will be more 
likely to participate in institutional channels than those not engaged in collective 
action.  
 Institutional and infrastructure characteristics 
The fourth component recognises the influence of institutional and infrastructure on the 
market participation of FFV growers. Having access to credit and quality inputs is essential for 
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FFV growers. Institutions such as agricultural universities and research institutions add 
knowledge and innovation to existing agribusiness practices, and governments provide 
regulative policies that entities can use for compliance. The flow of information also depends 
upon the structure of institutions and how they spread market information related to such 
things as weather, prices and future options. The availability of storage, cold chain and 
transportation and the national roading infrastructure also depends on institutions and their 
capabilities and how they act in challenging agribusiness activities. Therefore, the following 
variables relevant to institutional and infrastructure characteristics are included, to measure 
their impact on FFV growers’ participation in institutional channels.  
4.3.4.1  Access to formal credit    
In agriculture, farm credit is as vital as other inputs used in production. Farm credit is not only 
considered one of the critical inputs in agriculture but is also an effective means of economic 
transformation. A large number of agencies, including cooperatives, commercial banks, non-
banking financial institutions, self-help groups and informal credit agencies represent a 
developing country’s farm credit delivery system. Credit plays a vital role in agricultural growth 
and day-to-day farming activities, especially as farming is capital intensive (Goel & Kaur, 2008; 
Hazarika & Alwang, 2003).  
The seasonal nature of farm credit needs and the uncertain nature of most agricultural 
produce undermines the viability of borrowing groups for farm credit purposes (Hazell, 2007). 
Low collateral and a lack of availability of farm credit from publicly funded agricultural 
development banks, means that smallholders often have to rely on informal sources of credit 
(Doran, McFayden, & Vogel, 2009). A high percentage of small scale farms in developing 
countries are financed through informal sources of credit (Adebayo & Adeola, 2008; Gill, 2016; 
Satish, 2006). The primary reason is the interlocking of credit with the product market (Jodhka, 
2006). Fresh produce growers take credit from rural money lenders who also work as 
commissioning agents at the wholesale markets (Singh, Kaur, et al., 2009). An indebted farmer 
not only has to grow low-risk commodities but must sell them through the same commission 
agent to whom they are indebted. These commission agents also own retail outlets at the 
marketplace where they sell inputs (seeds, fertilisers, pesticides) and agricultural equipment. 
They sell these resources on credit and charge farmers high-interest rates (2 to 3 per cent per 
month) (Singh, 2016a). This system may prevent fresh produce growers from selling through 
institutional channels. 
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The demand for farm credit increases with the transformation of traditional farming to more 
commercial models. The introduction of high yield varieties, the use of agrichemicals to 
control weeds, pesticides, fertilisers, and the adoption of modern irrigation techniques and 
machinery require additional cash inflows for FFV growers. In developing countries, farm 
credit also plays a significant role in the widespread adoption of modern production and 
harvesting technologies. Capital investment constraints for the installation of costly 
machinery, modern irrigation techniques and the availability of quality seeds also hinder 
smallholder farmers from participating in institutional channels. Foltz (2004) finds that access 
to farm credit increases the profitability of less endowed farmers in Malawi. Logically, the 
availability of credit increases small and medium farmers’ ability to participate in modern food 
chains (Ayaz & Hussain, 2011; Minot, 2011; Poulton et al., 2006). Hence, credit provides 
farmers with the necessary support to purchase quality seeds, buy machinery, arrange/build 
irrigation, install fences, and pay for any related farm expenses. These features all increase a 
smallholder’s chance of participating in institutional channels. Thus, it is hypothesised that,  
H16: Smallholder FFV growers with access to the formal source of farm credit will be 
more likely to participate in institutional channels than those with limited or no access. 
4.3.4.2  Access to cold storage and logistics 
Logistics involves all activities that are focused on transporting products; getting the right 
product, to the right place, at the right time without the loss of its natural form (Christopher, 
2016). The perishable nature of fresh produce means that it requires a high degree of 
coordination between different actors along the chain. Each stage requires a strong emphasis 
on workforce development to prevent damage and wastage through mishandling or delays. It 
is particularly significant for countries located in tropical or hot climates who do not possess 
an integrated cool-chain infrastructure. Hence, logistics and transportation are key supporting 
activities in the global fresh produce supply chain. These functions ensure that perishable 
products reach their destinations in good condition. Cooling storage units are used throughout 
the chain to keep produce fresh. Both air and sea freighting, supported by the cold-chain, are 
crucial for maintaining the product’s shelf-life and timely delivery (Blackburn & Scudder, 2009; 
Blandon, 2006; Cooper, Lambert, & Pagh, 1997; Salin, 1998). 
Logistics infrastructure, such as refrigerated transport, cold storage,  and better sharing of 
market information lower the risk of food losses (Pingali et al., 2005). Institutional channels 
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require a regular supply of FFV that means that most smallholder farmers are unable to 
participate due to having a limited marketable surplus (Gulati et al., 2007; Ruben et al., 2007). 
In developing countries, poor road infrastructure (Minten et al., 2009; Singh, 2009), and high 
chances of product spoilage (Rienekens, 2011) result in high volumes of post-harvest losses, 
and as such, smallholder farmers are less likely to participate in institutional channels. 
Therefore, hypothesis 17 states that; 
H17: Smallholder FFV growers who have access to logistics (including cold chain 
storage and transport) will be more likely to participate in institutional channels than 
those without access to these resources/facilities. 
4.3.4.3  Access to technical assistance  
While FFV growers search for markets where they can meet quality requirements and sell their 
products at a predictable price, they also look for market attributes such as inputs, credit, 
advice and technical assistance. Technical assistance is also an important part of marketing. 
The agribusiness literature highlights that funding for technical assistance differs across the 
globe. In East Asia, South Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean, donor contributions make 
up less than 10% of the total expenditure on agricultural technical assistance. In the Middle 
East and North Africa, donors fund an estimated 21% of the total technical assistance, while 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, they fund an estimated 55% (Rapsomanikis, 2015). 
Technical assistance enables FFV growers to optimise their use of available resources. It also 
enables them to address risk more efficiently. Technical assistance includes farm preparation, 
bed width, plantations and the optimum use of fertilisers and pesticides, harvesting 
techniques and cold storage. With the right technical assistance, FFV farmers should be well 
equipped with technical knowledge and have a greater understanding of the marketing 
process. Technical assistance provided by agricultural institutions, such as universities and 
agricultural research centres, can help farmers with optimal land preparation, how to 
determine the adequate use of seeds and other inputs, credit, and technical services while 
guaranteeing FFV buyers’ supply. Cooperatives play a vital role in training and providing 
technical assistance to participating members. Hence, it is hypothesised that; 
H18: Smallholder FFV growers with access to technical assistance will be more likely to 
participate in institutional channels than those with limited or no access. 
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4.4 Linking the specific research questions with the hypotheses 
At this stage, it is essential to step back and review the research questions and hypotheses 
that have been developed. Table 4.2 below shows the relationships between the specific 
questions and the relevant hypotheses.  
Table 4.2 Linking the specific research questions with the hypotheses  
 
4.5 Chapter summary 
This chapter has developed the research hypotheses and contextualised them concerning the 
pre-existing agribusiness literature and theoretical framework. As noted, this research aims to 
empirically investigate the drivers of smallholder FFV growers’ participation in institutional 
channels. The literature review identifies various exogenous and endogenous factors that 
affect FFV growers’ production and marketing decisions. The exogenous factors’ effects on 
the macro-level include, changes in macroeconomic policies, trade liberalisation and 
government investments in extension services, improvement of transportation and 
communication infrastructure, upgrading credit services and rural markets (Minot & Ngigi, 
2004; Von Braun & Kennedy, 1994). They also include urbanisation, population growth, 
changes in per capita income and growing awareness about food safety and nutrition.  
Similarly, various endogenous factors related to farmers and farm characteristics were 
considered in the development of the research hypotheses. Various farmers related human 
 Research Questions Hypotheses 
RQ1 What is the impact of human capital assets on the participation 
of FFV growers in institutional channels?   
H1 to H4 
RQ2 What is the impact of physical farm assets on the participation of 
FFV growers in institutional channels?   
H5 to H8 
RQ3 What is the impact of the transaction costs of marketing on the 
participation of FFV growers in institutional channels? 
H9 to H13 
RQ4 What is the impact of collective action on FFV growers’ 
participation in institutional channels? 
H15a to H15b 
RQ5 What is the impact of institutional characteristics on the 
participation of FFV growers in institutional channels? 
H16 to H18 
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and physical farm assets, for example, age, level of education family labour, ownership of land, 
farm machinery, off-farm income, the experience of FFV production variables were also 
considered.  
Also, in the theoretical light of NIE, the role and effect of transaction cost and collective actions 
on farmer’s decision making is considered significant in the formulation of this empirical 
investigation. The current study also includes the role of access to information, social capital 
and group/cooperative membership. However, before testing these hypotheses, it is 




Research Methodology  
5.1 Introduction 
All research is based on underlying philosophical assumptions about what constitutes 'valid' 
research and which research method(s) is/are appropriate for the development of knowledge 
in a given study. In order to conduct and evaluate any research, it is important to know what 
these assumptions are. This chapter discusses the philosophical assumptions and the design 
strategies underpinning this research.  
The chapter begins with an overview of the study’s geographic scope. The chapter includes 
information about the research philosophy and strategies along with the framework. The 
quantitative data is analysed using statistical data analysis techniques: analyses of variance 
(ANOVA), T-Tests, cross-tabulations, and linear regressions. This chapter outlines all the 
quantitative methods employed in this study. 
5.2 Research philosophy 
Research studies differ in their philosophies and how they approach the design, data 
collection, data analysis, and results from interpretation. Broadly speaking, there are two 
major research philosophies in the Western tradition of science, namely positivism 
(sometimes called scientific) and interpretivism (also known as anti-positivist) (Sekaran & 
Bougie, 2016). 
The positivist approach to social reality is based on the philosophical ideas of the French 
Philosopher Auguste Comte. According to him, observations and reason are the best means 
of understanding human behaviour; true knowledge is based on the experience of senses and 
can be obtained by observation and experimentation (Comte, 2015). At the ontological level, 
positivists assume that the reality is objectively given and is measurable using properties 
which are independent of the researcher and his or her instruments; in other words, 
knowledge is objective and quantifiable. Positivistic thinkers adopt scientific methods and 
systematise the knowledge generation process with the help of quantification to enhance 
precision in the description of parameters and the relationship among them (Babbie & 
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Mouton, 2001). Positivism is concerned with uncovering truth and presenting it using 
empirical means. 
In contrast, the interpretivism paradigm believes that all knowledge is a matter of 
interpretation. The strength of this approach in the qualitative methods used to understand 
the phenomenon. The interpretive approach tends to be more flexible, meaning it can adjust 
to the unexpected. Hence it is more appropriate for producing new theories in areas not 
previously widely explored (Yin, 2009). 
Interpretive researchers believe that reality consists of people’s subjective experiences of the 
external world; thus, they may adopt an inter-subjective epistemology and the ontological 
belief that reality is socially constructed. Interpretivist researchers believe that there is no 
single or correct route or a particular method to knowledge (Babbie & Mouton, 2001). In short, 
the interpretive tradition argues that there are no ‘correct’ or ‘incorrect’ theories. Instead, 
they should be judged according to how ‘interesting’ they are to the researcher as well as 
those involved in the same areas (Creswell, 2013). Researchers following this paradigm 
attempt to derive their constructs from the field using in-depth examinations of the 
phenomenon of interest (Babbie & Mouton, 2001).  
The interpretive paradigm is underpinned by observations and interpretations; to observe is 
to collect information about events, while to interpret is to make meaning of that information 
by drawing inferences or by judging the match between the information and some abstract 
pattern. It attempts to understand phenomena through the meanings that people assign to 
them (Silverman, 2013). In Summary, Table 5.1 outlines the research methods associated with 
each approach, ranging from one extreme, the positivist quantitative approach, to the other 
extreme, interpretivist qualitative approaches. The positivist approach believes in a singular 
objective reality. With quantitative data in the form of numbers, the singular reality is easy to 
code numerically. For example, a positivist approach would argue that it is possible to code 







 Table 5.1  Research approaches under epistemological, philosophical positions 
Research approach Researcher should Method 
Positivism:  
This approach promotes 
the idea of one 
objective reality  
• Focus on facts 
• Look for causality and 
fundamental laws 
• Reduce phenomena to the 
simplest elements 
• Formulate hypotheses and 
then test them 
• Operationalising concepts  
• Large samples 
• Randomisation 
• Quantitative approach 
Interpretivism: 
Is related to 
constructivism. It holds 
that social reality is a 
subjective construction 
based on interpretation  
• Focus on meanings 
• Try to understand what is 
happening 
• Look at the totality of each 
situation 
• Develop ideas through 
induction from data 
• Use multiple methods to 
establish different views 
of the same phenomena 
• Small samples 
investigated in-depth over 
time 
• Contextualisation 
• Qualitative approach 
Source: Adapted from (Quinlan, Babin, Carr, Griffin, & Zikmund, 2011; Wilson, 2006, p. 160) 
 Research approach  
This research uses a positivist approach as it holds that there is one objective reality; this 
reality is singular and separate from consciousness (Quinlan et al., 2011). Furthermore, 
positivism philosophical system is grounded in the rational proof/disproof of scientific 
assertions; it assumes that there is an objective reality. It deals with the nature of knowledge 
itself, its possibility, and scope. It also reflects how researchers can determine whether 
something is good or bad (Rudestam & Newton, 2014). The positivist approach then informs 
the quantitative methodology used in this study.  
Hence, due to the quantitative nature of data, large samples can be used to generalise the 
findings for policy formulation (Sekaran & Bougie, 2016). The quantitative approach is 
considered appropriate for scientific enquiry through the formulation of hypothesising to test 
the theories (Creswell, 2013). Knowledge of the quantitative research method is especially 
important because of the emphasis on evidence-based practices in the field of social sciences. 
However, quantitative data is inflexible and cross-sectional. Conversely, this approach has 
limitations related to understanding behaviour and causality.  
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Conversely, qualitative data is often too complicated to code numerically. As data sometimes 
takes the form of thoughts, feelings, ideas, researchers can lose richness and depth when they 
code it. However, the collection of qualitative data can be very time consuming and costly. 
Further, in analysis, thematic presentation and coding of complex phenomena can be 
interpreted differently. Others may also question the results due to a lack of generalisability 
(Malhotra, Peterson, & Kleiser, 1999).  
As a starting point to adopting a research approach, (Sarantakos, 1998) suggests that a 
positivist approach should be used when existing knowledge on a particular phenomenon has 
been accepted as robust and comprehensive.  
The primary reason for adopting a positivist approach in this study is that prior research uses 
this technique to measure the effects of components of transaction cost and collective action 
theories on market participation in Africa, Latin America and Asia. The transaction cost 
variables and collective action components, along with human capital, farm physical and 
institutional assets have been examined by various researchers to explore smallholders’ 
market access (Alene et al., 2008; Barham & Chitemi, 2009; Barrett, 2008; De Janvry et al., 
1991; Devaux et al., 2009; Makhura, 2001b; Narrod et al., 2009; Pingali et al., 2005). Therefore, 
the positivist quantitative approach seems more appropriate for examining the market 
participation of FFV growers in institutional channels. 
5.3 Research design   
Under the positivist quantitative approach, there are several different data collection 
techniques that researchers can choose from according to their objectives, research budget, 
time and knowledge. As such, this research uses a survey approach because; 
• The study’s primary objective is to produce numeric descriptions of various factors 
derived from smallholder FFV growers’ participation in institutional channels.   
• The survey design is an appropriate method for collecting numeric information. 
• The components of the survey include sampling, designing questions, and data 
collection. These activities have many applications outside of the sample survey, but 
their combination is essential to a good survey design (Fowler Jr, 2013). The survey 
design starts with the first step of reviewing the previous literature and assessing the 
reliability and validity of questions used. The time element of data collection and its 
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acceptability to potential respondents is a crucial point in survey research (Biemer, 
2010).  
 Survey instrument design and scale development  
Survey and observations are two basic models for obtaining primary quantitative data. The 
research objectives determine the information required for the research. Malhotra (2006) 
believes that there are no rules of thumb for constructing ideal survey instruments. The 
formulation of survey questions requires creativity, skill, and experience on the part of the 
researcher. However, method books and previous studies on similar topics can direct 
researchers and help them to minimise mistakes. The survey instrument design is influenced 
by various factors, such as the data collection method, respondent group characteristics and 
administrative issues such as cost, facilities, time and personal availability of interviewees. 
The current study uses the survey design process proposed by Malhotra (2006) and Zikmund, 
Babin, Carr, and Griffin (2013). The current study required a quantitative survey instrument, 
based on the information needed to meet the study’s objectives. Survey instrument 
development also includes a review of previous studies in agribusiness on the topic of fresh 
produce grower’s market participation, as discussed in previous chapters.  Figure 5.1 (below) 
outlines the steps for constructing a survey instrument used for the current study.   
Review previous studies/ survey 
instruments use relevant to research 
Survey objectives and information 
requirement 
Consult with experts/supervisor 
Decide the questions structure/question 
wording/appropriateness/question order 
Review and revise survey instrument
Finalise survey instrument 
Pre-test and revise survey instrument  
Translated into Punjabi language  
Pre-test with experts of both languages 
and revise again 
Translated into English language to 
eliminate ambiguity   
 
Figure 5.1 Guidelines for formulating the survey instrument 
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Note that three additional steps were added to the process due to respondents’ language 
preferences. The survey instrument formulation process starts with the research objectives 
and information required. Previous studies are a good source of information for developing a 
new survey. Examining questions that have been used by other reviews on a similar topic 
provides a useful starting point for choosing the wording of the questions. This research 
considered prior survey instruments used in Master/PhD theses and journal articles published 
on fresh produce, market participation and developing countries in drafting its questions 
(Bhattarai, Lyne, & Martin, 2015a; Blandon, 2006; Poliquit, 2006; Riungu, 2011).      
An interviewee assisted (personal interview) is structuring the first draft of the survey. 
Respondents were asked to indicate their degree of agreement by choosing one of five 
response categories (on a Likert scale). The survey instrument included questions related to 
each of the different variables in the hypotheses, including socioeconomics, farm and 
household characteristics, marketing, and organisational characteristics of the farmers and 
their farms.   
 Scale development 
A scale is defined as the combined set of points that anchor the measurement tool or validate 
the instrument. Scale development is the process of representing the range of possible 
responses to a question about a particular construct. The goal of scale development is to 
precisely triangulate and quantify what is to be measured (Malhotra, 2006). There are three 
essential elements in scale developments, and these are clarity in terms of the; items, 
variables and constructs. In this research, scales are used to measure latent variables or 
constructs: beliefs, satisfaction, and attitudes.  
The Likert scale is often used to collect interval scale data to assess agreement or 
disagreement with or the importance of a particular statement. The latent items in the survey 
instrument consist of items such as benefits of cooperatives, factor considerations in choosing 
the market channels, source of price information, lending, the importance of standards and 
grading are measured through Likert scales 1 to 5, where ‘1’ accounts for the minimum 
possible value, and ‘5’ accounts for the maximum possible value. Overall, a variety of data 
types were produced, including nominal, ordinal, interval, and ratio data types.   
The high number of values for the Likert scale were reverse coded to obtain an actual meaning 
and maintain consistency for data analysis. Before responses can be combined into a single 
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meaningful total score, all items must be in the same direction. To accomplish this, the scores 
for those items that are in the opposite direction were “reversed.” High scores became low 
scores, and low scores became high scores.     
 Survey instrument translation  
Once formulated, each question item needed to be reviewed internally before being tested. 
This way, spelling mistakes and grammar discrepancies could be corrected as early in the 
process as possible. The internal review was conducted with joint meetings with PhD 
supervisors. Here decisions were made on issues like question type, structure, wording, 
appropriateness, and order.    
When developing the survey instrument, it was essential to have a clear idea of the sample 
populations’ characteristics. The respondent groups’ profiles influenced the question design. 
Hence the chosen format and wording were designed to be applicable and understandable to 
all respondents, in particular poorly educated farmers in Punjab. Further, the survey 
instrument needed to be translated into languages commonly spoken by the sample regions 
(Fowler Jr, 2013). 
For this sample, Punjabi is the primary language. While Punjabi is a modern Indo-Aryan 
language spoken mostly in the Punjab states of both India and Pakistan, it is also used in East 
Africa, the United Kingdom, and Canada. Approximately 45 million people around the world 
speak Punjabi either as a first or second language. It is recognised as one of the several 
national languages of India and Pakistan (Bhatia, 2013, p. 25). Therefore, after the survey 
instrument was drafted in English, it was then translated into the Punjabi language. The survey 
instrument was then back-translated into English to ensure that consistency and flow were 
maintained.  
The back-translation of the Punjabi version was conducted by two experts in the Punjabi and 
English languages by members of the Economics Department from Punjabi University, Patiala 
(Punjab, India). The back translation ensured that there would be no problems with wording 
or measurements and that the questions would be easily understood by potential 
respondents (Sekaran & Bougie, 2016). A paper-based survey instrument, translated into the 
Punjabi language, was used for data collection. 
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  Pretesting the survey instrument  
Pretesting the survey instrument is an important way to pinpoint problem areas, reduce 
measurement errors, reduce respondent burden, determine whether or not respondents are 
interpreting questions correctly, and ensure that the order of questions is not influencing the 
way a respondent answers (Quinlan et al., 2011). In other words, a pretest is a critical 
examination of the survey instrument that will help determine whether a survey will function 
as a valid and reliable social science research tool. 
By pretesting the survey, researchers can ensure that the questions are formulated and that 
the response options are relevant, comprehensive, and mutually exclusive - not just in their 
own estimation, but also from the respondents’ point of view (Babbie, 2013). Making sure 
that researchers and respondents interpret the survey, in the same way, pre-testing must be 
conducted. Pretesting can bring to light those inevitable instances of obscure terminology, 
unfamiliar references, and ambiguous words and phrases that the developer may have 
overlooked. It is essential to remove these issues as they may confound and frustrate 
respondents and may negatively affect the data quality and response rates. Furthermore, the 
pretest also allows the researcher to assess response latency, the amount of time it takes to 
complete individual items in the survey, as well as the full survey, which can then be reported 
in the introduction of the full-scale survey (Zikmund et al., 2013). The pretesting of the survey 
instrument was conducted in the selected Majitha and Jandiala blocks of Amritsar district, and 
the Bhogpur block of the Jalandhar district of the state of Punjab (India). The areas were 
purposively selected for pretesting, as they have the greatest area of FFV crops in Punjab.  
A snowball sampling technique was used to select respondents for the pretest and the main 
survey. The snowball sampling technique is outlined in Table 5.4. Pretest respondents were 
chosen based on leads provided from village leaders (the Sarpanch or Numberdar), and lead 
farmers.  
The pretest includes 22 respondents through personal interviews. The pretest was helpful for 
the researcher in several ways. The pretesting helped to narrow the scope of the study only 
two major crops (potato and tomato) for subsequent interviews as it was determined that 
data would be available for both crops. Along with narrowing the scope to the two fresh 
produce crops, survey responses were recorded, and changes were made to the survey 
instrument. The pretesting identified some items with ambiguous language that was 
corrected in the final version. The survey instrument was revised to incorporate the 
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respondents’ suggestions. These changes are described in Table 5.2. The final version of both 
languages after the pretest of the survey are included in the Appendix. 
 Table 5.2 Corrections to the survey instrument post-pretesting  
SNO  Questions  Item  Description of changes  
1 Question 9 Farm labour  Added seasonal labour in farm labour.   
2 Question 13  Variable 
production cost  
Added bifurcation of cost with each activity along with 
family labour and hired labour in production cost.  
3 Question 20 Market channel Changes in market channel options from open-ended 
to six market selections.  
4 Question 27  Source of price 
information 
The added tendency of using source and applied the 
Likert scale.  
5 Question 28 Mode of market 
engagement 
Response limited to 3 options according to pre-test 
study responses.  
 
The reference period of the study was circa 2017-2018. The data gathering was conducted in 
the North West region of the Punjab State of India in October – December 2017. 
 Survey protocol 
Survey protocols provide the researcher with a set of general rules, procedures, and steps for 
engaging with respondents. Data collection should be planned as efficiently as possible and 
the researcher should aim for consistency across all interviews (Babbie & Mouton, 2001). 
Survey protocols are a road map the researcher follows to maintain the uniformity of the 
entire data collection process. Following a protocol, minimises deviations in outcomes (Yin, 
2009).   
• The interviewer met each respondent with “Sat Siri Akal”, a warm greeting in Punjabi 
culture. It is a common way to introduce yourself and establish trust. It provides an 
image of competence; Sat means "truth", Siri is an honorific word, and Akaal (or Akal) 
means "the timeless being, God". Thus, the phrase can roughly be translated as "True 
is the name of God". Sat Shri Akaal is exclusively used by Sikhs to greet each other. 
• The protocol continued with general information questions designed to ‘break the ice’ 
and establish rapport. The researcher explained the survey’s purpose, its importance 
and its use. 
• The researcher either met with respondents in their homes or the field. 
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• Respondents’ elder sons or wives were encouraged to help them to complete the 
survey.  
• The wording of the survey instrument was designed to sound like a normal 
conversation. 
• A similar format of a paper-based survey instrument with the same pattern of question 
numbers was followed to ensure the consistency.  
• The researcher recorded the respondents’ responses immediately on the survey 
instrument sheet, ensuring data accuracy and completeness. 
• In addition to the survey questions, field notes were also taken to record clarifications, 
aspects of the environment, non-verbal cues and the respondents’ emotions. 
• The respondents were formally acknowledged and thanked at the end of the interview 
for their contribution and time.  
 Units of analysis 
Keller (2010) states that when choosing an appropriate unit of analysis, a researcher should 
be aware of the ecological fallacy, which states that the conclusion(s) drawn at a group level 
may not pertain to the individual (that is, the student), and conversely that the conclusion(s) 
drawn based on the analysis of individual-level (that is, the student) may not be accurate at 
the group (that is, the school) level. Therefore when choosing the unit of analysis, it is essential 
to consider the unit of generalisation, as the conclusions and inferences drawn as a result of 
the investigation may be accurate only at the level of the unit of analysis. Thus, if it is desired 
to conclude achievement at the school level, the unit of analysis, and generalisation should be 
at the school level, not at the student level, regardless of the unit of measurement (Keller, 
2010). 
The objective of the current study is to understand FFV growers’ views and what factors they 
consider in their market selections. Hence, “FFV farmers’ market participation” is the unit of 
analysis in this research. To briefly reiterate, in this research, a smallholder farmer is defined 
as a farmer who has a farming area of less than 4.99 ha.  
 Sampling technique, sample frame and sample size 
5.3.7.1  Probability sampling 
In probability sampling, the selected sample is considered representative of the population. 
Probability sampling is based on mathematical theories that claim that the research findings 
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can be generalised to the entire study population. The underlying assumption of the 
probability sampling technique is that each unit of the population has an equal chance to be 
chosen in the sample. As this is the case, the researcher must have a complete list of every 
member of the population from which the sample will be chosen. This comprehensive list of 
the population is known as the sample frame. Simple random sampling, stratified sampling, 
systematic sampling and cluster sampling are a few examples of probability sampling 
techniques used (Quinlan et al., 2011) 
5.3.7.2  Non-probability sampling  
In non-probability sampling, the sample is selected to represent the target population of 
interest. In the case where the sampling frame is without a complete list of the population, 
the non-probability sampling technique is more appropriate. Contrary to probability sampling, 
all entities do not have equal chances to be chosen (Quinlan et al., 2011). Without a complete 
sampling frame, it is not possible to use probability sampling. Non-probability sampling 
techniques include judgemental sampling, quota sampling, snowball sampling and 
convenience sampling.  
5.3.7.3  Sampling technique in the current study  
This research uses quantitative methods, with a mix of snowball sampling and purposive 
sampling. There was no complete list of FFV growers in the sample region, making both 
purposive and snowball necessary sampling techniques. Kunda-Wamuwi, Babalola, and 
Chirwa (2017) adopt the same method to investigate the reasons behind the abandonment of 
jatropha projects using out-grower schemes among smallholder farmers in the Chibombo 
District of Zambia. 
Similarly, Kyomugisha, Mugisha, and Sebatta (2017) use the snowball technique to determine 
market efficiency and profits from the potato market chain, and factors that influence 
earnings in Uganda. Further, Mercado, Carsten Nico, and Honig (2018) employ snowball 
sampling to investigate how smallholders cope with international food safety standards in 
Bolivia. Similarly, in the Indian context, Kerswell and Pratap (2019) use snowball and purposive 
sampling to investigate the consequences of worker cooperatives on the economy.   
Two districts of the Punjab region were selected for the study. These have the maximum area 
under fresh produce. In snowball sampling, the most suitable participants are contacted first 
and asked to recommend other participants. Two blocks of the Amritsar district, namely 
Jandiala Guru and Majitha, and two blocks of the Jalandhar district, Bhogpur and Adampur, 
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were selected using the same criterion. That is the maximum area under potato and tomato 
crop cultivation. Referrals are used to locate others who possess the same characteristics 
(Biernacki & Waldorf, 1981). These additional persons are contacted and asked to name 
additional persons in the population. The process continues until an adequate sample size has 
been obtained or until no new names are elicited from the process. 
5.3.7.4   Creating a snowball sample 
Snowball sampling was useful for enabling research participants who were contacted first to 
identify other FFV farmers for participation in the study. Table 5.3 shows the steps used, 
1. Identifying the leading farmers of the village or the head of the village in the desired 
population who grow FFV; and  
2. Using these leads to find further FFV growers and so on until the sample size is met. 
Table 5.3 Steps for creating a snowball sample 
Steps                                          Market/ Informants   
Step 1 meetings  • Numbardar:  A title in the sample region (Punjab, India), belongs to 
resourceful families of the village, collects revenue for the state, 
and has wide-ranging governmental powers, associated social 
prestige (see Figure 5.2) 
• Sarpanch (a democratically elected village leader), Ex-Sarpanch of 
the village 
• Seed suppliers and lead farmers  
• Processing company procurement officer 
Step2 meetings  • Contacting farmers if the phone number is provided. Otherwise 
personal visit  




Figure 5.2 Meeting with Nambardar and lead farmer at Jodhey village, Punjab, India 
Source: Private photo taken during field survey 
5.3.7.5  Sample size  
A critical aspect of sampling design is deciding upon the sample size. Statistically, a large 
sample is considered more generalisable and affects the degree of inferences. While small 
samples tend to produce unreliable results, overly large samples demand a considerable 
amount of time and resources and possess too much statistical power. Sekaran and Bougie 
(2016) recommend that the size of the sample should be based on reliable statistical estimates 
and must reflect the population parameters as closely as possible with a smaller margin of 
Type 1 errors. Hence, based on statistical inferences, the researcher is required to specify the 
level of confidence which is established at α=.05 or 95%. Hair, Anderson, Tatham, and Black 
(1998) assert that large sample size produces higher statistical power, provide broader 
generalised inferences and significant results. In short, the sample size affects the results of 
the statistical analysis. 
Cohen (1992) suggests that the power of a statistical test can be generalised with sample sizes 
of 100 or more, with predicted moderate sizes at both alpha levels (α=0.5 and α=.01). 
However, for the current study, the sample population was not able to be selected randomly 
because of the non-availability of a census or any other formalised database. A list of FFV 
growers was not available either. Thus, an alternative approach was used. Lead farmers or 
village leaders were approached to identify FFV growers in the relevant blocks. General 
information and FFV growers’ addresses were collected from the Sarpanch (democratically 
elected village leader) and the Nambardar (a government-appointed an influential personality 
of the village) when visiting nearby villages. As the data collection occurred during harvesting 
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season (for paddy) and the planting season for potatoes, respondents were mostly found 
working in their fields or at home.  
Table 5.4 Sample size crop-wise in both the Jalandhar and Amritsar regions 
                                 Number of FFV growers  
 Region Total 
Jalandhar Amritsar 
Crop Tomatoes 49 49 98 
Potatoes 49 53 102 
Total 98 102 200 
 
From the above mentioned two regions crop-wise, Table 5.4 shows the sample of 200 
growers added to draw the inferences from the data.    
 Data collection methods 
Before the data collection phase in Punjab, a thorough review of secondary information was 
undertaken. It consisted of analysing data from local (Punjab) and international sources, 
including a literature review of previous studies in other countries. Secondary data was 
collected using Punjab government publications; that is, statistical abstracts of various Punjab 
volumes and years, and peer-reviewed published journals relevant to studies of fresh produce 
in developing countries. The initial approach was to use the keywords of ‘smallholder’, ‘farmer 
participation’, ‘agribusiness’, ‘supply chains’, ‘developing countries’, ‘collective action’, ‘food 
supply chains’, ‘transaction cost’ and ‘agribusiness supply chain’ in ProQuest, Science Direct 
and Google scholar. Besides, the researcher also searched discussion papers from the Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the International Food Policy 
Research Institute, in New Delhi (IFPRI), Food Policy (ELSEVIER), the International Fund for 
Agricultural Development (IFAD), Modernizing Extension and Advisory Services (MEAS), the 
Centre for Management in Agriculture, Ahmadabad (CMA) and Oxford journals. 
The mode of primary data collection was personal interviews (survey interviews). One-on-one 
meetings were conducted using a structured survey instrument. These meetings enabled the 
interviewer to establish rapport with the respondent and explain the importance of the 
research in detail. The researcher is also able to record the conversation and transcribe it after 
it is finished. In one-on-one interviews, there is less chance of missing data or wrongly 
interpreting the responses. 
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However, interviews can be time-consuming due to the amount of data an interviewer must 
collect. Travelling to multiple locations can also be exhausting and resource-intensive. The 
non-availability of respondents can delay a research project, and non-cooperative 
respondents may also hinder data collection (Quinlan et al., 2011).        
Personal interviews were deemed an appropriate method for primary data collection, due to 
the nature of the study. The survey was completed personally, either in the field or at the 
farmers’ houses, and this allowed a better appreciation of the real conditions in which farmers 
operate. The benefit of personal interviews over paper-based survey instruments is a higher 
response rate as opposed to mail or email surveys. Furthermore, personal interaction provides 
the additional benefit of interpreting the questions or concepts when asked and clarifying any 
responses. It may also provide useful supplementary information relevant to the research 
(Zikmund et al., 2013). The research was carried out with critical informants selected for their 
reputation, authoritative status, knowledge or position. The development of trust and rapport 
was essential and was built up by acknowledging their status and introducing myself as a ‘local 
boy’ who was attending an international university.  
During the field survey, many lead farmers became friends with whom I then met in the 
evening. Lead farmers were vital in gaining further referrals, but conversely, in some cases, 
this restricted my access to others as I was aligned to one group. I tried to ensure that I met a 
range of key informants who were representative of the difference farmer groups. The 
decision of 'representativeness' was solely the researcher's, based on categories evolving from 
earlier research (Nair & Singh, 2016), and a deep understanding of the culture and practices 
of the people as the researcher grew up in the region. Great care was taken to avoid different 
forms of bias, related to gender, age, ethnicity and wealth (Zikmund et al., 2013). Ownership 
of land was considered a benchmark for differentiating between the farmers. 
 Response rate 
Personal interviews are considered to have the highest possible response rates in survey 
research. With personal interviews, the interviewer can boost the personal motivation in 
respondents by showing them official identification. It has been observed that advanced 
information derived from interviewing potential respondents enhances the overall response 
rate (Quinlan et al., 2011). The personal visits to the villages were conducted using a two-
wheeled motorbike. The first step was to meet village leaders to gain access or contact 
potential respondents who grow FFV. The second step was to meet likely respondents. 
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Mobile phone numbers, along with respondents’ physical addresses were recorded to 
facilitate initial contact. The research initially contacted all potential participants via their 
mobile phone number. If a mobile phone number was not available, then the researcher 
visited them personally, at home or in the field. The respondents were told that the interview 
would take appropriately 40 minutes. After obtaining their consent, participants could either 
complete the interviews on the spot or arrange a more convenient time. During the data 
collection, the sampled region farmers were involved in paddy harvesting and planting 
potatoes. Table 5.5 shows that of the 302 farmers who were contacted, a total of 224 survey 
instruments were completed (including 22 pilot surveys). Two hundred surveys were included 
in the analysis. The final response rate was 66%.  
Table 5.5 Effective response rate from the survey 
Sample selection description  Number Percentage  
Total farmers contacted 302 100 %  
Less: Received reference but not contactable (wrong name or 
refused to meet) 
42 14 % 
Less: Contacted but not interviewed (landless or marginal) or 
unsuitable  
12 3.9 %  
Less: Contacted but busy with ploughing/land preparation of 
potatoes  
24 7.9 %  
Total non-responses: 78 20 % 
Effective sample size  224 74 % 
Less: Pretesting  22 9 %  
Less: Number who quit during the interview  2 0.9 %  
Interview completed/response rate   200 66 % 
 
 Data entry and coding   
The paper-based collected data and field notes were entered into an electronic format. 
Numeric data was coded by assigning numbers to the values or level of each variable. The data 
coding was completed following Newton and Rudestam (2012) recommendations. Initially, 
data was fed into a blank datasheet that was generated using Microsoft Excel, then the data 
file was generated in SPSS (version 25) by labelling the variables.  
A first coding sheet was created to assign numeric codes. The researcher followed master 
coding instructions suggested by Leech, Barrett, and Morgan (2013). The final coding sheet 
included the variable number, the variable label and the coding range of the variable. Data 
was analysed using SPSS as this software provides more comfortable and quick access to 
essential functions, such as frequency analysis (ideal for ungrouped data), exploratory 
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analysis, independent T-Tests and other descriptive statistics. It is also known for effective 
data management, its ability to compose or transform a new variable, and better output 
organisation. It also has a much more extensive range of analytical options when compared 
to Excel.  
It is essential to name and define variables in order to aid data analysis and interpretation. 
Quantitative research involves examining the interplay among variables after they have been 
operationalised, thus allowing researchers to measure study outcomes. At the core of 
quantitative research is studying and measuring how variables change. If a variable does not 
differ, researchers cannot draw conclusions from the data. 
5.3.10.1 Descriptions of the variable used in the current study   
An independent variable (IV) in a study is the presumed causal variable. In quantitive 
research, the independent variable is presumed to influence the other variables. It is an 
antecedent condition to an observed resultant behaviour (Martin & Bridgmon, 2012). Table 
5.6 provides the names and definitions of independent variables used in this study. These 
variables are known as the stimulus variable, the treatment variable, the experimental 
variable, and the intervention variable. Conversely, a dependent variable (DV) is a variable 
assumed to depend on, or be caused by, other variables (the independent variables). A 
dependent variable is the presumed resulting outcome. It is usually observed and measured 
in response to an IV or more. Researchers look for changes in the DV caused by the IVs in the 
research study. 
The review of the agribusiness literature in Chapter 3 indicated that processors are considered 
the most institutionalised marketing channels, followed by supermarkets, traders at the farm 
gate and, finally, the traditional wholesale markets. Institutional channel processors have a 
shorter supply chain, that consists of a direct relationship with farmers, preferably with 
written contracts, avoiding the presence of intermediaries (Chen & Stamoulis, 2008; Singh, 
2009). Supermarkets are less institutionalised compared to processors, as supermarkets 
procure FFV products through several channels, such as direct procurement, intermediary 
firms, specialised wholesalers, and from traditional wholesale markets (Berdegué et al., 2005; 
Neven & Reardon, 2004; Ruben et al., 2007).   
In the current research, the dependent variable (market access to institutional channels) was 
transformed/computed using SPSS to make inferences about the factors that drive 
smallholders’ participation. It is necessary to transform the dependent variable because FFV 
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supply chains tend to be multi-layered in the sample region. Fresh produce growers sell 
products to several buyers. The survey data found that farmers sell potatoes and tomatoes 
into several marketing channels, such as traditional large wholescale markets, local spot 
(nearest small town) markets, large institutional food processors, domestic (local) small-scale 
food processors, supermarket retail chains, traders at farm gate and direct sales to local 
hotels/restaurants.  
Due to the complex nature of the FFV supply chains in the study region, it was necessary to 
include multiple channels. Fresh produce growers sell their produce to a range of buyers. In 
order to convert the percentage of each type of buyer into a scale of access, a series of weights 
were created, and a new variable related to market access to institutional channels was 
created using the weighting system. The highly institutional chain processors were given the 
highest weight + 2, then supermarkets which are still considered institutionalised, but not 
extremely institutionalised, were multiplied by + 1. Similarly, traders at farm gate were given 
a negative -1 weighting, and the traditional wholesale market was weighted – 2.  
After transforming/computing the new variable, we used the normality test to check the 
assumptions of the dependent variable and assess its suitability for analysis.  
Equation 5.1  Computation of dependent variable (DV) 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑙𝑠
=  [(2 ∗ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑟 % + 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 %)
− (𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑚 𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠 % + 2 ∗ 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 %)] 
Whereas 
+2 = highly institutional 
  0 = neither institutional nor traditional 
-2 = highly traditional  
 
5.3.10.2 Assessing Q-Q plots for normality of the dependent variable  
Each observed value in the distribution of scores is paired with its expected value from the 
normal distribution in a normal distribution plot (Q-Q plot ). The expected values from the 
normal distribution are based on the number of cases in the sample and the ranked order of 
the case in the sample. If the sample is from a normal distribution, it is expected that the 
points will fall more or less on a straight line. 
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A Q-Q plot was produced for the distribution of the dependent variable, market access to 
institutional channels, and the results are displayed in Figure 5.3. The motivation for the 
development of this scale was to capture the hierarchy of institutional channels from the FFV 
markets available to the local producers. For the most part, the points were on or near the 




Figure 5.3  Q-Q plot to assess the  normality assumption of the dependent variable  
The next section explores the data screening methods before analysing the data in relation to 
the research objectives. In other words, it explains data diagnosis concepts, techniques and 
the implemented procedures.  
 Study data diagnostics  
Diagnostic assessments are conducted on the sample data after it has been collected but 
before testing the research hypothesis. Before computing any inferential statistics, it is 
essential to do data diagnostics, which is also called exploratory data analysis or data 
preparation (Leech et al., 2013). Study data diagnostics is necessary for;  
• Checking the accuracy of data entries  
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• Checking normal distribution, coding, fixing any missing values, and data entry errors 
• Detecting and making decisions about univariate (one dependent variable) outliers 
• Confirming statistical assumption before running analysis 
• Obtaining demographic information necessary when presenting results                                                                                           
5.3.11.1. Detecting erroneous data entry  
The integrity of the data can be significantly compromised by entering wrong data. It is 
recommended that researchers compare the input data with the original data (Martin & 
Bridgmon, 2012). Any data that is downloaded, imported, or mined from another data source 
also needs to be carefully reviewed and checked against its original source.  
In the current study, screening analysis was conducted to ensure the completeness and 
validity of the data. Initial screening analysis assesses whether variable scores are in the 
expected ranges. Additionally, a researcher should determine whether the frequencies, 
means and standard deviations seem reasonable. This process includes checking for missing 
values, incomplete responses, unclear and binary values. Measures of central tendencies, such 
as mean values and standard deviations, were produced to ensure the completeness and 
validity of the collected data. The SPSS statistical package was used to compute descriptive 
statistics such as the mean, minimum and maximum values for all participants, as well as to 
check for other types of errors or problems. The next section of the chapter explains how 
missing data and univariate outliers were treated.  
5.3.11.2. Identifying and dealing with missing data and univariate outliers 
Sometimes, for mail surveys, respondents do not answer all the questions when they fill in a 
survey instrument. In the current study, the survey was conducted using a face-to-face 
method between the researcher and FFV growers in the study region. This technique has a 
distinct advantage of minimising the likelihood of missing data. Indeed, there several ways of 
handling missing data. Babbie (2013) advises that the best solution for handling missing data 
is to make every attempt to minimise the problem before and during the study. Tabachnick, 
Fidell, and Ullman (2007) state that the deletion of cases may be more attractive when only a 
small subsample of random cases of a large sample of cases has missing data. Hair, Black, 
Babin, Anderson, and Tatham (2006, p. 55) state that “missing data” under 10% for an 
individual case or observation can generally be ignored, except when the missing data occur 
in specific non-random fashion”. In this research, the deletion of cases approach was applied. 
For example, in the data, two cases, case numbers 97 and 100, were deleted from the farmer’s 
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level of education variable and 198 cases were added for analysis. Table 5.6 shows the variable 
name, number of missing cases for each variable and case numbers deleted from the data.  
Table 5.6 Identification of missing cases in data  




Age groups 200 0 10 
Level of education 198 2 97, 100 
Family members 199 1 130 
Percentage of land used for 
crop 
197 3 9,52,87 
Experience in fresh produce 
farming 
199 1 10 
Income other than farming 200 0  
Variable production cost 200 0  
Cooperative membership 200 0  
Experience of cooperative in 
years 
156 Only 156 members out of 
200 
 
Farm machinery ownership 200 0  
Price consideration 199 1 61 
Price information before the 
sale 
200 0  
Frequency of price information 193 7 197, 66, 24, 70 
194, 161, 162 
Relationship with buyer 200 0  
Visibility of buyer 200 0  
Access to farm credit 200 0  
Technical assistance 200 0  
Ownership of transport 200 0  
Distance farm to market 200 0  
 
Along with treating missing data, it is also important to identify and make decisions about 
outliers. According to Martin and Bridgmon (2012), in statistics, an outlier is a data point that 
differs significantly from other observations. An outlier may be due to variability in the 
measurement, or it may indicate an experimental or design error; the latter are sometimes 
excluded from a data set. An outlier can cause serious problems in statistical analyses. 
There are many possible reasons for the existence of outliers. Outliers can be initiated by 
errors in data entry and the mismanagement of a data file. The current study follows 
Tabachnick et al. (2007) who provide guidelines for determining if a participant’s score on a 
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continuously scaled dependent variable is a univariate outlier. They state that when the raw 
score on dependent variables is transferred to a z-score, any z-score is greater than ±3.29 
(two-tailed test), it is considered a univariate outlier.  
There are several approaches for neutralising the effects of outliers. The common method to 
minimise the effect of outliers is to delete the case of the variable with the outlier based on 
an assessment of whether the case is representative of the sample population. Tabachnick et 
al. (2007) advises discarding 5% of the largest scores and doing the same for 5% of the smallest 
scores. Using Tabachnick et al. (2007), methods, we can state that there are no significant 
outliers in data.  
 Data analysis  
Quantitative data analyses were conducted to examine the research questions. Descriptive 
statistics are useful for showing the relative importance of the factors responsible for FFV 
growers’ market participation. Several other methods of quantitative analysis are also used, 
including ANOVA, the independent sample T-Test, cross-tabulations, and linear regressions. 
Table 5.7 provides descriptions of the variables and outlines the statistical techniques used 







Table 5.7 Descriptions of the variables and statistical techniques used for data analysis 
Independent variables The operational definition of variable  H Statistical technique 
Age Age of respondent in years H1 One-way ANOVA 
Edu  Household head’s education le H2 One-way ANOVA 
Farm Exp. Farming experience in years  H3 One-way ANOVA 
Family Mem. In Farm Percentage of family members in farming  H4 Linear regression  
Land % Percentage of land use for FFV H5 One-way ANOVA 
Mach-Own Farm machinery ownership: Yes/ No H6 Independent sample T-test 
Variable Production cost Per acre cost of production  H7 Linear regression 
Other Income Income other than farming  H8 Independent sample T-test 
Mkt- Info. (a) Access to and (b) Usage of market information H9 Independent sample T-test 
Info-Freq How frequently information is received H10 One-way ANOVA 
Buyer Proximity How to further down may the buyer be seen                                     H11 Independent sample T-test 
Farm to Mkt.  Distance between FFV producer and market or delivery points H12 One-way ANOVA 
Grading Specification and grading requirements: Yes/No H13 Independent sample T-test 
Mkt Eng. Spot transactions/word of mouth/formal contract H14 One-way ANOVA 
Coop Membership Cooperative membership: Yes/No H15a Independent sample T-test 
Coop Experience Experience with cooperatives in years  H15b One-way ANOVA 
Credit Access Farmers having access to credit (Formal/Informal) H16 One-way ANOVA 
Cold Storage Access to logistics (cold chain storage and transport): Yes/No H17 Independent sample T-test 
Tech. Assistance. FFV growers have access to technical assistance H18 Independent sample T-test 
Dependent Variable;     
Market Access to Institutional 
Channels 
The supply chain where FFV grower sell DV  
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 Descriptive analysis 
This section explains the ways of describing, representing and analysing the collected data. 
Quantitative data starts with a set of descriptive statistics. The first step for quantitative data 
analysis is summarising the data in a way that readers can understand. If quantitative data is 
presented in rows and columns, it will be hard to see trends, distributions and proportions. 
Hence, frequency tables and frequency distributions are used to summarise the respondent 
numbers or to present a clear view of the data. Similarly, to illustrate continuous variables, 
categories can be created in data using graphs like histograms, pictograms and area and line 
charts.   
Further measures of central tendency, including means, minimum and maximum values, 
frequencies, percentages, and standard deviations, provide an understanding of the central 
values of data. This research applies these measures to describe and examine the socio-
economic characteristics of different farmer categories and then compared the means to find 
the significance of different groups of institutional and market characteristics. Means (the 
average) and standard deviations are theoretically statistically meaningful only for data 
measured at interval or ratio scales, which is not that useful for Likert scale responses (Field, 
2000). The frequency distribution is a tally or count of the number of times each score on a 
single variable occurs.  
  Inferential statistics  
5.3.14.1      Mean difference and relationship analysis 
T-test analysis is used to estimate the probability of whether two sample means are different, 
and therefore, represent various population means. This test is based on the observed 
difference between the two sample means and their distribution (Williams & Monge, 2001). 
For this purpose, two hypotheses are set: 
                  H0:   µ1=µ2 
                  Ha:   µ1≠µ2 
Where H0 is the null hypothesis, Ha is the alternative or research hypothesis, and µ1 and µ2 
are the samples means one and two respectively. If the probability p estimated is equal to or 
less than a critical value set by the researcher (for example, α = 0.05), the null hypothesis is 
rejected, and the alternative hypothesis is accepted, this means that the sample means are 
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significantly different. In this research, T-tests are conducted to statistically compare sample 
means of different groups of farmers to measure their market participation. 
When an analysis does not directly include estimates related to the characteristics of the 
population, a nonparametric test, such as Chi-square is recommended (Williams & Monge, 
2001). Chi-square tests are generally used to make inferences when the data collected is 
categorical (Dane, 1990). Widely used in cross-tabulations, chi-square is conducted when 
measurement tools are nominal or ordinal to assess the association between variables (Leech 
et al., 2013). Its calculation is based on the difference between the observed and expected 
sample distribution. Like the T-Test, if the probability p estimated is equal to or less than a 
critical value set by the researcher, the null hypothesis that there is no association between 
variables is rejected, and the alternative hypothesis (there is an association between variables) 
is accepted. T-tests and cross-tabulations are used for participants and non-participants. 
The independent samples T-test has two assumptions. The Levine’s Test for Equality of 
Variances determines if the two conditions have about the same or different amounts of 
variability between scores. If a value is more significant than .05, this means that the variability 
in the two conditions is about the same. If the scores in one condition vary more than the 
scores in the other condition, this means that the variability in the two conditions is 
significantly different. SPSS takes this into account by giving slightly different results in the 
second row. If the ‘Sig. Value’ in this example is more significant than .05 we would see this in 
the second row of the output tables. 
5.3.14.2 Analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
The Analysis of Variance test (ANOVA) applies the logic of statistical significance between two 
or more groups. Fundamentally, the cases under study are combined into groups representing 
an independent variable, and the extent to which the groups differ from one another is 
analysed in terms of a dependent variable. The extent to which the group differs is compared 
with the standard of random distribution (Babbie, 2013, p. 486). 
There is a similarity between the T-test and ANOVA as both are used to test hypotheses about 
the differences (the variation) in the means in groups. While the T-test is used to test two 
means, ANOVA can be used to test the differences among the means of more than two groups 
(Quinlan et al., 2011). The underlying assumptions of ANOVA are that the dependent variable 
is normally distributed (or close to normal), the group variance and error variance of the 
dependent variable are equal, or near equal, and all observations are independent of each 
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other. Independence screening measures have a limitation as to their usefulness given various 
conditions of the study. Thus, there are several measures to assess normality and 
homogeneity of variance as described below. The researcher must look at several screening 
measures to assess the underlying assumptions of the evidence and to decide whether to 
proceed.  
The dependent variable used in ANOVA must be continuously scaled at the level of interval or 
ratio. The following three underlying assumptions need to be met in order to use ANOVA. 
1. Population normality - The score on the dependent variable for each condition are 
normally distributed around their mean. 
2.  Homogeneity of variance - The variance of this course of the independent variable 
across the condition should be constant. In interpreting output, the researcher must 
first ensure that the homogeneity assumption has not been violated. Levene’s test for 
homogeneity of variances is not significant (p>.05). The researcher can then be 
confident that the population variances for each group are approximately equal.  
3. Independence of observations - The observations are independent of one another and 
not correlated with each other.  
The purpose of doing ANOVA is to see if there is any difference between groups on some 
variable. ANOVA calculates the mean for each of the final grading groups - the group means. 
It calculates the mean for all the groups combined - the overall mean. Then it calculates, within 
each group, the total deviation of each's score from the group mean - within-group variation. 
Next, it calculates the deviation of each group means from the overall mean - between-group 
variation. Finally, ANOVA produces the F statistic, which is the ratio between-group variation 
to the within-group variation. If the between-group variation is significantly higher than the 
within-group variation, then there is likely a statistically significant difference between the 
groups. 
The essence of the analysis of variance is to compare variability within groups versus variability 
among different groups. The larger the F value, the more likely it is that the null hypothesis 
(H0) of no differences among the group means (that is, locations) is false. In other words, if the 
p-value is less than or equal to the significance level, we reject the null hypothesis and 
conclude that not all of the population means are equal (Quinlan et al., 2011). The only 
assumption of the test is that the observations (rows of the original data matrix) are 
exchangeable under a correct null hypothesis. To assume exchangeability under the null 
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hypothesis is generally to believe that the observations are independent and that they have 
similar distributions (Zikmund et al., 2013). 
ANOVA uses the F distribution as this probability distribution of sample variances changes with 
the sample size. Post hoc analysis (such as the Scheffe’s and Tukey’s tests), that generally 
examine the variation between three or more groups, are not required in this situation 
(Zikmund et al., 2013). Figure 5.4 shows the justification for using post hoc tests for the current 
study. 
 
Figure 5.4 Post hoc test justification 
Source Leech et al. (2013, p. 190) 
Having obtained a significant result, the researcher can go further and determine, using the 
Tukey HSD test, where the significance lies.  
5.3.14.3  Regression analysis  
Several of the hypotheses outlined in the literature review are expected to identify a positive 
or negative relationship between independent variables and a dependent variable and require 
a different statistical tool. In this case, regression analysis was used to examine the 
relationship between these independent variables and the dependent variable (institutional 
engagement). The aim is to predict the dependent variable through the values of the 
independent variables (Hair et al. 2010). 
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Linear regression analysis is used along with mean difference analysis. In simple linear 
regression, independent variables are used to predict the value of a dependent variable. 
Linear regression attempts to model the relationship between two variables by fitting a linear 
equation to observed data. One variable is considered to be an explanatory variable and the 
other is considered to be a dependent variable 
The formula given for a single linear regression with one independent variable is: 
Yi = β0 + β1χi+ ξi where i = 1...n. 
y = dependent variable,  
β0 = constant,  
β1 = regression coefficient, 
χi = independent variable,  
ξi = prediction error 
The independent variable(s) used to predict the dependent variables should correlate 
strongly, as this will give the model greater predictive accuracy (Hair et al., 2010). To accept 
the hypothesis that the model is predicting, several statistical measures must reflect the 
overall model fit. The coefficient of determination, R2, is used to measure how well the 
prediction is made by the independent variable on a scale from 0 to 1. Values closer to 1 are 
considered excellent predictors, but anything more than 0.3 is considered a good model. In 
field studies, lower R2 values of R2 are acceptable. Furthermore, ANOVA can be used to check 
the statistical significance at a predefined level. 
In this study, the simple linear regression model is applied to test two hypothesis while the  
ANOVA model is used as the main statistical method. The most common application of the 
regression analysis is to estimate the value of the dependent variable for a given value or 
range of values of the dependent variables. Therefore, the regression analysis is widely used 
in predicting and forecasting. It is also used to establish relationships in experimental data. On 
the other side, ANOVA does not involve the analysis of a relation between two or more 
variables explicitly. Rather it checks whether two or more samples from different populations 
have the same mean. The fundamental idea of ANOVA is to consider the variation within the 
sample and variation between the samples. The variation within the sample can be attributed 
to the randomness, whereas the variation among samples can be attributed to both 
randomness and other external factors. 
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ANOVA is the analysis of variation between two or more samples while regression is the 
analysis of a relation between two or more variables. Both the Regression and ANOVA are the 
statistical models which are used to predict the continuous outcome but in case of the 
regression, the continuous outcome is predicted on basis of the one or more than one 
continuous predictor variables whereas in case of ANOVA continuous outcome is predicted 
on basis of the one or more than one categorical predictor variables. ANOVA is a statistical 
tool that is generally used on random categorical variables involves group not directly related 
to each other to find out whether there exist any common means. A large number of 
independent variables are categorical, therefore the current study has limited use of the 
regression model.  
5.4 Research constraints  
The primary obstacle was locating representative participants from the chosen regions. A 
second major constraint was the weather. It was the paddy harvesting season, and in both 
areas, farmers burn the paddy stubble. Smoke created by paddy stubble and the start of 
winter fog was converted into thick air pollution (smog). Several factors contribute to the 
smog such as motorised road transport, dust on roads and construction sites and burning of 
farm residual. This aggravates health problems such as asthma, and other respiratory issues 
as well as eye infections and reduced resistance to colds and lung infections. The researcher 
faced mainly eye infections during the data collection period due to travelling on a two-
wheeler (motorbike).  Another constraint was that farmers had limited time available. Finally, 
travelling into deep rural areas, where public transport is largely non-existent was also a 
significant constraint. A two-wheeler motorbike was necessary to both reach the farm and 
find the farmers on their land. However, these problems were overcome and the research 
progressed. 
5.5 Chapter summary  
This chapter has explained the research philosophy, design and methods used in this study. 
The data collection methods and analysis techniques were also discussed in relation to the 
research objectives. Assessing the integrity of data used in statistical analysis is essential to 
enhance the validity of the study’s findings. As explained, data diagnostics were used to screen 
for data accuracy, data representativeness and to ensure that the data met the underlying 
assumptions of the statistics being used. Similarly, the geographical area selected was the 
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most representative in terms of the supply and demand of FFV in the country according to the 





The previous chapter explained the research methodology, the design of the survey 
instrument, the development of scales, sampling techniques, and methods of data collection. 
The chapter also outlined the data coding process, how missing data was identified and dealt 
with, and other important practices, such as checking univariate assumptions. It explained 
statistical data analysis methods and noted the constraints faced by the researcher in the data 
collection process.  
The present chapter explains the results derived from the survey based on the study’s frame 
of reference. The results section aims to report the results of the data analysis concerning the 
hypotheses. The chapter begins with (section 6.2) a description of the sample including 
marketing characteristics of the study region, a general overview of the fresh produce supply 
chains in the Punjab state of India. It provides an integrated map of the food supply chains, 
including traditional and institutional channels. Section 6.3 discusses the socio-economic 
characteristics of FFV growers (gender, age, family size, farm assets, and average yield). 
Section 6.4 discusses the results of the hypothesis testing phase and results are discussed 
concerning the relevant agribusiness literature. The final section of the chapter draws some 
conclusions and presents a summary of the results.     
6.2 Sample description 
 Supply chains for FFV in the study region  
Agriculture is essential for developing countries’ economies. In the sample regions, 
agribusiness markets are primarily coordinated by traditional wholesale markets where 
farmers sell their marketable surplus through intermediaries (Singh, 2012b). A study 
conducted by Sidhu (2016) on marketing system and agriculture development in Punjab state 
show that the number of Government regulated traditional markets were 149 until the year 
2011-2012. The Agricultural Produce Market Committee (APMC) Act regulates the 
agribusiness markets in the study region, and the APMC is a statutory market committee 
constituted by the state government in respect of trade in certain notified agricultural, 
horticultural and livestock products. 
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The price received by farmers supplying traditional markets can vary greatly between the 
highest and lowest price, but processors offer the prevailing market rate with a minimum 
guaranteed purchase price. Typically, in the traditional supply chain where farmers produce is 
aggregated, there is no premium price for quality produce (Punjabi, 2015). Hence, farmers are 
not motivated to focus on quality issues. As a result, the state government of Punjab amended 
the APMC Act in 2003 as follows: 
• They phased out restrictions on the movement of fresh produce for selling at 
regulated markets.  
• They allowed direct marketing, and contract farming between farmers and 
corporates. 
• The allowed the establishment of future markets through electronic exchange links.  
• The facilitation of food processing and value additions (Chandrasekhara Rao & 
Bathla, 2016). 
The APMC regulations require that the purchase of fresh produce takes place in a notified 
market with registered traders cum commission agents (called ‘Aarthia’ in the local language). 
There are two charges levied on the marketed products in the traditional spot market; First, 
the commission paid to the agent and second, the market fees paid to the market committee 
as a payment towards the use of the premises and other capital works related to market 
development (Punjabi & Sardana, 2007).  
In the sample region, FFV supply chains tend to be multi-layered. This impacts on farmers’ 
share of the final consumer price and the marketing costs as the various agents add their 
expenses. Traditional market sales are one-off transactions between farmers and retailers or 
consumers, with neither promising repeated transactions nor prior agreements on product 
delivery or price. The study found that at the traditional market, the commission agent is a 
crucial link between farmers and the market. Most farmers transport their tomato crops to 
the nearest market immediately after harvesting it. Plastic crates are used for packaging the 
tomato crop (see Figure 6.1).  
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Figure 6.1 Packaging of tomatoes at Amritsar wholesale market 
Source: Author (taken during field survey) 
 
Some commission agents act as wholesalers as well; in short, they buy from farmers and sell 
to different retailers from distant small towns. Primary producers use mobile phones to obtain 
information from wholesalers or commission agents about prices on a day-to-day basis. The 
price of produce fluctuates widely, depending on the demand and supply of a given day. 
Farmers who are unable to supply directly to wholesale or retail markets sell their produce to 
traditional market traders who act as intermediaries. Such traders collect vegetables at the 
farm gate without any prior agreement, often using word of mouth contracts built on trust 






Figure 6.2 Packaging and transportation of potatoes at the traditional wholesale market. 
Source: Author (taken during field survey) 
 
Potatoes meant for the traditional market are typically packed in cotton bags weighing 50kg 
each (see Figure 6.2), while tomatoes are packed in plastic crates which weigh 20-25 kg each 
(see Figure 6.1). Other crops such as okra or cauliflower are packed in plastic bags. Farmers 
transport their own produce to the nearest markets using tractors and trollies. They may also 
hire small four-wheelers if they intend to travel to a market further away.  
In the traditional supply chain of potatoes and tomatoes, farmers sell to traditional markets 
(regulated by the APMC). The following four chains were identified:  
1. FFV growers → commission agent → wholesaler → retailers → consumers     
2. FFV growers → commission agent → primary wholesaler → secondary wholesaler →  
retailers → consumers 
3. FFV growers → traders/agents → wholesaler at distant markets → retailers →  
consumers 
4. FFV growers sell seed (in the case of potatoes) → other states rather than Punjab  
 Marketing of FFV products through traditional wholesale markets 
The study found that while farmers have access to multiple channels to sell their produce, 
they prefer to sell them at the nearest district traditional market using a commission agent, 
immediately after harvesting. The most frequent channel for both potato and tomato FFV 
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growers, are open auctions at traditional markets using commission agents. The study also 
found that traditional markets dominate the FFV trade in the sample region. Table 6.1 shows 
that out of 200 respondents, 32.0% sell 100% of their crop to traditional markets via 
commission agents.  
Table 6.1   Proportion of tomato and potato output sold to the traditional wholesale 
market  
 
Crop Type Percentage of farmers selling at the traditional wholesale market  
0% 10 20 25 30 40 50 55 60 70 80 90 100% Total  
Tomato  33.7 1.0 5.1 2.0 6.1 4.1 2.0 1.0 10 3.1 3.11 3.11 25.5 98 
Potato  49.0 0.0 5.9 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 3.9 0.0 1.0 0.0 38.2 102 
Total  41.5 0.5 5.5 1.0 3.0 2.5 1.5 0.5 7.0 1.5 2.0 1.5 32.0 200 
 
Table 6.1 shows that crop-wise, 25.5% of tomato growers and 38.2% of potato growers sell 
100% of their crops at traditional wholesale markets. In contrast, 33.7% of tomato growers 
and 49.0% of potato growers in the sample do not sell any of their produce at the traditional 
wholesale market. 
 Marketing of FFV product through traders at the farm gate 
The second most frequent traditional channel farmers use is selling directly to traders at the 
farm gate. The agents (mostly from local households) make contact with farmers before 
harvesting and verbally fix prices according to the observed quality of the produce. Farmers 
only see these first buyers in the chain. They sometimes sell to them at a lower price compared 
to the current market price. The primary benefit in selling to these traders has reduced costs 
such as packaging costs, loading/unloading costs, transportation costs and waste, especially 
when delivering to traditional markets located far away.      
Table 6.2 Proportion of tomato and potato output sold to traders at the farm gate  
Crop Type    Percentage of farmers selling to traders at the farm gate 
 
  0% 10 20 25 30 35 40 50 60 80 100% Total  
Tomato  72.4 2.00 5.10 1.00 2.00 1.00 5.10 2.00 2.00 1.00 6.10 100.0 
Potato  75.5 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.90 0.00 2.90 1.00 1.00 1.00 15.7 100.0 
Total  74.0 1.0 2.50 0.5 2.50 0.50 4.00 1.50 1.50 1.00 11.0 100.0 
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The proportion of farmers who sell their crop to traders at the farm gate varies from 10 to 
100%. Out of 200 respondents, 11.0% of farmers sell 100% of their crop to traders at the farm 
gate, while 74.0% of farmers do not sell any of their produce at the farm gate. Table 6.2 shows 
that potato growers are more likely to sell their produce at the farm gate compared to tomato 
growers. The primary reason for this difference is the dual use of the tomato crop. Farmers 
selling at the traditional market may realise an acceptable price, if not they can sell their crop 
to food processors (Field Notes). While traders arrange transport this means they often offer 
farmers a lower price than they would receive at the traditional market.   
 Marketing of FFV produce through the supermarkets 
The current study’s findings on the presence of supermarkets in the study region were 
unexpected. Although there was much discussion about the potential implications of new 
retail chains and their effect on existing procurement practices, there were almost no 
supermarkets in the study area. The reason for unexpected results might be because most of 
the Punjabi population live in villages where local is known as fresh. According to the statistical 
abstract of Punjab state for the year 2016, the rural population was 62.52% and the urban 
population was just 37.48% (GOP, 2016). 
There is an absence of international supermarket chains and only a few Indian retail brands 
such as Reliance Fresh, ITC Choupal Fresh, More and Spencer’s. The data presented in Table 
6.3 shows that out of 200 interviewed farmers, only 17 were selling to supermarkets, and they 
were only selling a small proportion (between 5 to 15%) of their crops. Indeed, not a single 
FFV growers sold their entire produce to supermarkets.   
Table 6.3 Proportion of tomato and potato output sold to the supermarkets  
Crop type Percentage of farmers selling to the supermarkets 
  0 5 10 15 20 30 Total 
Tomato  85.70 1.00 11.20 1.00 0.0 1.0 100.0 
Potato 97.10 0.00 2.00 0.00 1.0 0.0 100.0 
Total  91.50 0.50 6.50 0.50 0.5 0.5 100.0 
 
The current study found that large retail chains buy directly from farmers and most use 
traditional markets for their procurement needs. The minimal quantity they buy directly from 
farmers occurs largely during the season. Institutional channels, mainly Reliance Fresh, have 
multiple stores in large cities in Punjab, such as Amritsar, Jalandhar, and Ludhiana. Reliance 
Fresh’s variety and amount of fresh produce have significantly declined over the past few 
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years; instead, they focus on the sale of non-perishable grocery items. These chains only have 
small quantities of fresh produce. The research contacted the procurement manager of 
Reliance Fresh stores in Ludhiana and Amritsar. They reported that Reliance Fresh is buying a 
significant portion of fresh produce from traditional markets (Azadpur Mandi New Delhi) and 
that they have a collection centre at Sirhind city in Punjab from where they distribute this 
produce to different stores in Ludhiana, Jalandhar and Amritsar (Source: field survey).  
 Marketing FFV products through the food processors 
Food processors were found to be a significant institutional channel in Punjab. Table 6.4 shows 
that out of 200 respondents, 29.50% were selling 100% of their crop to food processors, while 
57% were not selling to them at all.  
Table 6.4 Proportion of tomato and potato output sold to processors 
Crop Type Percentage of farmers selling to processors 
 
0 10 20 35 40 50 60 70 80 100 Total  
Tomato 52.00 1.00 3.10 1.00 3.10 4.10 3.10 4.10 1.00 27.60 100.0 
Potato  61.80 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 3.90 2.00 31.40 100.0 
Total  57.00 0.50 1.5 0.5 1.50 2.00 2.00 4.00 1.50 29.50 100.0 
 
FFV growers in the study region have the option to either sell to multinational or local food 
processors for both crops. PepsiCo is a major multinational buyer who buys potatoes for 
processing in the branded potato crisp market. It processes raw potatoes into Lay’s Potato 
Chips, Uncle Chips and other traditional snacks. It has the capacity to process 36,000 metric 
tonnes of potato annually (Punjabi, 2015; Singh, 2008). The company has a minimum 
requirement of 5 acres (2.02 Hc) for contract production, but also offers contracts to smaller 
farmers if they show a progressive attitude towards fulfiling the contract commitments (Singh, 
2008). The company employs more than 50 technical experts and began offering contract 
farming from early 2000. The company also has 300 potato seed growers and offers 
contracted farmers seed and technical assistance. There are other local potato processors in 
major Punjab cities.  
However, during the field survey, FFV growers identified some issues, including, low 
processing capacity and delayed payments. In the case of tomatoes, there are a couple of local 
processors. The Amritsar region farmers supply to Harraj Agro Foods, which was established 
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in 2011. The company buys tomatoes from farmers to process into tomato paste, tomato 
puree and tomato juice. Harraj Foods, Maharbanpura, near Amritsar is an Amritsar-based 
tomato paste manufacturer which supplies Nestle and Del Monte. Other processed food 
makers in the northern Indian region include Cremica (Hoshiarpur), Kapoorthala and GD foods 
(Tarntaran). The field survey found that a significant tomato processing company 
(manufacturing tomato paste) operating in the Amritsar region, Nijjar Agro foods Lt, 
established in 1988, shut down, owing hundreds of farmers money (field survey notes). Table 
6.5 shows major tomato processing firms operating in the study region.  
Table 6.5 Major tomato processors in the study region   
No  Processing unit  Location  Year established Processing Capacity  
1 GD Foods  Tarn Taran  2016 42,000 tonnes per 
annum 
2 Cremica Group  Ludhiana/Hoshiarpur  1978 1,34, 000 tonnes per 
annum (Owned 
+contractual) 
3 Harraj Agro 
Foods  
Amritsar  1988, re-
established in 
2011 
30,000 tonnes per 
annum 
Source: Field notes 
Except for contracted potato farmers, farmers sell FFV products to a variety of buyers, 
depending on the price they are offered. A large proportion of farmers sell to multiple buyers 
including food processors, traders at the farm gate, local village, lead farmers or directly to 
traditional spot markets. In the case of tomatoes, food processing companies allow farmers 
to sell at the traditional spot market, but for potato processors, such activity would be 
considered a breach of contract. Figure 6.3 (below) shows the potato supply chain in the 
Amritsar district study region. 
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Figure 6.3 Potato supply chains for FFV in the Amritsar study region 
Apni Mandi (farmers’ market) is another market outlet identified by farmers. After studying 
the concept of the “Saturday Market” prevalent in the U.K and the U.S.A, the Apni Mandi 
scheme was launched by the state marketing board to abolish the involvement of middlemen 
(a form of disintermediation). Under this arrangement, farmers sell FFV directly to consumers 
at reasonable rates. The profit which was previously consumed by the middleman is now 
shared by the producers and the consumers (Sidhu, 2016). However, none of the farmers from 
the sampled regions had participated in this type of market. 
6.3 Fresh produce growers’ characteristics  
 Gender, age, education levels and farming experience  
This section summarises the respondents’ demographic characteristics. Gender is an 
important factor impacting on participation in institutional channels. All farmers were male, 
as in the study area, farming is considered a man’s job. Thus, men make all production and 
marketing decisions. The male respondents were contacted and interacted due to the cultural 
and social norms of the sampled region. In the sample region, men work in the fields. Women 
play a supporting role, feeding the cattle and cooking for farm labourers. Interestingly, the 
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current study found that female FFV workers in the sample region are mainly employed to 
sow seeds, pick fruits and vegetables and sort them. It is believed (falsely or not) that male 
members of the household have stronger communication skills and business knowledge. 
These attributes are considered essential for commercialisation (Sebatta et al., 2014).     
Age is considered an important determinant of the sale of FFV products in the institutional 
markets. This is because participation in the market depends on one's position in the family. 
Major decisions are made by an older member(s) of the household. This is necessary to ensure 
the welfare of the household. In the study region, the data reveals that FFV growers are indeed 
older, although most only have basic levels of education. The average age of respondents in 
this research is 52 years old. About 44.5% of farmers are between 46-55 years old, while 
approximately 27% of farmers are 36-45 years old. Interestingly, 9% of farmers were 26-35 
years old, and only 1.5% were 16-25 years old. Figure 6.4 shows that the age group of 46-55 
years are typically in the leading positions of agricultural practices.    
 
Figure 6.4 FFV growers’ ages  
Education level plays a vital role in smallholders’ decision-making processes, particularly about 
the adoption of new and changing agricultural practices. Also, the knowledge of agricultural 
practices is considered critical in ensuring sustainable innovations in new agriculture markets 
(Barrett et al., 2012). The current study data shows that 45% of FFV growers in the sample 
region have a high school education, a necessary qualification for the numeric calculations 
required for farming. Figure 6.5 shows that 18.69% of respondents have completed middle 
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school, while 17.5% of respondents have college-level qualifications. Only 7.5% of 
respondents have not completed any formal education, while at the other end of the scale, 
only 1% of fresh produce farmers have university qualifications.   
 
Figure 6.5 Education level of FFV growers 
These findings indicate that farmers gain experience in agricultural practices over the years 
and that as a result of this experience, farmers can manage various production and marketing 
risks. Figure 6.6 shows the distribution of FFV growers’ experience, measured as years of FFV 
production. The figure shows that while 45% of respondents have between 6 to 10 years of 
farming experience in fresh produce, 35 % of farmers have more than ten years’ experience. 
The data shows that only 2% of respondents are new to FFV agriculture production.  
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Figure 6.6 Fresh produce growers’ experience in fresh produce farming (in years)  
Most of the FFV growers who participated in the survey are experienced. Having several years 
of experience in FFV production means that farmers understand climate conditions, and the 
production and marketing risks associated with FFV production. Farmers who have spent 
more years farming are more likely to collaborate with buyers and have long-standing 
relationships with them. It assumes that as farmers have more extensive experience in 
farming in years, they become more risk-prone in their FFV production. These findings also 
imply that buyers rely on more experienced farmers to ensure the quality, quantity and safety 
of FFV products. The following section discusses family size and the number of family member 
involved in farming activities.   
 Family size and number of members participating in farming activities  
The current study considers family as a group of people who commonly live together and take 
their meals from a common kitchen unless they are away working. A family is a basic unit in 
any society and is influenced by social, economic, political and demographic factors. 
Demographic factors such as birth rates, mortality rates, migration and sex composition also 
have an effect on the size of households in society.  
 
Figure 6.7 Number of family members of FFV farmers in the study region 
 
As FFV production is a labour-intensive activity, it requires family labour, as well as hired 
labour. Figure 6.7 shows that in the study region the average family size is 6.47 members (for 
 129 
respondents’ families). Larger families (those with six or seven members) constitute 23.5% of 
the respondents.   
 
Figure 6.8 Number of family members involved in farm activities 
Figure 6.8 shows that 31.16% of respondents have four family members involved in farm 
activities, while 26.63% have five family members involved in farm activities. Rapsomanikis 
(2015) states that smallholders use more family labour than capital to produce food. The 
report also found that in Kenya, on average two family members work full time on one-hectare 
of land and one family member is involved for half the time. The numbers working on one 
hectare of land producing FFV varies for other countries; five family members in Nepal, 2.5 
family members in Bolivia. The average family consists of four people involved in fresh 
produce farming activities. The next section discusses the respondents’ physical farm assets.  
 Farm assets, average yields and prices received 
Having discussed farmers’ demographics, this section explores FFV growers’ farm 
characteristics, such as operational land, farm labour and irrigation structures. Ownership and 
access to assets determine household participation in various income-generating activities. 
Table 6.6 shows that smallholder FFV growers own an average of 5.8 acres (2.5 hectares) in 
the study region. The data from the current study is somewhat similar to a study conducted 
by (Singh, Kaur, et al., 2009) that reports that operational land in Punjab is larger (considering 
small, medium and large farmers together) than the national average in India (>4 Hc compared 
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to just about 1 Hc in India). The land is considered the most important asset in the rural areas 
and its distribution has a significant influence on income inequality. 
Table 6.6  FFV growers owning land in the study region   
n = 200  Unit of Measure (in Acres) 
Mean 5.818 
Median 6.000 





In Punjab, agriculture on rental land (cash rent tenancy) has become increasingly popular. As 
such, agriculture on rental land is a universally prevailing institutional mechanism through 
which marginal or small farmers landowners not wanting to, or unable to cultivate their own 
land, rent it out to others to cultivate it for a specified period in exchange for a pre-agreed 
payment (Singh, 2016a).  
Table 6.7 FFV growers renting land in the study region   
n = 200  Unit of Measure (In Acres) 
Mean 2.318 
Median 2.000 





Table 6.7 shows that FFV growers in the study region rent an average of 2.3-acres, along with 
owned land under agriculture operation. Rental land ranges from a minimum of 0 to 15 acres 
in the study region.     
Table 6.8  FFV growers total operational land (owned+ rental) 
n = 200  Unit of Measure (In Acres)  
Mean 8.135 
Median 8.000 






Table 6.8 shows the total amount of operational land that FFV growers own and rent (cash 
rent tenancy). FFV growers in the study region have an average of 8.135-acres (3.4 Hc) of 
operational land.  
Along with the size of operational land, farm machinery (or a means of transportation) is a 
critical resource for FFV production. Due to the perishable nature of FFV products, farmers 
require some means of transport to avoid food losses and ensure timely delivery of the 
product. Generally, the means of transport are either owned, rented or shared by farmers. 
Table 6.9 shows that out of 200 farmers, 86.5% own tractors, while 13.5% hire tractors for 
FFV production. The high rate of farm machinery ownership shows that farmers in the 
sampled regions are resourceful.    
   Table 6.9 Farm machinery owned by FFV respondents  
Ownership of farm machinery (tractor) Frequency Percentage 
 Yes 173 86.5 
No 27 13.5 
Total 200 100.0 
 
In the sample region, 100% of farmers have access to irrigation. Interestingly, 98% of farmers 
use groundwater to irrigate FFV, while only 1.5% of farmers use government-managed canals. 
According to the statistical abstract of Punjab government for the year 2016-2017, the net 
area irrigated by government canals was 1,201 thousand hectares. In contrast, wells/tubewell 
cover 2,936 thousand hectares (GOP, 2016).   
Access to irrigation is considered a significant productive asset which is necessary for 
increasing yield. An FAO report on smallholder farming in nine countries finds that irrigation 
is a significant determinant of higher land productivity. It contributes to lower crop failures 
(Rapsomanikis, 2015). Moreover, assured irrigation enables farmers to adopt diversified 
cropping patterns.  
In the study region, submersible tube wells are the primary source of irrigation. The 
dependence on tube wells for irrigation shows that farmers in the study region have low 
production risks (crop loss) due to drought or lower levels of rain. It also suggests that at some 
time, the farmers invested money in a bore well or submersible water pump to access 
groundwater. Table 6.10 shows that 98% of farmers have access to tube wells, while a 
minority, 1.5% FFV growers, use canals for irrigation.   
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Table 6.10 Method of irrigation in the study region 
                Method of irrigation  Frequency Per cent 
 Tube Well                   196 98.0 
 Canal                  3.0 1.5 
Micro-irrigation                    1.0 0.5 
Total                  200 100.0 
 
Cold storage provides smallholders with a support mechanism to enable efficient marketing. 
Cold storage facilities are crucial to minimising post-harvest losses; however, losses occur at 
every step in the post-harvest cycle (Fonseca & Njie, 2014). Fresh food products are 
characterised by their perishability, and levels of vulnerability to pests and spoilage; however, 
in general, the control of temperature and relative humidity and the prevention of damage 
can increase shelflife, especially of fresh vegetables and fruits (Pingali, Aiyar, Abraham, & 
Rahman, 2019) Cold storage increases farmers’ bargaining power as well as reducing food loss. 
FFV products need a specific temperature to maintain aesthetics, quality and shelf-life.   
 
Figure 6.9 Percentage of FFV growers with access to cold storage 
Figure 6.9 shows that 48% of respondents have access to cold storage, 41.50% have no access, 
and 10.50% have access to cold storage but do not use it. Tomato growers prefer to transport 
their vegetables immediately after picking them, either to a traditional market or food 
processors thus bypassing the cold chain.   
Most potato growers have access to and use cold storage. At the time of harvesting, due to 
an oversupply of potatoes, the price drops considerably at traditional spot markets. Potato 
growers prefer to store their produce in cold stores and wait for a rise in demand and price in 
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the off-season. However, if prices stay constant and new crops come to the market, farmers 
struggle to pay for storage charges and suffer losses (Field survey notes).  
The next section explains the empirical testing of the research hypotheses. The results are 
used to determine whether individual hypotheses are supported or rejected.  
6.4 Assessment of research hypotheses 
The research framework suggests that FFV farmers’ participation in marketing channels 
depends on various exogenous and endogenous factors. This section presents the empirical 
findings on human, physical farm assets, marketing, institutional and infrastructure variables. 
The first part of the results section covers the impact of human capital assets on FFV growers 
participation in institutional channels. The first hypothesis considers farmers’ age and other 
influential variables to determine their participation in institutional channels.  
H1: Smallholder FFV growers who are older will be less likely to participate in an 
institutional channel than those who are younger  
ANOVA was used to analyse the differences among group means in the sample. Table 6.11 
shows descriptive statistics for the different age groups of FFV growers. The mean score of the 
16-25-year-old age group is x̄ = .200, the 26-35-year-old age group is x̄ = .844, the 36-45 old 
age group is x̄ = .2278, the 46-55-year-old age group is x̄ = .2236 and the above 56 years old 
age group is x̄ = .3944. The mean scores of the age groups are similar, except for the age group 
of 26-35 years old, which is x̄ = .8444.  
Table 6.11 Group statistics for farmers’ age groups   
                                                              Group statistics  
Age group  N Mean value of access to 
institutional channels 
Std. Dev 
16-25 3 .2000 1.90788 
26-35 18 .8444 1.36219 
36-45 54 .2278 1.68393 
46-55 89 .2236 1.76769 
56 > above 36 .3944 1.71763 
Total 200 .3110 1.69808 
 
Table 6.12 shows a small F = .555, meaning that there are no significant variations across the 
age groups in terms of participation in institutional channels. ANOVA results indicate that the 
effect of age on FFV growers’ participation in institutional channels was not statistically 
significant F (4, 195) = .555, p = .695).  
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Table 6.12 ANOVA results for farmers’ ages 
ANOVA 








Between groups 6.464 4 1.616 .555 .695 
Within groups 567.347 195 2.909   
Total 573.811 199    
 
The output in Table 6.12 shows that the ANOVA results were not significant. Thus, the first 
hypothesis (H1) was not supported. The reason for this contradiction may be that as farmers 
age, they are more reluctant to change their choice of market channel. In short, if a farmer 
has been selling to the traditional market channel for an extended period of time, s/he may 
be reluctant to make the necessary farm investments to sell their produce to institutional 
channels.  
Agriculture, especially FFV production, require special attention, skills and knowledge. It is 
assumed that as farmers age and gain experience, they may become more productive as a 
result of their improved skills. There is a common belief that farmers’ productivity increases 
with age reaching a peak in middle-age and then declining thereafter (Tauer, 1995). However, 
this is not the case in the current study. The current study did not find a significant variation 
across the age groups in terms of participation in institutional channels. Similar findings have 
been presented by Blandon et al. (2009), who finds no relevance of age with market selection 
decisions of smallholders’ in Honduras, while price and transaction cost were found 
significant. Hernández et al. (2007) also report a negative relationship between age and 
participation in supermarket channels in Guatemala, where older farmers are reluctant to 
invest in new farm equipment so that they can sell their produce to supermarkets. Similarly, 
Simmons et al. (2005) find that the farmer’s age has no relationship with seed corn contracts 
in Indonesia. Finally, Bathla (2015) reports that farmers’ age has a negative but non-significant 
impact on grower participation in supermarket channels in Haryana (India). 
The second hypothesis tests the effect of farmers’ education levels on their participation in 
institutional channels.  
H2: Smallholder FFV growers with higher levels of education will be more likely to 
participate in institutional channels than those with lower levels of education. 
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Hypothesis H2 was tested using ANOVA to compare participation in institutional channels 
across education levels. Table 6.13 shows descriptive statistics for FFV’s different levels of 
education levels. The mean score of college-level education is x̄ = .6943, which is slightly 
different from the group with no formal education x̄ = .3733, primary school x̄ = .3714, middle 
school x̄ = 1.1257 and high school x̄ = .3394. 
Table 6.13 Descriptive statistics for different group levels of education  
Group statistics 
Level of education N Mean value of access to 
institutional channels 
                Std. Dev 
No formal education 15 .3733 1.6451 
Primary School 21 .3714 1.5972 
Middle school 37 1.1257 1.3626 
High School 90 .3394 1.6701 
College 35 .6943 1.7558 
Total 198 .3096 1.6994 
 
ANOVA was used to analyse the differences among group means in the sample. The ANOVA 
results presented in Table 6.14 shows that the effect of education level on FFV growers’ 
participation in institutional channels was statistically significant, F (4,193) = 5.702, p =.000)  
Table 6.14 ANOVA results for education impact 
ANOVA 





Df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between groups 60.135 4 15.034 5.702 .000 
Within groups 508.832 193 2.636   
Total 568.967 197    
 
Multiple comparisons of group mean in Table 6.15 shows how they differ from each other. 
The table shows a statistically significant difference in the education levels of college and 







Table 6.15 The Tukey post hoc test, multiple comparisons of different levels of education 
Multiple comparisons 
Dependent Variable: Market access to institutional channels 













Primary school -.00190 .54891 1.000 -1.513 1.5097 
Middle school .75234 .49701 .555 -.6163 2.1210 
High school -.03389 .45283 1.000 -1.280 1.2131 





.00190 .54891 1.000 -1.5097 1.5135 
Middle school .75425 .44362 .436 -.4674 1.9759 
High school -.03198 .39349 1.000 -1.1156 1.0516 





-.75234 .49701 .555 -2.1210 .6163 
Primary school -.75425 .44362 .436 -1.9759 .4674 
High school -.78623 .31709 .100 -1.6594 .0870 
College -1.81996* .38286 .000 -2.8743 -.7657 
High school No formal 
education 
.03389 .45283 1.000 -1.2131 1.2809 
Primary school .03198 .39349 1.000 -1.0516 1.1156 
Middle school .78623 .31709 .100 -.0870 1.6594 
College -1.03373* .32345 .014 -1.9244 -.1430 
College No formal 
education 
1.06762 .50109 .211 -.3122 2.4475 
Primary school 1.06571 .44819 .126 -.1685 2.2999 
Middle school 1.81996* .38286 .000 .7657 2.8743 
High school 1.03373* .32345 .014 .1430 1.9244 
* The mean difference is significant at the p = 0.05 level.  
These results indicate that a farmer’s level of education is important in terms of generating 
human capital. Farmers who are highly educated are more likely to accept/be open to new 
ideas as opposed to those with lower levels of education. It also enables smallholders to use 
adequate quantities of seed, pesticides and harvesting practices. Well-educated farmers bring 
value via increased human capital (Rapsomanikis, 2015). The FAO published an analysis based 
on household data from nine countries and confirms that a higher level of education 
significantly increases farm productivity (Poole, 2017).  
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The next hypothesis tests smallholder farmers’ experience of farming (in years) on 
participation in institutional channels  
H3: Smallholder FFV growers with more extensive farming experience are more likely to 
participate in institutional channels than those with less farming experience.   
Table 6.16 shows the descriptive statistics for the different levels of experience in FFV farming. 
The 3-5 years of experience group has the highest mean value, followed by the up to 2 years 
group at x̄ = .5. The group with 6-10 years has a mean of x̄ = -.5326. Above ten years has a 
mean of x̄ = -0.179. ANOVA was applied to analyse the differences among group means. 
Table 6.16 Descriptions of different groups’ experience in FFV farming (in years) 
Group statistics 
Experience in years  N         Mean value of  
access to institutional channels 
Std. Deviation 
Up to 2years 4         -0.5 1.73205 
3-5 years 37          0.0203 1.66631 
6-10 Years 89         -0.5326 1.69127 
10 > 69          -0.179 1.72598 
Total 199         -0.3065 1.70118 
 
Further, Table 6.17 shows the between-group results of the ANOVA, highlighting that the 
effect of experience in farming in years on FFV growers’ participation in institutional channels 
was not statistically significant, F (3, 195) = 1.128, p = .339). 
Table 6.17 ANOVA results for different groups’ experience in FFV farming 
ANOVA 
Market access to institutional channels 
 Sum of Squares df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Between groups 9.772 3 3.257 1.128 .339 
Within groups 563.245 195 2.888   
Total 573.017 198    
 
Based on the above results, hypothesis H3 is not supported. Unexpectedly, the current study 
reports that experience in farming, the age of FFV growers and family labour do not influence 
smallholders’ participation in institutional channels. This could be due to several factors. For 
example, farm experience includes the process of gaining knowledge or skill, yet as farmers 
age, s/he may be more reluctant to change their choice of market channel. Therefore, if the 
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farmer sells to the traditional market channel for an extended period of time, they may be 
reluctant to invest in new technology so that they can sell to institutional channels. 
Institutional channels offer more certainty on prices, but farmers must meet planting and 
grading requirements. While experienced farmers might be able to meet these requirements 
and thus participate in institutional channels, the findings show that this is not the case. The 
next hypothesis tests the effect of family labour on smallholders’ participation in institutional 
channels. 
H4: Smallholder fresh produce growers with a higher percentage of family members 
involved in farming activities will be more likely to participate in institutional channels 
than those with a lower percentage.  
A linear regression method was used to examine the effect of the independent variable (family 
members as family labour), on the dependent variable (participation in institutional channels). 
 
Figure 6.10  Q-Q plot to assess the normality of family members in the farm activities 
variable 
 
To assess the normality assumption of linear regression, an observed value in the distribution 
is paired with its expected value from the normal distribution to form the normal Q-Q plots. 
Figure 6.10 shows the normal Q-Q plots as the number of cases in the sample fall more or less 
on a straight line, thus meeting the assumptions of normality. 
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Simple linear regression was applied to investigate the relationship between smallholders’ 
access to institutional channels and family members in farming activities, the results being 
presented in the following table. 
Table 6.18 Relationship between smallholders’ access to institutional channels and family 







B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -.347 .491  -.707 .480 
Family 
Members 
.007 .074 .007 .094 .926 
a. Dependent variable: Market access to institutional channels 
 
The results of linear regression in Table 6.18 were not significant, so Hypothesis H4 is not 
supported. A higher percentage of FFV growers’ family members engaged in farming activities 
means the number of family members help in farming activities. While an FAO report suggests 
that smallholders use more labour than capital in the production of FFV (Rapsomanikis, 2015), 
the findings of the current study reject this. For example, Bathla (2015) report that family 
member involvement in farm activities has a positive and significant influence on participation 
in supermarket chains in Haryana (India).  
The findings of this research are also contrary to Makhura (2001b) who suggests that 
households who participate in the institutional markets have a higher percentage of family 
members involved in farming. The foremost reason for this unexpected result may be the 
mechanisation of FFV agricultural practices in the study region. Table 6.6 shows that out of 
200 farmers, 86.5% own tractors, while 13.5% hired tractors for FFV production. The current 
study finds that in the study region, smallholders rely on family labour only for a few tasks, 
usually those which require human capital. These tasks include timely irrigation, arranging 
seasonal labour for picking and harvesting the crop and daily supervision.   
Another reason for the unexpected results might be the perishable nature of FFV products. 
This means that institutions cannot wait for long because the quality may deteriorate if crops 
are not picked quickly, or there are delays in loading and dispatching produce (Kader, 2004). 
Another reason might be the smaller number of family members involved in farming activities 
in the study region. The average family consists of four persons involved in FFV  activities. The 
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study finds that older family members participate more in farming than younger family 
members. Younger family members are generally not interested in farming and seek work in 
urban locations or study overseas. The declining profits of FFV is another reason why the 
younger generation may not be interested in participating in agriculture (field survey notes).  
The next hypothesis tests the effect of smallholder farmers who use a higher percentage of 
operational land for FFV on their participation in institutional channels. 
H5: Smallholder FFV growers using a higher percentage of operational land for fresh 
produce are more likely to participate in institutional channels than those with smaller 
areas of operational land for fresh produce 
Table 6.19 shows descriptive statistics for the percentage of operational land used by FFV 
growers. The mean score of the group which uses up to 25% of the land is x̄ = -1.4. The mean 
score for the group which uses between 25-50% is x̄ = -.36. The group which uses between 50-
75% of the land’s mean score is x̄ = .045. ANOVA was used to analyse the differences among 
group means. 
Table 6.19 Descriptive statistics of percentage use of operational land by FFV growers  
         Group statistics  
Group  Number of 
respondents 
     Mean value of  
access to institutional 
channels 
Std. Deviation 
Up to 25% 16 -1.3031 .88778 
25-50% 123 -.3585 1.69807 
50-75% 61 .0451 1.76280 
Total 200 -.3110 1.69808 
 
In Table 6.20, the ANOVA results show that the effect of percentage use of operational land 
on FFV growers’ participation in institutional channels was statistically significant, F (2, 197) = 





Table 6.20 ANOVA results for different groups’ use of operational land (in percentages)  
ANOVA 
Market participation in institutional channels 
 Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between groups     23.761 2 11.881 4.255 .016 
Within groups    550.049 197 2.792   
Total    573.811 199    
 
As the ANOVA results show, there are also statistically significant differences across the 
groups. The Tukey HSD multiple comparisons test shows that the extreme groups differ 
significantly from each other. Although the Tukey post hoc test is generally the preferred post-
hoc test for ANOVA, many other tests can be used (Leech et al., 2013). Table 6.21 shows a 
statistically significant difference between the up to 25% group and the between 50-75% 
group. Neither of these groups differs significantly from the middle 25-50% group. These 
results suggest that the farms with a higher percentage use of operational land are more likely 
to participate in institutional channels. 
Table 6.21 Tukey HSD multiple comparisons for different groups’ use of operational land 
(in percentages) 
Multiple comparisons 
Dependent variable: Market access to institutional channels  
(I) % use for 
Crop 













Up to 25% 25-50% -.94459 .44408 .087 -1.9933 .1041 
50-75% -1.34821* .46934 .013 -2.4566 -.2398 
25-50% Up to 25% .94459 .44408 .087 -.1041 1.9933 
50-75% -.40362 .26167 .273 -1.0216 .2143 
50-75% Up to 25% 1.34821* .46934 .013 .2398 2.4566 
25-50% .40362 .26167 .273 -.2143 1.0216 
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
Further, the means plot of percentage use of operational land in FFV production presented in 
Figure 6.11 shows similar findings. The size of operational land under agriculture is considered 
an essential variable in the farmer’s ability to gain scale economies needed to sell to 
institutional channels.  
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Figure 6.11 Means plot of percentage use of operational land in FFV production 
The next hypothesis tests the effect of smallholder FFV growers’ ownership of farm machinery 
on their participation in institutional channels. To reiterate; 
H6: Smallholder FFV growers who have access to farm machinery will be more likely to 
participate in institutional channels than those with no access. 
Table 6.22 (below) shows statistics for FFV growers who own farm machinery (n = 173, x̄ =  -
.2529) and those who do not (n = 27, x̄ =  -.6833). The independent sample t-test method was 
used to determine if there is a significant difference between the means of the two groups. 
Table 6.22 Group statistics for FFV growers’ ownership of farm machinery   
Group statistics  
 Own farm 
machinery 




Market access to 
institutional channels   
Yes 173 -.2529 1.74506 
No 27 -.6833 1.32585 
 
Table 6.23 (below) shows the result of the Independent Sample t-test, which indicates that 
there is not a statistically significant difference in the mean scores for those who own farm 
machinery (x̄ = -.25), and those who do not (x̄ =  - .68). The Independent Sample t-test reflects 
the conditions; t (198) = 1.227, p = .221. These results suggest that ownership of farm 
machinery does not influence FFV growers’ participation in institutional channels.  
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Table 6.23 Independent Samples T-Test of FFV growers’ ownership of farm machinery 
effect on market participation  
                    T-test for Equality of Means 















 1.227 198 .221 .4304 .35093 -.2615 1.122 
 
The independent sample t-test shows no significant P value at .05 confidence level. The results 
suggest that participation in institutional markets does not differ whether a farmer owns 
machinery or not. For the farm-to-fork journey, it is essential to transport fresh produce to 
the market. Thus, due to the perishable nature of FFV, having some form of transport is 
critical. Generally, in the study region transport is owned, rented or shared by farmers. This 
variable is defined as a binary variable and captures whether the farm household is equipped 
with transportation means. The current study hypothesises that owning farm machinery will 
have a positive effect on participation in institutional channels since it allows farmers to 
deliver their FFV to the supermarket distribution centres. Ownership means that they do not 
have to rely on alternative forms of transportation.  
Contrary to the current study’s results, the agribusiness literature suggests that in less 
developed countries, ownership of transport provide smallholders with a decisive economic 
advantage (Alene et al., 2008). Similarly, Osebeyo and Aye (2014) report that ownership of 
personal transport in Nigeria has a positive influence on smallholders’ participation in 
institutional channels. Similarly, Ali et al. (2017) also report that access to transportation has 
a positive effect on cotton sales in Pakistan; those with access to transport are more likely to 
sell their cotton in a modern market than to traders at the farm gate.  
The next hypothesis tests the effect of variable production costs on smallholders’ participation 
in institutional channels. 
H7: Smallholder FFV growers with highly variable production costs are more likely to 
participate in institutional channels than those with lower variable production costs. 
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Simple linear regression was used to investigate the relationship between smallholders’ access 
to institutional channels and variable production costs.   
 
Figure 6.12  Q-Q plot to assess the normality assumption of variable production cost   
To assess the normality assumption of linear regression, Figure 6.12 shows the normal Q-Q 
plots of the observed variable. The assumption of normality is satisfied as to the number of 
cases in the sample fall more or less on a straight line.   
Table 6.24 Relationship between smallholders’ access to institutional channels and 










1 (Constant) -1.063 .705  -1.507 .133 
Variable 
Production Cost 
1.674E-5 .000 .077 1.082 .281 
a. Dependent Variable: Market access to institutional channels 
Regression analysis results in Table 6.24 show a non-significant correlation coefficient (β= 
.007, p = .281). The linear regression result was not significant, so it can be concluded that 
hypothesis H7 was not supported. FFV growers selling to institutional channels face higher 
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transaction costs than farmers who sell into the spot market (i.e. they have less variability). 
Conversely, institutional channels incur greater transaction costs when they deal with a large 
number of smallholders due to higher levels of variability and these costs are reflected in the 
prices paid for FFV. Institutional channels rely on large farmers, collective groups and 
institutional arrangements to minimise their overall transaction costs (Pingali et al., 2005; 
Singh, Kaur, et al., 2009). The next hypothesis tests the effect of off-farm income on 
smallholders’ participation in institutional channels. 
H8: Smallholder FFV growers who have off-farm income will be more likely to 
participate in institutional channels than those without off-farm income. 
Table 6.25 shows group statistics for FFV growers who have an off-farm source of income. 
While the no group (n = 142) has a mean value of x̄ =  -.48 (SD= 1.6), the yes group (n = 58) has 
a mean value of x̄ =  .097 (SD=1.8).  
Table 6.25 Group statistics for FFV growers’ off-farm income  
           Group Statistics  
 Off-farm 
income 
N Mean value of  




Market access to 
institutional channels 
No 142 -.4778 1.61849 
Yes 58 .0974 1.82974 
 
Table 6.26 reports the result of the Independent Sample T-test which suggests that there is a 
statistically significant difference in the scores for FFV growers with no income other than 
farming (x̄ =  -.4778, SD 1.62) and those who work off-farm (the yes response) (x̄ =  - .09, SD 
1.83) conditions; t (198) = -2.19, p = .029. These results suggest that income other than farm 
income has a statistically significant effect on FFV growers’ participation in institutional 
channels. Specifically, the results indicate that when FFV growers have off-farm income their 





Table 6.26 Independent Sample Test results for FFV grower farmers’ off-farm income and 
its effect on participation in institutional channels 
Independent Samples Test 
            T-test for Equality of Means 







95% Confidence Interval 









  -2.1 198 .029 -.575 .2621 -1.09 -.058 
Off-farm income includes income from other crops, income from dairy farming, government 
employment and remittances from family members living abroad. The above results indicate 
that off-farm income is significant in farmers’ participation in institutional channels. If farmers 
have another source of income, they can use better quality seeds, apply fertiliser and pay for 
labour (labourers demand advanced payment in the busy season). If they rely solely on farm 
credit, which is time-consuming to organise, this can delay their ability to sell their produce at 
their preferred market, especially into institutional channels. 
The next hypothesis tests the effect of access to market information (H9) and the effect of 
checking the price more frequently (H9) on smallholders’ participation in institutional 
channels. 
H9: Smallholder FFV growers with (a) access to and (b) usage of market information will 
be more likely to participate in institutional channels than those without these. 
And. 
H10: Smallholder FFV growers who monitor prices with (a) higher frequency and (b) 
using multiple sources will be more likely to participate in institutional channels than 
those who do not. 
Table 6.27 shows the result for FFV growers who have access to price information (H9) before 
the sale (the yes response), and those do not (the no response). While the mean value of the 




Table 6.27 Group statistics for FFV growers’ price information before the sale       
Group statistics  
 Price information before the sale N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Market access to 
institutional channels 
No 45 -.3711 1.56737 
Yes 155 -.2935 1.73862 
The independent sample t-test determines whether there is a statistically significant 
difference between the means in two unrelated groups. Table 6.28 shows the results of the 
Independent Sample t-test. This test assumes the variances of the two groups measured are 
equal in the population. 
Table 6.28 Independent Samples T-Test for FFV growers’ price information effect on 
participation in institutional channels  
                        T-test for Equality of Means 

















 -.27 198 .788 -.07756 .28821 -.646 .4908 
The result suggests no statistically significant difference in the scores for FFV growers who 
have no access to price information (x̄ =  -.295, SD = 1.7) and the yes response (x̄ = - .37, SD = 
1.6) conditions; t (198) = -.27, p = .778. There is no significant difference between farmers who 
have access to market information before the sale and those who do not. In short, having 
access/not having access to information does not affect participation in institutional channels. 
Hence, the results do not support the research hypothesis H9. 
Table 6.29 FFV growers’ frequency of obtaining price information 
                                                                           Group Statistics 
 Frequency of obtaining price 
information 
N Mean value of  
access to institutional channels 
Std. 
Deviation 
Once a day 30 -1.04 1.17256 
Twice a day  101 -1.0129 1.36334 
Once a week 32 1.4375 1.22784 
Twice a week 30 0.8833 1.62355 
Total 193 -0.3161 1.70054 
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Table 6.29 reports descriptive statistics for FFV growers’ frequency of obtaining price 
information. The mean scores are: once a day x̄ = -1.04, twice a day x̄ =  -1.01, once a week x̄ 
= 1.4, twice a week x̄ =.88. An ANOVA test was used to analyse the differences among the 
group means. 
Table 6.30 ANOVA results for different groups’ frequency of obtaining price information 
ANOVA 
Market access to institutional channels   
 Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between groups 206.318 3 68.773 37.253 .000 
Within groups 348.917 189 1.846   
Total 555.235 192    
Table 6.30 shows a statistical significance between the groups. The results F (3, 189) = 37.253, 
p = .000) indicate that there is a strong and significant difference in the participation levels in 
institution channels across the frequency of market information groups. 
The Tukey HSD method was used to determine differences between the groups (see Table 
6.31). Participation in institutional channels is higher for those who source information once 











Table 6.31 Tukey HSD multiple comparisons for different groups’ frequency of price 
information 
Multiple comparisons 





















Once a day Twice in a day -.0271 .282 1.000 -.759 .705 
Once in week -2.47 .345 .000 -3.375 -1.52 
Twice in week -1.923 .350 .000 -2.827 -1.01 
Twice a day: 
Morning 
/afternoon 
Once in a day .0271 .282 1.00 -.702 .759 
Once in week -2.45 .275 .000 -3.16 -1.73 
Twice in week -1.896 .282 .000 -2.65 -1.16 
Once a week Once in a day 2.477 .345 .000 1.58 3.37 
Twice in a day  2.450 .275 .000 1.73 3.16 
Twice in a 
week 
.554 .345 .378 -.340 1.44 
Twice a 
week 
Once in a day 1.923 .350 .000 1.01 2.83 
Twice in a day  1.896 .282 .000 1.19 2.62 
Once in a week -.554 .345 .378 -1.44 .340 
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
The results confirm the statistical significance of H10. While the hypothesis results are 
significant, they contradict the original assumption. Interestingly, the results suggest that 
groups who spend less time searching for information about prices have higher levels of 
participation in institutional channels. Table 6.32 shows the group statistics for the frequency 
of price information and relationship with the buyer. 












Once a day 9 17 4 30 
Twice a day  54 35 12 101 
Once a week 5 13 14 32 
Twice a week 5 12 13 30 
Total 73 77 43 193 
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The reason for these results might be that farmers from the sample region mostly sell their 
produce in traditional markets. The price volatility in the spot market may also be a reason for 
this non-significant result. The philosophy of, ‘produce first and then look for the market’ 
might explain the contradictory results in the study region. Table 6.32 shows that FFV growers 
who sell at the spot markets check the prices twice a day, while contracted farmers check once 
or twice a week. This seems logical as contracts are usually negotiated at a fixed price.  
The next hypothesis addresses the effect of supply chain visibility on smallholders’ 
participation in institutional channels. 
H11: Smallholder FFV growers who have greater visibility of their supply chain will be 
more likely to participate in institutional channels than those who cannot. 
The results in Table 6.33 shows that fresh produce growers have visibility up to the immediate 
buyer and up to the second buyer in the chain. Inspection of the two groups’ means indicates 
that the first response is x̄ =  -.16 and the second group’s response is x̄ =  -.75.  
Table 6.33 Group statistics for buyer visibility  
Group statistics 






Market access to 
institutional channels 
The immediate buyer 
in the chain 
124 -.2823 1.76976 
Up to two buyers in 
the chain 
76 -.3579 1.58451 
 
Table 6.34 shows the result of the Independent Sample t-test. These results suggest that there 
is no statistically significant difference in the scores of FFV growers who can see the immediate 
buyer (x̄ =  -.283, SD 1.7), and those who can see two buyers (x̄ =  - .358, SD 1.5) conditions, t 






Table 6.34 Independent Samples T-Test for the effect of visibility on participation in 
institutional channels 
 T-test for Equality of Means 


















 .305 198 .761 .07564 .24794 -.4133 .5645 
The table shows that there is no statistically significant difference. Thus, the results do not 
support the research hypothesis H11. Indeed, buyer visibility represents the interaction 
between primary producers and buyers, and in some cases, communication with end 
customers. It is argued that, if primary producers know a buyers’ requirements, for instance, 
the quality, quantity, frequency, changing trends, and sensitivity to food safety, they can then 
plan production more accurately (Caridi, Moretto, Perego, & Tumino, 2014). 
The contradiction of the current study results with supply chain literature might have several 
reasons that say the greater the visibility, the more efficient they are. The lack of processing 
capacity of institutional processors might be the one reason for the contradiction between 
supply chain literature reflections and results produced by the current study. According to the 
World Processing Tomato Council (WPTC), an estimated 41.37 million tonnes (MT) of 
tomatoes (26% of global production) worldwide were processed into value-added products in 
2018 (WPTC, 2018). By comparison, less than 1% of India’s tomato production currently gets 
processed into such products. An estimated 130,000 tonnes of tomato was processed in India 
in 2015, which is 0.3% of the global tomato processing market. So it can be argued that if there 
is a lack of ventures to absorb FFV production, suppliers visibility can not influence 
smallholders’ participation in institutional chains. 
Another reason for this contradiction might be the lack of institutional supermarkets in the 
study region. The current study reveals that supermarkets are not significant FFV buyers in the 
study region. Supermarkets prefer to buy from the wholesale market and have limited 
quantities of FFV in their stores. Individual farmers sell a small portion of FFV (5% to 10%) to 
supermarkets after meeting strict grading and quality checks. The current study reports that 
smallholders prefer to sell their stock to those who offer the highest prices; however, this is 
usually the spot market, buyers at the farm gate or processing firms. Similar to the lack of 
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processing firms discussed in the previous section, lack of presence of supermarkets can be 
another reason suppliers visibility can not influence smallholders’ participation in institutional 
chains. 
The next hypothesis tests the effect of the market’s proximity (geographically) on smallholder 
farmers’ participation in institutional channels. 
H12: Smallholder FFV growers who are closer to their primary market will be more likely 
to participate in institutional channels than those who are not. 
Table 6.35 shows the descriptive statistics for the distance in kilometres for four groups. The 
mean score of distance to primary markets of more than 50 km has the highest institutional 
channel mean of .951. The mean of the group who must travel up to 10 km is x̄ = -1.20, the 
mean of the group who must travel between 10 km -25 km is x̄ = -1.29, and the mean of the 
group which must travel between 25 km-50km is x̄ =  -1.27. 
Table 6.35 Descriptive statistics of FFV growers’ distance to market 
                                                         Group statistics  
Distance to market N Mean Std. Deviation 
Within 10Km 20 -1.2 0.433 
Between 10 & 25 Km 11 -1.29 0.63 
>25 Km & <50 Km 83 -1.27 1.21 
More than 50 Km 86 0.9512 1.54 
Total 200 -0.311 1.69 
 
Table 6.36 shows that the ANOVA results confirm the effect of distance to the primary market 
on FFV growers’ participation in institutional channels: F (3,196) = 47.121, p = .000. 
Table 6.36 ANOVA results for FFV growers’ distance to primary markets (in km) 
ANOVA 
Market access to institutional channels   
 Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between groups 240.441 3 80.147 47.121 .000 
Within groups 333.370 196 1.701   
Total 573.811 199    
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As the Tukey HSD results in Table 6.37 show, there are statistically significant differences 
between the ‘more than 50 km’ group and all other groups. There are no significant 
differences between the other groups. 
Table 6.37 Tukey HSD multiple comparisons for FFV growers’ distance to primary markets 
Multiple comparisons 
Dependent Variable: Market access to institutional channels  
(I) Distance: 
Farm to market 













Within 10kms Between 10 & 25kms .08591 .48956 .998 -1.1826 1.3545 
>25kms & <50kms .06849 .32486 .997 -.7733 .9103 
More than 50kms -2.15616* .32376 .000 -2.9951 -1.3172 
Between 10 & 
25kms 
Within 10kms -.08591 .48956 .998 -1.3545 1.1826 
>25kms & <50kms -.01742 .41847 1.000 -1.1018 1.0669 
More than 50kms -2.24207* .41761 .000 -3.3242 -1.1599 
>25kms & 
<50kms 
Within 10kms -.06849 .32486 .997 -.9103 .7733 
Between 10 & 25kms .01742 .41847 1.000 -1.0669 1.1018 
More than 50kms -2.22466* .20067 .000 -2.7446 -1.7047 
More than 50 
km 
Within 10kms 2.15616* .32376 .000 1.3172 2.9951 
Between 10 & 25kms 2.24207* .41761 .000 1.1599 3.3242 
>25kms & <50kms 2.22466* .20067 .000 1.7047 2.7446 
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
The hypothesis H12  is supported but contradict the original assumption of proximity to market 
and smallholders’ participation in institutional channels. This is discussed further in the next 
chapter. The next hypothesis tests the effects of quality standards on smallholder farmers’ 
participation in institutional channels. 
H13: Smallholder FFV growers who can meet quality standards will be more likely to 
participate in institutional channels than those who do not. 
Table 6.38 shows the FFV growers who have grading requirements (‘yes’ responses) and those 
who do not (‘no’ responses). While the yes response’s mean was x̄ =  -.11, the no response’s 




Table 6.38 Group statistics for FFV growers’ grading requirements 
Group statistics 
Groups  N Mean value of  
                      access to institutional channels 
Std. Deviation 
No 44                              -1.0409 1.42475 
Yes 156                               -0.1051 1.71609 
Total 200                                -0.311 1.69808 
 
The independent sample t-test results in a statistically significant difference for participation 
in institutional channels in Table 6.39 shows between the grading and no-grading groups. The 
results support hypothesis H13. 
Table 6.39 Independent Samples T-Test for FFV growers’ grading requirements’ effect on 
farmers’ participation in institutional channels 
 T-test for Equality of Means 


















-3.31 198 .001 -.9357 .28288 -1.494 -.378 
 
Grades and standards define quality parameters that segregate similar products into 
categories and describe them with consistent terminology that can be commonly understood 
by market participants. The specific quality (for example, appearance, cleanliness, and taste), 
safety (for example, pesticide or artificial hormone residue, microbial presence), and 
authenticity (guarantee of the geographical origin or use of a traditional process), help to 
maintain grades and standards (Giovannucci & Reardon, 2000). The next hypothesis tests the 
effect of formal contracts on smallholder farmers’ participation in institutional channels.  
H14: Smallholder FFV growers with a formal contract, will be more likely to participate 
in institutional channels than those without. 
Table 6.40 shows the descriptive statistics for the three different modes of relationships with 
buyers of  FFV products have with the farmers.  The mean value of spot transactions is x̄ = -
1.44, word of mouth x̄ =  -.26 and written contracts x̄ =  1.45. 
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Table 6.40 Descriptive statistics for FFV growers’ relationship with buyers 
Group statistics 
Relationship with buyers N                            Mean value of  
                    access to institutional channels 
Std. Deviation 
Spot transactions 74                            -1.4358 1.0793 
Word of mouth contract 81                            -0.2623 1.55265 
Written contract 45                              1.4511 1.19061 
Total 200                               -0.311 1.69808 
 
Table 6.41 shows a statistically significant difference between groups determined using 
ANOVA (F (67.606) = 2, 197, p = .000). Further, the Tukey post hoc test results show that 
institutional channel participation was statistically significantly higher in the case of farmers 
who have formal contracts with buyers as compared to those who only have a verbal contract 
or sell by spot transactions.  
Table 6.41 ANOVA results for FFV growers’ relationship with buyers 
ANOVA 
Market access to institutional channels 





Between groups 233.543 2 116.772 67.606 .000 
Within groups 340.268 197 1.727   
Total 573.811 199    
 
From the results so far, there are statistically significant differences between the groups 
supports the H14. Figure 6.13 (below) shows that the groups differ from each other. The figure 
indicates that contracted farmers have higher levels of participation in institutional channels 




Figure 6.13 FFV growers’ market membership and experience with cooperatives 
The mode of market engagement includes the type of marketing arrangement farmers have 
with buyers. The mode of market participation is a critical factor for FFV growers. The results 
of the current study imply that the contract mode of relationship has a positive impact on 
smallholder FFV growers’ participation in institutional channels. However, only 22.5% of 
farmers have written contracts with buyers. Smallholders are motivated to participate in 
institutional channels by the fixed price, quantity and technical assistance.  
The next hypothesis tests the effect of cooperative membership (H15a) and cooperative 
experience (H15b) on smallholder farmers’ participation in institutional channels.  
H15a: Smallholder FFV growers who participate in collective action will be more likely 
to participate in institutional channels than those without membership. 
The group statistics in Table 6.42 show that FFV growers who are members of cooperatives (n 
= 156) have a mean value x̄ =  .0788 (SD 1.8). By comparison, non-members have a numerically 






Table 6.42 Group statistics for FFV growers’ cooperative membership     
Group statistics  
 Members of 
Cooperative 
N Mean value of  




Market access to 
institutional channels 
Yes 156 -.0788 1.7652 
No 44 -1.1341 1.1060 
 
The independent sample t-test in Table 6.43 shows a significant P value (p = .000). This result 
indicates that variability in both conditions is significantly different. It suggests that there is a 
statistically significant difference between those who are members of a cooperative, and 
those who are not, and participation in institutional channels, thus supporting H15a is 
supported.    
Table 6.43 Independent Samples Test for FFV growers’ cooperative membership effect on 
participation in institutional channels 
 T-test for Equality of Means 



















3.759 198 .000 1.05524 .28074 .50161 1.60888 
 
The findings of the current study are partially in line with existing studies that show that 
collective action among farmers enhances their chances of participating in high-value crops 
(Berdegué Sacristán, 2001; Boselie et al., 2003; Henson et al., 2005; Minten et al., 2005). 
Indeed, Jagwe (2011) notes that group membership lowers transaction costs and increases 
smallholder market participation in high-value crops in Africa. The next test (H15b) determines 
the impact of cooperative experience on participation.  
H15b: Smallholder FFV growers with more collective action experience will be more 
likely to participate in institutional channels than those not engaged in collective 
action. 
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The descriptive statistics in Table 6.44 show FFV growers’ experience with cooperatives in 
years. The mean score of the up to 2 years’ experience group is x̄ =  -.8000, the 3-5 years group 
is x̄ =  .2820, the 6-10 years group is x̄ =  -.0404, and the above ten years group is x̄ =  -.0775. 
ANOVA was used to analyse the differences among group means in the sample. 
Table 6.44 Descriptive statistics for FFV growers’ experience with cooperatives 
Group statistics 
Experience with coop N                            Mean value of  
                    access to institutional channels 
Std. Deviation 
Up to 2 years 15 -0.8 1.65314 
3-5 years 25 0.282 1.53751 
6-10 Years 57 -0.0404 1.76937 
Above 10 years 60 -0.0775 1.84929 
Total 157 -0.0758 1.76 
 
The ANOVA results in Table 6.45 show that the significance value (p = .311), is higher than 
0.05. The F is also small (3, 153 = 1.20), and shows no significant difference between the 
groups. Therefore, the results do not support hypothesis H15b. In other words, there is no 
statistically significant difference in the mean of experience with cooperatives on participation 
in institutional channels.  
Table 6.45 ANOVA results for FFV growers’ experience with cooperatives 
ANOVA 
Market access to institutional channels 
 Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between groups 11.139 3 3.713 1.203 .311 
Within groups 472.084 153 3.086   
Total 483.223 156    
 
The study finds experience in years with cooperatives has no significant impact on smallholder 
farmers’ participation in institutional channels. It may be because of a lack of cooperative 





The next hypothesis tests the role of formal sources of farm credit on smallholder farmers’ 
participation in institutional channels.   
H16: Smallholder FFV growers with access to the formal source of farm credit will be 
more likely to participate in institutional channels than those with limited or no access.  
Table 6.46 shows the descriptive statistics for FFV growers’ sources of farm credit. The mean 
score of credit obtained from a commercial bank had a mean of x̄ = -.0953, relatives and 
friends x̄ =  -.1167, commission agent x̄ =  -.9061, and cooperatives x̄ =  -.1638. 
Table 6.46 Descriptive statistics for FFV growers’ credit agencies  
Group statistics 
Credit agencies N                             Mean value of  
                    access to institutional channels 
Std. D 
Relatives and friends 9 -0.1167 1.56 
Commission agents 49 -0.9061 1.31 
Cooperatives 47 -0.1638 1.82 
Commercial banks 95 -0.0953 1.76 
Total 200 -0.311 1.69 
 
Further, in Table 6.47 the ANOVA results show that the effect of different credit agencies on 
FFV growers’ participation in institutional channels was statistically significant, F (3,196) = 
2.745, p = .044), thus supporting hypothesis H16. 
Table 6.47 ANOVA results for FFV growers’ source of credit 
ANOVA 
Market access to institutional channels  
 Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean square F Sig. 
Between groups 23.134 3 7.711 2.745 .044 
Within groups 550.677 196 2.810   
Total 573.811 199    
 
There are statistically significant differences between the groups. Table 6.48 shows that 
farms which use credit from commercial banks have greater levels of participation in 
institutional channels than those who use commission agents. 
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Table 6.48 Tukey HSD multiple comparisons for FFV growers’ sources of credit 
Multiple comparisons 
Dependent variable: Market access to institutional channels  















.78946 .60788 .565 -.7857 2.3646 
Cooperatives .04716 .60988 1.000 -1.5332 1.6275 
Commercial 
banks 





-.78946 .60788 .565 -2.3646 .7857 
Cooperatives -.74229 .34222 .136 -1.6291 .1445 
Commercial 
banks 
-.81086* .29481 .033 -1.5748 -.0469 
Cooperatives Relatives and 
friends 
-.04716 .60988 1.000 -1.6275 1.5332 
Commission 
agents 
.74229 .34222 .136 -.1445 1.6291 
Commercial 
banks 





.02140 .58459 1.000 -1.4934 1.5362 
Commission 
agents 
.81086* .29481 .033 .0469 1.5748 
Cooperatives .06857 .29892 .996 -.7060 .8431 
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
Generally, farm credit provides financial liquidity and encourages FFV growers to employ 
agricultural technology and buy quality seeds. It also enables them to pay advanced labour 
costs, repair machinery, arrange transportation and pay other agriculturally related expenses.  
The next hypothesis tests the role of access to logistics (including cold chain storage and 
transport) on smallholder farmers’ participation in institutional channels.  
H17: Smallholder FFV growers who have access to logistics (including cold chain storage 
and transport) will be more likely to participate in institutional channels than those 
without access to these resources/facilities 
Table 6.49 group statistics suggest that there is a statistically significant difference in the 
scores for FFV growers: ‘no access to cold storage’ category (x̄ = -.83, SD 1.4) and ‘yes’ 
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response (x̄ =  .22, SD 1.8). Independent sample t-test results in Table 6.54 show significant 
conditions; t (177) = -4.278, p = .000, thus supporting hypothesis H17.  
Table 6.49 Group statistics for FFV growers’ access to cold storage     
                                                                  Group Statistics  
Access to cold storage N Mean Std. Deviation 
No 86 -0.8285 1.41481 
Yes 93 0.2183 1.81617 
The results in Table 6.50 suggest that access to cold storage has a statistically significant effect 
on FFV growers’ participation in institutional channels. Specifically, the results indicate that 
when FFV growers have access to cold storage, their participation in institutional channels 
increases. 
Table 6.50 FFV growers’ access to cold storage on market participation  
 T-test for Equality of Means 









Interval of the 
Difference 
 








-4.278 177 .000 -1.04677 .24471 -1.5297 -.5638  
 
Cold storage is considered an essential component of efficient marketing of FFV products. It 
increases farmers’ bargaining power and reduces their food loses. Fresh produce needs to be 
kept at a specific temperature to maintain its quality and shelf-life.  
The final hypothesis tests the role of access to technical assistance on smallholder farmers’ 
participation in institutional channels   
H18: Smallholder FFV growers with access to technical assistance will be more likely to 
participate in institutional channels than those with limited or no access.  
An independent sample t-test was carried out to test the hypothesis. Table 6.51 presents the 
group statistics for both FFV grower groups, those who have access to technical assistance 
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and those who do not. The ‘yes’ response to technical support has a higher mean score (x̄ =  -
.0811), compared to the ‘no’ response (x̄ =  -.9654) 
Table 6.51 Group statistics for FFV growers’ access to technical assistance     
                                                          Group statistics  
Technical Assistance N Mean Std. Deviation 
No 52 -0.9654 1.2284 
Yes 148 -0.0811 1.7819 
 
The independent sample test results (see Table 6.52) suggest that there is a statistically 
significant difference in the scores for FFV growers with no access to technical assistance (in 
the ‘no’ response  x̄ =  .9654, SD 1.4), and the ‘yes’ response (x̄ =  -.0811, SD 1.22) conditions; 
t (198) = -3.331 p = .001. The results indicate that having technical assistance has a statistically 
significant effect on smallholders’ participation in institutional channels, thus supporting 
hypothesis H18. 
Table 6.52 FFV growers’ access to technical assistance on market participation 
 T-test for Equality of Means 







95% Confidence Interval 









-3.31 198 .001 -.884 .267 -1.41 -.357 
 
Technical assistance enables FFV growers to optimise their available resources. It also allows 
them to deal with risky situations more efficiently. Technical support is used for farm 
preparation, plantation bed width, the optimum uses of fertilisers and pesticides, harvesting 
techniques and cold storage.  
6.5 Chapter summary  
This chapter has described the sample, a general overview of the FFV supply chain in the study 
region, a map of the FFV supply chains, along with FFV growers’ socio-economic characteristics 
(gender, age, family size, farm assets and average yield). Finally, the chapter has provided a 
summary of the results for each specific hypotheses. Of the eighteen hypotheses tested, 11 
were found to be supported while seven were not supported.  
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The hypothesis test results reveal that except for a higher level of education, other human 
capital asset variables such as age, farming experience and a higher percentage of family 
members involved in farming activities do not impact on smallholders’ participation in 
institutional channels.  
Similarly, only two of the physical farm asset variables (a higher percentage use of operational 
land for fresh produce and off-farm income) were supported. The other two variables (access 
to farm machinery and highly variable production costs) were not supported.   
The five transaction costs of marketing variables have some interesting results. The access to 
and usage of market information and buyer visibility variables are not supported while higher 
frequency and in multiple sources of price information, proximity to the primary market, and 
meeting quality standards variables were supported. Interestingly two variables (a) higher 
frequency and (b) multiple sources of information were supported. As were proximity to the 
primary market variables, in the case of contract farming with an assured price offered by 
institutional channels. 
For the impact of collective action, one of the two variables was supported while the other 
was not. While the membership of a cooperative variable was supported, the experience with 
cooperatives was not. Finally, in terms of the impact of institution variables, all three variables 
(access to farm credit, access to logistics, and access to technical assistance) were supported 
in smallholders’ participation in institutional channels.  
Finally, the following chapter discusses the results of the hypothesis testing and provides a list 
of theoretical and managerial implications. Table 6.53 provides a summary of the results.  
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Table 6.53 Summary of results 
Hypothesis Result 
H1: Smallholder FFV growers who are older will be less likely to participate in an 
institutional channel than those who are younger. 
Not 
supported  
H2: Smallholder FFV growers with higher levels of education will be more likely to 
participate in institutional channels than those with lower levels of education. 
Supported  
H3: Smallholder FFV growers with more years of farming experience are more 




H4: Smallholder fresh produce growers with a higher percentage of family 
members involved in farming activities will be more likely to participate in 
institutional channels than those with a lower percentage. 
Not 
supported 
H5: Smallholder FFV growers using a higher percentage of operational land for 
fresh produce are more likely to participate in institutional channels than those 
with smaller areas of operational land for fresh produce. 
Supported 
H6: Smallholder FFV growers who have access to farm machinery will be more 
likely to participate in institutional channels than those with no access. 
Not 
supported 
H7: Smallholder FFV growers with highly variable production costs are more likely 




H8:  Smallholder FFV growers with off-farm income are more likely to participate in 
institutional channels than those with no off-farm income. 
Supported 
H9: Smallholder FFV growers with (a) access to and (b) usage of market 




H10: Smallholder FFV growers who monitor prices with (a) higher frequency and (b) 
using multiple sources will be more likely to participate in institutional channels 
than those who do not. 
Supported 
H11: Smallholder FFV growers who have greater visibility of their supply chain will 
be more likely to participate in institutional channels than those who cannot. 
Not 
supported 
H12: Smallholder FFV growers who are closer to their primary market will be more 
likely to participate in institutional channels than those who are not. 
Supported 
H13: Smallholder FFV growers who can meet quality standards will be more likely 
to participate in institutional channels than those who do not. 
Supported 
H14: Smallholder FFV growers with a formal contract, will be more likely to 
participate in institutional channels than those without. 
Supported 
H15a: Smallholder FFV growers who participate in collective action will be more 
likely to participate in institutional channels than those without membership 
Supported 
H15b: Smallholder FFV growers with more collective action experience will be more 
likely to participate in institutional channels than those not engaged in collective 
action.    
Not 
supported 
H16: Smallholder FFV growers with access to the formal source of farm credit will 




H17: Smallholder FFV growers who have access to logistics (including cold chain 
storage and transport) will be more likely to participate in institutional channels 
than those without access to these resources/facilities. 
Supported 
H18: Smallholder FFV growers with access to technical assistance will be more likely 






7.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter described the sample, a general overview of the fresh produce supply 
chains in the study region and FFV growers’ socio-economic characteristics. It has also shown 
that the farmers participating in this research have good levels of access to farm machinery, 
road infrastructure and assured irrigation, with an average of four family members being 
involved in farming activities. The current chapter discusses the results of this study and 
assesses the research objectives considering agribusiness literature and theories.  
 Objective 1: Identify the factors influencing fresh produce growers’ 
participation in institutional channels  
While the relative importance of FFV is increasing in developing countries, agribusiness supply 
chains are transitioning from price-driven traditional wholesale spot markets to well-
coordinated institutional channels (Chowdhury et al., 2005; Delgado, 1999; Ehret & Haase, 
2012; Hobbs & Young, 2000). The speedy rise of institutional channels has had significant 
impacts on smallholder FFV growers (Minten, Reardon, & Chen, 2011). While the transitioning 
of food systems offers smallholders an opportunity to participate and compete in institutional 
channels, a variety of factors constrain them from doing so (Reardon & Swinnen, 2004; 
Reardon & Timmer, 2007; Reardon et al., 2003; Reardon et al., 2012).  
Institutional channels feature shorter supply chains, with a smaller number of intermediaries. 
In contrast, traditional spot markets feature multi-level and fragmented chains (Poulton et al., 
2006). Institutional channels also focus on scale economies, grading, quality standards and a 
regular supply of FFV. Agribusiness researchers have reported that farmers receive a higher 
price selling to institutional channels. For example, supermarkets in Honduras, Sri Lanka, and 
Kenya pay smallholders higher prices (Blandon et al., 2009; Chowdhury et al., 2005; 
Ratnadiwakara et al., 2008). Due to the conditions and requirements of institutional channels, 
smallholders face several entry barriers that discourage them from participating in these 
channels (Rao & Qaim, 2011). Prior agribusiness literature discusses the critical role collective 
action plays in lowering individual farmer’s transaction costs (Barham & Chitemi, 2009; Hellin 
et al., 2009; Kaganzi et al., 2009; Markelova et al., 2009). Indeed, the agribusiness industry 
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and FFV agriculture, in particular, is assumed to be highly volatile because of the production 
and marketing risks. Various biological predators like disease, insects, and pathogens, along 
with variable climate patterns result in significant variability in FFV production and processing 
(Gustavsson, Cederberg, Sonesson, Van Otterdijk, & Meybeck, 2011). These variable 
conditions affect the output and efficiency of the entire agribusiness supply chain.  
Agribusiness researchers have identified various endogenous and exogenous factors that 
affect FFV growers’ market participation in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Specifically, 
endogenous factors are related to farm and farmer characteristics; for example, resource 
endowments (social, physical, human, and financial capital), household size, age and gender 
of the household head (Von Braun & Kennedy, 1994). Endogenous factors, such as low-
yielding environments, a lack of essential farm assets, and high transaction cost are considered 
obstacles for smallholders wanting to participate in institutional channels (Holloway et al., 
2000; Omiti et al., 2007; Pingali et al., 2005).  
Further, Boughton et al. (2007) find household assets (first and foremost land, but also 
livestock, family labour and ownership of equipment as found in this study), are strongly 
positively associated with primary producers’ market participation. Jaleta, Gebremedhin, and 
Hoekstra (2009) review the literature on smallholder participation in commercial markets and 
find that human capital elements (education, experience, and family members’ skills) are 
essential in commercialising smallholder agriculture. Narrod et al. (2009) find that group 
membership (cooperatives) enhance the possibility of fresh produce growers’ participation in 
institutional channels. Similarly, Reardon et al. (2009), and most recently, Mercado et al. 
(2018), consider food safety standards to be a significant obstacle for smallholder farmers’ 
participation in institutional markets in Bolivia.  
The current study finds that endogenous factors related to farm and farmer characteristics, 
such as a smallholder’s level of education, off-farm income, access to technical assistance, a 
higher percentage of operational land use for growing FFV, access to formal sources of credit, 
a farmer’s grading capability variables significantly affects his/her participation in institutional 
channels. Also, the contract mode of market engagement and cooperative membership is 
positively associated with smallholder farmers’ participation in institutional channels. The 
next sections of this chapter discuss in further detail the factors that support or hinder 
smallholders’ participation in institutional channels (see Table 7.1 below). 
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Table 7.1 Summary of variable which supports smallholder participation in institutional channels   
Variable  Factor description   Influence on market 
participation 
Age Higher the age of the FFV farmer (in years) -  
Education  Higher levels of education (of farmers) + 
Experience  More extensive farming experience (in years) -  
Family labour  A higher percentage of family members involved in farming activities -  
Operational land  A higher percentage of operational land use for FFV + 
Farm machinery  Ownership of farm machinery  -  
Variable production cost Highly variable production costs -  
Off-farm income  Income other than FFV + 
Price information   (a) access and (b) usage of market information,  -  
Frequency and source of price information    (a) higher frequency and (b) multiple sources of price information + 
Visibility of buyers FFV growers who can see further down their supply chain -  
Proximity to market  Close to their primary market + 
Quality and grading  Capacity to meet quality standards + 
Mode of market engagement  FFV growers with a formal contract + 
Cooperative membership  FFV growers who are members of a cooperative + 
Cooperative experience  FFV growers who have more extensive experience with cooperative -  
Farm credit  FFV growers who have access to formal sources of farm credit + 
Access to logistics FFV growers who have access to logistics (including cold chain storage and transport) + 
Technical assistance  FFV growers who have access to technical assistance  + 
+ sign = supported,  - sign  = not supported 
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As shown in Table 7.1, of the 18 hypotheses tested, 11 were supported, while seven were not. 
The next section includes a detailed discussion of the factors supported by the research 
hypotheses, extracted from the results.   
7.1.1.1  Farmers’ levels of education  
The current study finds that farmers who have higher market participation in institutional 
channels generally also have higher levels of education. The positive results for this hypothesis 
might be related to several reasons. One reason for the positive influence of education on 
farmers’ decisions to sell in institutional channels in the study region may be that there are 
more educated farmers in the Punjab state compared to the national average. 
Table 7.2 Education level in Punjab state (2010-11) and current study data 
No  Education level  Punjab  India              Current study   
1 Not literate 27.67 34.53                             7.58 
2 Up to primary  21.28 24.72                          10.61 
3 Middle  12.99 16.72                          18.69 
4 High school   19.08 10.11                          45.45** 
5 Higher secondary  8.79 5.21 
6 Diploma/certificate  1.7 1.9 
7 Degree and post-graduate studies 8.49 6.81                            17.68*** 
Total (1-7) 100 1000 100 
Mean years of schooling  6.551 5.482 
Source: Adapted from (Brar, 2016, p. 299) 
** High school data includes senior secondary 
*** Degree and post-graduate include vocational training certificate and college education 
 
Indian census data collected by the planning commission of India in the year 2011 shown in 
Table 7.2 reveals that the number of farmers who have high school and college-level education 
is significantly higher than the total Indian level (Brar, 2016, p. 299). The current study data 
shows variations from the previous census (2011) data from the Planning Commission of India. 
The reason for this variation might be a general improvement in smallholders’ education or 
the sample data-focused on particular study regions. The positive results of the current study 
can be also related to an increase in educational institutions in the Punjab state after the 
previous census. In the year 2015, the number of universities in the state increased from 6 to 
14. Similarly, the number of middle schools have increased from 3,792 to 5.445. Likewise, the 
number of high/senior secondary schools have increased from 8,810 to 9,171.  
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Table 7.3  Number of education institutions in the state of Punjab in India  
Name of the 
institution  
Institutions in 
the state (year 
2010) 
Institutions in 
the state (year 
2015) 
Institutions in 
the study district 
Amritsar (2015) 
Institutions in the 
study district 
Jalandhar (2015) 
Universities  6 14 1 1 
Arts, commerce, 
home science and 
science colleges  
234 272 8 16 
High/senior 
secondary schools  
8,810 9,171 700 732 
Middle schools  3,792 5,445 535 409 
Primary schools  13,950 14,372 1,026 1,119 
Source: (GOP, 2016) 
Along with it, modern agriculture is based on the philosophy of knowledge-based coordination 
among supply chain partners. This is different from the traditional market that typically is 
based on the ‘produce first and then look for the market later’ philosophy (Boehlje, 1996, 
1999; Collins, 2006). The TCE theory suggests that information, searching, and negotiation 
costs are significant in shaping exchange relationships. Educated farmers tend to negotiate 
better deals as compared to uneducated farmers; they can ask for better terms and conditions 
in their contracts. Further, they are better able to apply for new agricultural and technical 
knowledge (Hobbs & Young, 2001). As a farmer’s level of education increases, they tend to be 
more risk-averse, able to understand the buyers’ requirements and be rational users of farm 
inputs, extension services and financial planning (Hewett, 2012; Lawal et al., 2004; Slamet et 
al., 2017).  
Several studies have suggested that farmers’ increased levels of education have improved 
their livelihoods in several ways. Similar to the current study, Makhura (2001b) finds that 
educated smallholder FFV farmers in South Africa have better economic viability compared to 
less educated farmers. The current study’s findings also support Bathla (2015) and Rao et al. 
(2012), who both report that FFV growers who sell to supermarkets have higher levels of 
education than those who sell to traditional channels. 
Similarly, Neven et al. (2009) report that farmers who supply to institutional channels in Kenya 
are more likely to have completed secondary school compared to those who sell to traditional 
channels (most only have primary school education). A certain level of education is required, 
as the marketing of fresh produce includes various activities such as communicating with 
buyers, price negotiations, the arrangements of shipments and warehousing.    
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Education level also affects the adoption of allied activities that help in agriculture. Crop 
insurance, credit arrangements, buying and use of agribusiness machinery, use of quality 
inputs and seeds are few significant activities that require knowledge. Ghimire and Huang 
(2016) report that the household head’s age and level of education has a positive impact on a 
farmer’s decision to adopt new varieties of rice in Nepal. Similarly, Bishu et al. (2018) find that 
a farmer’s education level positively affects their decision to participate in cattle insurance as 
a risk management strategy in northern Ethiopia. Asante-Addo et al. (2017) find a positive 
association between the household head’s level of education and the adoption of microcredit 
programmes in Ghana. Osebeyo and Aye (2014) present similar findings for tomato growers 
of Nigeria. Giné and Yang (2009) find a farmer’s education level is positively correlated with 
insured loans and lower default costs in Malawi. Kumar et al. (2016) report that ginger 
growers’ education levels have a positive association with participation in institutional 
channels in the adoption of contract farming in Nepal. In the current study region, Vatta and 
Pavithra (2016) find a positive correlation between the level of education and size of land asset 
holdings. The authors conclude that new employment opportunities require education, and 
educated farmers are more concentrated in the larger sized farming categories. This provides 
further evidence of the concentration of income from sources other than agriculture. Indeed, 
Minten et al. (2009) also point out that educated households may have a better awareness of 
business opportunities with global retail chains in Madagascar. 
Knowledge and a certain level of education help farmers to incorporate advanced agriculture 
technology (Giné & Yang, 2009). Farmers with agricultural knowledge and technological skills 
can more efficiently utilise the land, water and agrichemical products (Ghimire & Huang, 2016; 
Lawal et al., 2004). For example, Lawal et al. (2004) find that the household head’s level of 
education has a positive influence on a farmer’s decision to adopt new, improved seed 
varieties of cassava in Ghana. Likewise, educated farmers with limited operational land, are 
more likely to form groups to collectively market their agricultural products (Fischer & Qaim, 
2012). Education is also critical in the production of specific agribusiness products that require 
more human supervision, knowledge and training, like organic FFV products (Singh, 2008). 
Smallholders can achieve a competitive advantage in these products by producing FFV at a 
lower cost with the use of local climate knowledge and family labour.  
A farmer’s level of education also affects their ability to adopt a viable mode of market 
engagement to sell FFV (discussed separately in section, 7.2.2.). The complex nature of a 
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contract’s terms and conditions (product specifications, size, and quality attributes), require a 
perfect exchange of information between parties (Abebe et al., 2013; Minot, 2011). Besides, 
the production of FFV under contract requires several prerequisites, namely a suitable climate, 
land preparation and the use of a specific variety of seeds (Barrett, 2008). Therefore, a higher 
level of education plays a vital role in smallholder farmers’ adoption of vertical coordination 
(Barrett et al., 2012). To gain access to formal credit, farmers also need to understand the 
procedures, arrange the necessary collateral and understand the terms and conditions of 
credit. Tangible outcomes associated with educated farmers are improved financial 
management and loan repayments (Alene et al., 2008; Temu, Mwachang'a, & Kilima, 2001).      
7.1.1.2  Higher percentages of operational land in FFV 
Along with other endogenous factors, higher percentages of operational land use in FFV is 
instrumental for smallholders’ participation in institutional channels. The current study finds 
that study region farmers owing average 5.8 acres land that meets the minimum requirements 
of institutional processors in the case of Potatoes. . Similar to the results of the current study, 
Neven et al. (2009) report that in Kenya supermarkets prefer using FFV growers with higher 
operational land under the production of fresh fruits and vegetables. In a later study, Rao et 
al. (2012) also report a higher operational land size for growers supplying supermarkets in 
Kenya. The current study data reveal that along with owned land, study region farmers 
cultivating average 2.3 acres rental land. Along with owing and rental, average operational 
land in the study region was 8.2 acres.   
Smallholders’ economic viability depends on their ability to compete in the market (Poulton 
et al., 2006). While institutional channels focus on creating economies of scale and frequent 
and graded quantities, smallholders are more likely to be excluded due to inadequate physical, 
legal, capital and regulatory infrastructure (Kirsten & Sartorius, 2002; Reardon & Barrett, 
2000; Reardon et al., 2003). It has been documented that institutional channels often avoid 
working with farmers who farm on less than 2 ha (Barrett, 2008; Jayne et al., 2005). Farmers 
who sell to institutional channels are five times larger than traditional farmers; 9-18 ha 
compared with 1.2 - 2.4 ha in Kenya (Neven et al., 2009). 
The current study finds the factors, higher percentages of operational land use in FFV is 
increases smallholders’ participation in institutional channels There might be several reasons 
for the positive results in the current study. First, farmers using a higher percentage of the 
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area under FFV production have better bargaining power compared to those who have a 
smaller percentage of land use. Institutional channels prefer to deal with large farmers to 
obtain scale economies (Kirsten & Sartorius, 2002). They often seek discounts from producers 
during festive seasons, which may be challenging for smallholders. Along with festive 
discounts, institutional channels require fixed quantities of FFV in periodic shipments to 
maintain continuity of production. Various researchers have examined the positive 
relationship between a higher percentage of area under FFV production and primary 
producers’ participation in institutional channels in different geographical locations (Boselie 
et al., 2003; Dolan & Humphrey, 2000; Key & Runsten, 1999; Michelson, 2013; Reardon & 
Barrett, 2000). Further, while large farmers have advantages in terms of scale, it is difficult for 
smallholders to access high-value markets due to high marketing and transaction costs 
(Blandon et al., 2009; Delgado, 1999; Key & Runsten, 1999; Kirsten & Sartorius, 2002; Reardon 
& Barrett, 2000; Reardon et al., 2003; Weatherspoon et al., 2001).  
Bellemare (2012) also reports similar findings, where the size of operational land has a positive 
relationship with contract farming. The current study also endorses these findings because 
Potato processors in the study region have a minimum threshold requirement to offer the 
contract to FFV growers was 5 acres of minimum operational land. Jagwe (2011) also finds 
that operational land size has a positive influence on banana growers’ participation in 
institutional channels in Burundi. Bathla (2015) reports that seasonal and moderate demands 
by institutional channels are the primary reasons for the insignificant impact on farmers’ 
participation in supermarket chains in Haryana (India).  
It is essential to understand that the study region has larger farms compared to the national 
average in India (>4 Hc compared to just 1 Hc in India) (Singh, Kaur, et al., 2009). All the 
smallholders interviewed were larger than five acres (2.023 ha), which is the minimum size 
required to sell to potato processors. However, the tomato processors do not impose a 
minimum size requirement.  
7.1.1.3   Off-farm income 
Off-farm income significantly influences smallholder farmers’ participation in institutional 
channels in the current study. Alene et al. (2008) find that off-farm income positively affects 
the adoption and use of fertiliser, which increases overall farm productivity. Off-farm income 
empowers farmers to use cash liquidity and time-saving options without waiting for credit 
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(Cadilhon et al., 2006). Off-farm income plays a critical role in the arrangement of farm inputs, 
farm labour and agricultural-related daily expenses. In particular, farm labour is critical in the 
production of FFV, especially in the case of products which have a short shelf-life. The farmers 
in the current research noted that there was often an issue hiring farm labour at the time of 
potato planting and tomato harvesting. Due to the high demand in the busy season, farm 
labourers often ask for advanced payments. In such cases, farmers rely on informal 
moneylenders who charge high-interest rates (Singh, 2016a). Consequently, off-farm income 
plays a vital role in the arrangement of farm labour in the current study.  
Several research studies have offered reasons why off-farm income leads to improved 
participation in institutional channels. Firstly, it facilitates FFV growers’ access to, and 
adoption of new, improved agribusiness inputs and production technology. Secondly, it 
enables small scale farmers to invest in day-to-day agricultural expenses without delay 
(Fenwick & Lyne, 1999; Masuku et al., 2001). Smallholder farmers need financial support to 
buy inputs and hire services to improve production and marketing activities. Smallholders’ 
access to cash encourages them to participate in agricultural markets (Lukangu, 2005; 
Makhura, 2001b). Ali et al. (2017) also report that income from off-farm activities has a 
positive effect on selling in the markets in Pakistan. 
In the study region, the service sector is a significant contributor to off-farm income. 
Generally, the service sector requires employees to have a certain level of 
education/training/skills. The current study finds that 45% of farmers have a high school 
education. In fact, a high school certificate is required for most entry-level jobs in India. In the 
study region, Vatta and Pavithra (2016) find a positive relationship between farmers’ levels of 
education and the size of land asset holdings. The authors conclude that new employment 
opportunities require education and that these are concentrated in the larger sized farming 
categories. This further indicates the concentration of income from sources other than 
agriculture.  
The survey revealed that migration to developed countries and joining the armed forces are 
preferred employment options over farm labour income (field survey notes). Table 7.4 shows 




Table 7.4  Major source of income other than FFV in the study region 
Source of off-farm income  Frequency Percentage 
Dairy 35 17.5 
Family member employment 27 13.5 
Family member abroad 25 12.5 
Traditional crops and other sources 44 22.0 
Total         131 65.5 
 
Punjabi youth who migrate to developed countries are simply following agricultural 
development strategies designed by the Indian government through successive five-year plans 
that stifled the development of industry and knowledge economies in Punjab (Singh, 2012a). 
Table 7.4 shows that 12.5% of respondents have a relative employed in a foreign country. 
Complaining of a lack of opportunities for high-skilled work in Punjab, young people explained 
that they had no alternative but to migrate overseas. Indeed, skilled migration routes from 
Punjab start with overseas study, which is one of the few remaining routes for young people 
to migrate overseas in the present regime of intensely managed and regulated migration. In 
Punjab, the overseas study has generated a multi-million-dollar industry comprised of agents, 
brokers, English language coaches and assessment institutions that are profiting from the 
dreams of prospective migrants (Al Ariss et al., 2013). Another study on migration issues 
conducted by Hussain (2018) highlights that skilled Indian migrants prefer to move to New 
Zealand despite having to work in low-skilled jobs on their arrival in the country.  
Another source of off-farm income is dairy farming in Punjab. The dairy sector in this region 
provides significant off-farm income options for smallholder farmers. There are three options 
for the farmers; to join the extensive network of cooperatives run by the Punjab State 
Cooperative Milk Producers’ Federation Limited (Milkfed) established in 1973, be an 
independent milk supplier for the urban population or link up with the private sector 
(Kanupriya & Devesh, 2012). 
7.1.1.4  Access and frequency of price information  
Efficient flow of marketing information results in positive benefits to farmers, traders, and 
policymakers, but only if they respond to the information. Efficient flow of marketing 
information facilitates price negotiation between farmers and traders, supports spatial 
 176 
distribution of products from rural to urban areas, and creates consumer awareness about 
prices and market conditions (Shepherd, 2007). 
In the current study, the results of the access and frequency of obtaining price information 
variable were unexpected. Limited market information and market access are two major 
obstacles for increased smallholder farmers’ economic viability in developing countries. 
Access to market information is crucial in smallholders’ development because it creates the 
necessary demand and offers remunerative prices, thereby increasing smallholder incomes 
(Fonseca & Njie, 2014). 
Initially, it was hypothesised (H9) that smallholder FFV growers with (a) access to and (b) usage 
of market information would be more likely to participate in institutional channels than those 
without these. Similarly, for hypothesis (H10), smallholder FFV growers who check prices with 
(a) higher frequency and (b) using multiple sources would be more likely to participate in 
institutional channels than those who do not. From the results, Table 7.5 shows FFV growers 
frequency of obtaining price information. The hypothesis results are significant but contradict 
in the opposite way to the original assumptions related to the frequency of price information 
and participation in institutional channels.  
Table 7.5  FFV growers’ frequency of obtaining price information  
FFV grower’s frequency of obtaining market 
information  
Frequency  Percentage  
Once a day 30 15.0 
Twice a day morning/afternoon 101 50.5 
Once a week 32 16.0 
Twice a week 30 15.0 
Total 193 96.5 
 
Interestingly, the results suggest that the group with a lower frequency of obtaining price 
information have higher levels of participation in institutional channels. Table 7.6 shows the 
group statistics for FFV growers’ frequency of obtaining price information in the study region. 





















Once a day 9 17 4 30 
Twice a day  54 35 12 101 
Once a week 5 13 14 32 
Twice a week 5 12 13 30 
Total 73 77 43 193 
The reason for these results might be that in the sample region, farmers still largely rely on 
traditional markets to sell their produce. The price volatility of the spot market might explain 
the need for repeated price interrogation and hence the non-significant result. The philosophy 
of ‘produce first and then look for the market’ might also explain the contradictory results. 
Table 7.6 shows that those who search for information twice a day are more likely to sell at 
spot markets while contracted farmers search for information once or twice a week. Another 
explanation might be that contracts tend to have firm conditions, such as price, and hence 
farmers do not need frequent information updates.  
Access to up to date market information enables FFV growers to select the right market outlet. 
Information sharing between buyers and seller is considered one of the primary means of 
enhancing supply chain performance. It allows supply chain partners to better coordinate their 
activities that will enhance their performance (Baihaqi & Sohal, 2013). Market information 
consists of information about prices in different markets, new markets, and the demand for 
commodities on a particular day. Thus, access to market information may enable fresh 
produce growers to participate in economically viable markets. Another variable (price 
information before the sale), was not significant in FFV growers’ participation in institutional 
channels in this study. It was hypothesised (H10) that farmers who have price information 
before they sell would be more likely to participate in institutional channels, but surprisingly, 
this was not the case. 
Access to market information affects whether a buyer will purchase FFV or not. The demand 
for products varies between the different markets. In the study region, most farmers harvest 
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at the same time of the season, thus the price drops due to an oversupply of the product in 
the market. Due to the perishable nature of FFV, high transportation costs, uncertainty around 
obtaining a higher price at markets further away, and storage expenses, farmers prefer to sell 
at lower auction prices at traditional markets. Zanello and Srinivasan (2014) suggest that 
market information is only helpful when it enables farmers to make marketing decisions. 
Otherwise, it would be an activity to increase the quantum of knowledge about farming 
without implications and that was the case in the sample region.  
Table 7.7 FFV growers’ mode of obtaining price information  
Mode of obtaining price information  Numbers             Mean             Std. 
Deviation 
Self-enquiry 198 4.25 0.974 
Speaking with commission 
agent/trader 
198 3.70 1.459 
Speaking with other farmers 198 3.17 1.442 
Farmer organisation or cooperative 197 1.90 1.300 
Smallholders receive asymmetrical and incomplete market information (Zanello & Srinivasan, 
2014) because the information comes from a variety of agencies, government departments 
and private sector organisations. This means that it is difficult for smallholder farmers to 
access information. Table 7.7 shows the various ways that FFV growers obtain price 
information in the study region. The data shows that FFV growers prefer to ask themselves 
(self-enquiry, x̄ =4.25). The next preferred sources were commission agents or local trader (x̄= 
3.70) and speaking with other farmers (x̄ =3.17). The least preferred source of information 
was farmer organisations or cooperatives (x̄ =1.90). 
In order to overcome asymmetrical and inadequate information problems, developing 
countries must improve their Market Information System (MIS). This would encourage a more 
competitive economic environment by reducing informational asymmetry between 
agricultural buyers and sellers. The current study findings in Table 7.7 show that farmers rely 
on self-enquiry or information from traders. As traders are interested in making a profit, they 
may provide inaccurate information. Other sources, such as the government, cooperatives, 
and processing companies may provide better or more accurate information. Smallholder 
farmers need better access to market information (prices, quality, quantities, where to sell, 
and production technologies), that could be provided through the establishment of MIS 
overseen by the government and/or agricultural development partners. 
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7.1.1.5  Proximity to market 
The distance from the farm gate to the market also affects fresh produce growers’ 
participation in institutional channels. The distance to the farm gate variable is important as 
some smallholders have limited access to farm machinery and transportation. It assumes that 
farmers prefer to sell at the nearest market because it not only reduces their transportation 
costs but also the risk of food losses during transit. Smallholders who face high transportation 
costs might prefer to sell their produce at traditional wholesale markets. There are very few 
other studies that have examined this aspect of market participation, hence these findings are 
of some interest. 
Table 7.8 FFV growers’ distance from farm to market 
Proximity to market  Frequency  Percentage  
Within 10kms 20 10.0 
Between 10 & 24kms 11 5.5 
Between 25kms & 49kms 83 41.5 
More than 50kms 86 43.0 
Total 200 100.0 
 
In the study region, the major traditional markets are within 50—70 kilometres, compared to 
institutional channels (processors), who, in the case of potato growers, are 170-180 kilometres 
away. The proximity of tomato growers to the closest processor varies from 30 - 60 kilometres. 
Interestingly, the current study reports that with proximity to the market of between 10 km 
to 25 km, not a single farmer found involved in the contract farming.  Whereas Forty-five 
farmers in the +50km away group found selling to institutional processors via contract 
farming. This means they have a guaranteed market and a pre-arranged price giving assurance 
of compensation for the additional distance covered. Farmers who sell to processors must 
transport their stock on average 170km (from the Jalandhar region) and an estimated 200 km 
(from Amritsar). In the case of potatoes, processors reimburse the growers for transport costs 
in the final pay-out. The study’s findings suggest that with an assured contracted price and 
timely payments, fresh grower farmers can supply produce for a distant market. Hence, 
traditional markets are favoured when nearby and this discourages institutional participation, 
but when more formalised exchange mechanisms are used such as contracts, institutional 
markets at some distance become viable.  
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7.1.1.6  Meeting grading and quality standards  
The current study finds that the farmers who can meet grading and quality standards have 
higher levels of participation in institutional channels. Grades and standards are the quality 
parameters that segregate similar products into categories and describe them with consistent 
terminology that can be understood by market participants and priced accordingly. The 
specific quality (for example, appearance, cleanliness, taste), safety (for example, pesticide or 
artificial hormone residue, microbial presence), authenticity (guarantee of the geographical 
origin or use of a traditional process), are the main components of grades and standards 
(Giovannucci & Reardon, 2000). The grading requirements vary according to the nature of the 
crop and the mode of engagement. The ex-post costs for potato grading relate to size and 
sugar content, whereas for tomatoes, aesthetics (ripe red tomatoes) are important when 
selling to tomato processors.  
The current study finds that in case of potatoes, food processors rely on written as well as 
verbal contracts with farmers to ensure that they have access to a stable supply of 
commodities that satisfy specific quality requirements, rather than relying on products 
purchased at the farm gate or from spot markets. Some contracts have specified requirements 
for processing such as a minimum landholding threshold. For example, in the case of potatoes, 
PepsiCo will only work with farmers who own a minimum of five acres of land. In the case of 
tomatoes, buyers are not required to have a particular sized farm. In terms of tomatoes, the 
only major processing requirement is the colour of the tomatoes. However, for spot markets, 
the size of the tomatoes is important for gaining higher prices and tomatoes must be packed 
in specific plastic crates (20 to 25kg each).  
The current study finds that some contracts specifically mention a quality requirement, such 
as sugar content, or solids (between 15 and 20%) in case of potato processing for chips. 
PepsiCo is HACCP and ISO-certified and ensures quality compliance at every stage of farm to 
fork activities including, planting, field monitoring of production, storing, processing, and 
packaging. They seek to maintain quality at every step of the value chain.   
Interestingly, the current findings show that traditional spot market buyers have stricter 
quality and grading requirements for tomatoes, whereas institutional channels have stricter 
quality standards for potatoes. The packaging requirements also less strenuous in case of 
tomatoes (field survey notes) for the institutional channel food processors. The tomato 
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growers must sell green tomatoes in the local markets at a lower price because processors 
will only accept ripe/red tomatoes. This study finds that despite being paid more if they use 
institutional channels, many growers prefer to sell at local spot markets because there is less 
chance of their produce being rejected based on quality, size, and aesthetics. 
7.1.1.7  Access to technical assistance 
The current research shows that access to technical assistance is positive and significant in 
smallholders’ participation in institutional channels. Technical assistance such as vocational 
training increases farmers’ understanding which leads to higher levels of production. Those 
farmers who have undertaken vocational training, have a greater probability of participating 
in institutional channels. As a result of the knowledge and skills farmers’ received in vocational 
training, they have a greater ability to produce more. The current study results are positive 
and confirm this finding. Extension services provide agribusiness support for FFV producers in 
the study region, particular information about improved agricultural technology. Alwang et al. 
(1996) find that extension support helps reduce poverty in Zambia. However, for extension 
services to be effective, there must be institutions to disseminate knowledge, such as 
government institutes and universities.   
 
Figure 7.1 Sources of technical assistance in the study region 
The field survey finds that many contracting firms (buyers) provide technical assistance in the 
study region. The processing firm’s field officer offers technical support in terms of land 
preparation, nursery raising and adequate use of fertilisers, pesticides and herbicides. Figure 
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7.1 shows that circa 40% of FFV growers receive farm-related technical assistance from their 
buyers, thus reinforcing the relationship over the longer term.  
The second source of technical assistance was from the Punjab Government Agricultural 
Department and the Punjab Agricultural University (PAU). PAU was established in 1962 to 
serve the state of Punjab. They organise open field days to introduce new technology and farm 
machinery and encourage the use of quality seeds and fertilisers and pesticides. Indeed, nearly 
40% of FFV farmers obtain information from the Punjab Government Agriculture Department 
or Punjab Agricultural University (PAU), Ludhiana. PAU provides agricultural-related 
professional courses, advisory services and conduct agribusiness research (Singh et al., 2019). 
The study found that farmers who are in touch with university scientists benefit from the 
application of new knowledge.   
Table 7.9 FFV growers’ source of technical assistance 










Buyer 8 24 29 61 
Government dept 20 26 12 58 
Input supplier 9 7 0 16 
Neighbours/friends 11 6 0 17 
Total 48 63 41 152 
The study also finds that farmers who have a  written contract with buyers have a higher level 
of technical assistance. Table 7.9 shows that contracted farmers have greater access to 
technical assistance compared to spot transactions and word of mouth relationships. Further, 
the application of new agribusiness technology and dissemination of current knowledge to 
improve post-harvest handling systems (especially packaging and cold chain maintenance) 
require institutions. Because perishable fresh produce has both qualitative and quantitative 
food losses, to ensure quality and safety, farmers need this technical assistance to participate 
in institutional channels. 
The current study finds that technical support institutions play a vital and positive role in 
smallholder farmers’ access to institutional channels. Interestingly, only partial support was 
found for the influence of farmer cooperatives on smallholder farmers’ market participation 
(discussed separately in section 7.2.3.). The current study also finds that informal collective 
action by farmer groups such as neighbours, family, friends and local religious groups also 
provides support for participation in institutional channels.   
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7.1.1.8  Access to formal credit  
Similar to off-farm income, farm credit plays a vital role in agricultural growth, especially when 
farming practices are capital intensive. For many farmers, farm credit is essential for a growing 
number of day-to-day farm activities (Goel & Kaur, 2008; Hazarika & Alwang, 2003). The 
current study found that farm credit from a formal source positively affects smallholder 
participation in institutional channels. Agriculture-related activities cost money at different 
stages (from the planting stage to transporting products to end consumers). The need for 
credit can arise at any stage of FFV production. 
Table 7.10  Effects of access to farm credit on FFV growers’ agricultural practices  
Effects of farm credit N Mean               Std. Deviation 
Farm credit helps in paying advanced labour costs  196 4.71 .658 
Farm credit helps in arranging transportation 196 4.55 .718 
Farm credit helps me to buy quality seeds 196 4.50 .762 
Farm credit Increase productivity 196 3.30 1.021 
Farm credit helps me to buy farm machinery 196 3.20 1.104 
Farm credit helps in arranging irrigation 196 3.16 1.273 
Farm credit improves post-harvest practices 196 2.98 1.084 
Table 7.10 outlines the effects of access to farm credit on FFV growers’ agricultural practices 
in the study region. All cost segments are important, but arranging transport (x̄ 4.55), paying 
advanced labour costs (x̄ 4.71), and buying quality seeds (x̄ 4.50), are the primary reasons that 
farmers need credit.  
Credit is a significant variable for fresh produce growers’ market access. Various research 
studies suggest that farm credit has a positive influence on farmers’ access to institutional 
channels. Osebeyo and Aye (2014) find a positive impact of credit on market participation of 
smallholder tomato growers in Nigeria. Lawal et al. (2004) find a positive association between 
access to farm credit and the adoption of an improved variety of cassava in Ghana. For the 
current study, while 100% of farmers have access to credit, non-institutional credit (informal 
credit) is recognised as a significant contributor over formal credit. However, the share of 
formal sources of credit has been increasing in Punjab over the years. Gill (2016) examines the 
nature, extent and evolution of the credit market and its relationship with agricultural 
development in Punjab. Comprising of both formal and informal sources of finance, the credit 
markets have gone through major structural transformations. While the cooperative banks 
were contributing more than 82% of total institutional finance in 1970, in 2012-2013 it is now 
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the commercial banks that contribute 78% of the agricultural credit in Punjab. Table 7.11 
summarises various research studies conducted in Punjab on institutional credit markets. 
Most studies find commission agents are the most significant contributors. 
Table 7.11 Agency (%) share of agricultural credit in Punjab  















Commercial banks  19.42 24.43 28.40 44.65 31.78 47.5 
Cooperatives  27.14 30.12 17.60 17.28 18.91 23.5 
Commission agents  46.32 45.45 44.50 31.98 43.36 29** 
** Commission agent includes credit raised from relatives. Source: (Gill, 2016) 
The current study’s findings are similar to Singh, Kaur, et al. (2009) who also find that 
commercial banks are the main contributors of farm credit in Punjab. It may be because 
contributions from commercial banks have increased over time. Table 7.12 presents the rising 
share of formal credit in the total percentage of farm credit in Punjab.  
Table 7.12 Institutional credit flows to agriculture in Punjab (in percentage form) 
Year  Commercial banks  Cooperative banks   Regional rural 
banks  
Total  
1970-71 17.62 82.38 - 100 
1980-81 37.54 62.46 - 100 
1995-1996 38.99 59.02 1.99 100 
2000-2001 50.67 46.75 2.58 100 
2004-2005 60.15 36.59 3.26 100 
2010-2011 80.83 14.75 4.42 100 
2012-2013 78.11 15.83 6.06 100 
 
Source: (Gill, 2016, p. 172) 
Another study conducted by Singh (2016a) highlights the function of the informal and 
interlinked agrarian credit markets using a survey of commission agents (rural moneylenders) 
in the state of Punjab. The study concludes that imperfect information makes the rural credit 
market favourable to commission agents. This current study supports these findings, although 
there has been a marked shift in the agrarian credit market, from informal moneylenders to 
the formal source of credit, yet informal lenders still exist.  
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 Objective 2: Identify the mode of market engagement to ensure FFV 
growers’ participation in institutional channels  
The second objective of this study is to identify the mode of market engagement that ensures 
smallholder farmers can participate in institutional channels. The current study finds that it is 
contract farming that increases smallholders’ participation in institutional channels. These 
findings are partially consistent with previous research and this will be explained in the 
following section. The current study shows that contracted farmers have higher rates of 
participation in institutional channels; however, only approximately 21% of the farmers in the 
sample have written contracts. This is because agribusiness transactions for FFV are highly 
uncertain due to the products’ perishable nature and sensitivity to climate conditions. The risk 
of crop loss due to uncertain weather conditions, pest attack and value loss due to changes in 
product characteristics is higher for FFV production compared to staple crops.  
NIE provides a useful theoretical framework for explaining the existence of, and theoretical 
rationale, for contract farming. This is because market failure problems and missing markets 
are typically caused by asymmetric information and a range of other factors that impact on 
transaction costs. The current study suggests that transaction costs play a critical role in 
smallholders’ participation in institutional channels. Traditional spot market transactions 
benefit buyers and suppliers only in two conditions; first, the presence of standards and rules 
in the industry, second, parties must have perfect information about product attributes 
(North, 1995). When there are no rules, standards and information are asymmetric, either 
party may choose to maximise their self-interests as opposed to serving the interests of the 
supply chain as a whole (Williamson, 1979). In these situations, the application of power 
serves to extract rent, and this power is typically wielded by the larger buyers over the 
smallholder farmers. Indeed, there are various transaction cost components that farmers 
consider when selling to institutional channels. The survey results in Table 7.13 show the 






Table 7.13 Requirements smallholders consider when selling to institutional channels 
Requirements to sell to institutional channels           N                     Mean 
      Std 
Deviation 
Quantity  169 4.63 0.669 
Variety  166 4.07 1.042 
Frequency  166 3.88 1.164 
Food Safety  164 3.83 0.957 
Quality  166 3.70 1.07 
Packaging  166 3.67 1.028 
 
While the descriptive statistics show that all requirements are significant, quantity (x̄ = 4.63) 
and variety (x̄ = 4.07) are the two top requirements, followed by frequency (x̄ = 3.88), safety 
(x̄ = 3.83), quality (x̄ = 3.70), and packaging (x̄ = 3.67). FFV growers consider each of these 
aspects when deciding whether to sell to institutional channels.  
As noted previously, the transaction costs associated with uncertainty, asset specificity and 
the frequency of transactions affect smallholders’ participation in institutional channels 
(Blandon, 2006). Asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency are three critical components of 
TCE and affect all agribusiness transactions. In this research context, asset specificity includes 
transportation, collection and distribution centres available for FFV products. The frequency 
includes the number of FFV product delivery and months of crop production. Similarly, 
uncertainty occurs when farmers have no prior information about the production and 
marketing of FFV products. The uncertainty involved in agribusiness includes output risks, FFV 
quality requirements and price variability (Blandon, 2006), as well as climatic and biological 
variables. The next section discusses the factors that smallholder FFV growers consider before 
agreeing to contract farming.  
7.1.2.1  Pre-agreed price 
The current study finds that a pre-agreed price lowers farmers’ uncertainty about the crops 
harvest price. These findings are in line with the NIE framework, that suggests that factors, 
such as uncertainty, asset-specific investment and frequency shape the buyer/supplier 
relationship. Indeed, this study finds that smallholders are initially motivated to sell to 
institutional channels by the higher price (compared to the traditional wholesale market). 
Notably, contracted farmers receive a higher average price for both potatoes and tomatoes 
by selling through contracts than when selling through the traditional wholesale markets. 
Table 7.14 shows that the price that contracted farmers received by selling through 
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institutional channels was higher compared to those non-contracted sellers who at the 
traditional market in the case of potatoes. In the case of tomatoes, the maximum price 
received by traditional market farmers find slightly higher but the average price received by 
contracted farmers was higher at institutional channels. 
Table 7.14 Average price received by contracted selling through institutional channels 
(potato processors) and non-contracted farmers selling at traditional wholesale markets 
(Rupees per KG) 
Crop                     Tomato                         Potato  
Farmers  Min Max Ave Min  Max  Ave  
Non-contracted   2 6 4 1.3 7 4.15 
Contracted   3.5 4.75 4.125 6 12 9 
 
These findings are similar to Miyata et al. (2009), who reports that in China, 53% of farmers 
sign contracts with supermarkets because they receive a stable or guaranteed fixed price. 
Ngugi, Gitau, and Nyoro (2007) also report similar findings in the case of supermarkets in 
Kenya, where contracted smallholders realise higher prices compare to non-contracted 
farmers.  
The reason for this preference might be the pre-agreed fixed rate of the minimum guaranteed 
price offered in institutional channels, that is otherwise volatile in the traditional markets. The 
current study finds that at the start of the harvesting season when fresh produce first comes 
to market, and supply is limited; the price is higher in the traditional markets. In short, farmers 
who sell their produce at the traditional wholesale market at this time are better off. However, 
as the supply increases, the price naturally decreases. In contrast, while the price remains the 
same in institutional channels, farmers who sell their products to this market are overall better 
off when viewed over the entire growing season. Yet, the temptation to speculate in the early 
season sales is strong for smallholders.  
7.1.2.2  Smallholders’ access to resources  
Along with the higher price offered by institutional channels, this study identifies technical 
assistance as another factor that motivates farmers to join sign contracts. Contracting allows 
farmers to overcome barriers associated with entry into risk-prone high-value crops. Farmers 
usually enter into contract production in order to reduce their costs and gain access to 
information, technology, marketing channels, managerial skills, technical expertise, plants and 
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equipment and patented production procedures (Gulati et al., 2007). Contract farming also 
means that FFV growers can gain access to capital and farm credit (Alene et al., 2008).  
In the study region, FFV growers reported that the potato processing company’s field officer 
visits multiple times over the entire season (from crop planting to harvesting). The tomato 
processor’s field officer also visits farms multiple times to advise them on various technical 
issues, from planting to harvesting. Potato processors offer seeds and inputs. Some potato 
growers prefer to buy seeds from the market at a lower price but use the specified variety. 
Tomato growers generally used their nursery or seeds locally sourced from large, nearby 
farms. 
Table 7.15 Technical assistance related to the mode of market engagement   











Yes  46 (63.0%)   62 (76.5%) 40 (88.9%) 148 (74.4%) 
No   27 (37.0%)  19 (23.5%)  5 (11.1%)      51 (25.6%) 
                        Total   73 (100.0%)    81 (100.0%) 45 (100.0%)  199 (100.0%) 
 
Table 7.15 shows that farmers with written contracts have a higher percentage of technical 
assistance from buyers, 88.9% compared to; 76.5% word of mouth and 63% spot transactions. 
Along with above-discussed motivations, institutional channels have minimum quality and 
quantity or acreage (minimum/maximum) standards and timely delivery requirements. The 
current study finds that in case of potatoes, food processors rely on written as well as verbal 
contracts with farmers to ensure that they have access to a stable supply of produce that 
satisfies specific quality requirements rather than relying on commodities purchased at the 
farm gate or in spot markets 
7.1.2.3  Avoiding uncertainty  
FFV products are highly perishable and seasonal. The supply of vegetables is volatile, due to 
unpredictable weather and biological hazards. Food quality and safety issues are especially 
important in FFV production. These characteristics mean that there is a high degree of 
uncertainty associated with FFV transactions. 
While contractual certainty offers assured and relatively higher prices compared to traditional 
spot markets, farmers must meet strict quality and grading requirements. In the study region 
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farmers faces strict quality requirements from Potato processors. The quality requirements 
mainly associated with size, and sugar content in chip grade potatoes. The farmers contracted 
with PepsiCo realised higher price compared to those selling at the traditional market. Some 
occasions they face rejections those offset the higher realised price and farmers left with only 
option to sell at the local market at a lower price.   Similar to the current study, in Mexico, 
supermarkets pay higher prices to contract farmers, but higher standards and quality 
rejections offset the final value received by farmers (Schwentesius & Gómez, 2002). 
Consequently, the strict quality and grading restrictions offset the higher contract prices, 
bringing them closer to the spot price found at the traditional market.  
These characteristics mean that there is a high degree of uncertainty associated with FFV 
transactions. Considering the first component of TCE (uncertainty), the current study reports 
that farmers who have been offered contracts with an assured price and quantity tend to 
participate in institutional channels. From an agribusiness firms’ point of view, the benefits 
associated with contract-farming are reduced costs, the ability to control quality and less 
uncertainty about the supply of raw material (Kirsten & Sartorius, 2002).  
Transaction costs are reduced as a result of a more coordinated input-output processing 
function. The company can ensure that the quality of large volumes of the raw commodity is 
better controlled and that producers adopt the company’s technology (Minot, 2011; Miyata 
et al., 2009). Another benefit of contract farming to agribusiness firms are owing to a relatively 
stronger bargaining position in the contractual arrangement. The agribusiness is also able to 
influence commodity prices in festive seasons (Delgado, 1999). Agribusiness retail chains 
benefit from contracting because the quality of inputs is more consistent and there is less 
customer dissatisfaction (Singh, 2009). 
However, there are disadvantages associated with contracting as well. The main disadvantage 
associated with contract farming in developing countries is the high transaction costs due to 
dealing with a large number of smallholders from the buyers perspective. Transaction costs 
are often excessive in projects involving numerous smallholders who are spatially dispersed, 
require high levels of inputs and support and who make smaller, more frequent deliveries to 
the agribusiness (Key & Runsten, 1999). 
From the FFV growers’ point of view, the first reason farmers prefer contract farming is due 
to the uncertainty around the final output and the volatile price in the spot market (due to 
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seasonal oversupply). Contracting thus the farmers’ production risks to an acceptable level’ 
and reduces the uncertainty of large volumes of input (raw material) supply (Kirsten & 
Sartorius, 2002). The second reason might be that institutional channels usually adopts 
vertical coordination to ensure control over the production processes. This enables buyers to 
procure specific FFV products that meet their processing requirements and standards (Young 
& Hobbs, 2002).  
Consumers face a high degree of uncertainty in terms of quality, making them less inclined to 
pay a premium for produce. This often means that farmers are hesitant to improve product 
quality. Farmers face high levels of demand uncertainty because of the perishable, seasonal 
nature of their products, and changing consumer preferences. Farmers need timely 
information, targeted training, and guaranteed markets to deal with demand uncertainty. 
Through the provision of appropriate inputs, market information, technical assistance, and 
quality inspection and sorting, contract farming arrangements or cooperatives may help to 
reduce uncertainty. These institutions provide quality control and reduce the quality and 
quantity of information asymmetry between farmers and buyers (Minot, 2011; Royer, Bijman, 
& Bitzer, 2016). 
7.1.2.4  Input support  
Contract farmers can reduce their production costs and increase production and income as a 
result of the adoption of new technology and access to company inputs (Kirsten & Sartorius, 
2002). Contract farmers can reduce marketing risk and stabilise their income. In this sense, 
the integrator provides a form of insurance (Key & Runsten, 1999). Contracted farmers in 
developing countries can increase profit opportunities through a greater product range and 
differentiated FFV products, or by growing high-value crops rather than traditional ones 
(Delgado, 1999). 
In the current study, potato processors provide quality seeds on advanced credit to contracted 
farmers. The processing company’s agricultural field officer provides technical assistance and 
information about land preparation, width and depth of planting, use of fertilisers and 
agrichemicals. Moreover, the field officer conducts three farm visits to monitor plant growth 
according to company requirements. Similarly, tomato processors provide quality plants to 
contracted farmers, raised at the company’s nursery. Similar to potato processors, they 
appoint a field scientist who provides farmers with technical assistance. Some companies 
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deduct the cost of seeds from the farmer’s final payout. Agribusiness literature suggests that 
institutional channels assist smallholders by providing advanced input, credit and technical 
support. They provide these input services to ensure that the FFV meet their quality, size, and 
grades. Hernández et al. (2007) report that institutional channels provide input supply, credit 
and technical assistance to producers in Guatemala. Boselie et al. (2003) report similar 
findings in the case of Zimbabwe, where Hortico supermarkets provide FFV growers with 
production inputs and credit. Louw et al. (2006) also find that the SPAR supermarket in South 
Africa offers interest-free loans to smallholder FFV growers. All of these factors have been 
confirmed as pertinent in this research. 
7.1.2.5  Asset specific investments  
Asset specificity deals with the degree to which a particular asset can be redeployed for 
alternative uses. Asset specificity is a term related to the inter-party relationships of a 
transaction. It is defined as the extent to which investments made to support a particular 
transaction have a higher value to that transaction than they would have if they were 
redeployed for any other purpose. On one side, FFV producers require specific investments 
for land preparation, specific seeds and inputs, greenhouses, and irrigation systems, that 
might not be required for staple crops like wheat and rice (Gulati et al., 2007). On the other 
side, processing firms have asset-specific investments in plant and machinery and have limited 
alternative uses for these assets. These asset-specific investments force FFV growers and 
institutional channels to theoretically use vertical coordination.  
Interestingly, the current study finds that contracted FFV growers are not influenced by 
distance to market or frequency of obtaining market information. But asset specificity was 
higher for farmers due to the nature of FFV products and specific food processor product 
requirements. Maturity at harvest also affects its marketability and storage life, nutritional 
content, freshness and flavour. In the current study, tomato processors will only accept ripe 
red tomatoes (they reject all green coloured produce). A specific variety of tomato is used for 
groups of products use different varieties such as ketchup, sauce, juice, puree, pasta sauce, 
salsa, tomato-based powders, sun-dried tomatoes, curries and ready-to-eat products. Thus, 
tomato growers must wait for harvesting until the product has completely ripened or reached 
to expectations of the buyers. This condition makes it difficult for farmers because they often 
have to organise labour on short notice. Farmers reported that they are often expected to 
provide accommodation, fuel and food options to retain farm labour in busy harvesting times. 
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If they delay picking the tomatoes, they may lose some of their crops and ultimately their 
profits.  
In contrast, at the traditional market, wholesalers demand that tomatoes are harvested at the 
colour break stage (so they can transport them to distant markets), and the fully red/ripe stage 
for local markets. Due to a lack of temperature-controlled logistics, farmers sometimes sell 
their produce at a lower price in the nearby wholesale market to avoid suffering food losses.  
Similarly, potato processors demand a specific variety, with low sugar content and a minimum 
size (45 mm size potatoes) for chip processing (field survey notes). In the case of potato 
growers, asset specificity is very high, because when growers sign contracts with potato 
processors, they use a specific sized variety of chip grade potato, with a low sugar content that 
has a higher production cost ( Rs 8 to Rs 9 per kg) compared to the table potato variety which 
has an average production cost Rs 4.5 to Rs 5. Potato processors reject more produce based 
on quality standards, meaning that growers are particularly vulnerable because they receive 
prevailing market price (a lower price compared to the contracted price) at the wholesale 
markets for the rejected volumes. During the field survey farmers reported that, overall, they 
were better off contracting with institutional processors. However, they noted that they lost 
money on the stock that was rejected by the processors.  
7.1.2.6  Frequency of transactions  
The third component of TCE, transaction frequency, is applicable for this study as the 
frequency of transactions affects transaction costs. Institutional channels consider 
consistency in terms of quality, aesthetics of the product, and frequent shipments to ensure 
year-round production (Berdegué et al., 2005). Table 7.13 (located at the start of this section) 
shows that the frequency of transactions was the third most important consideration for 
farmers who sell to institutional channels.   
In the study region, tomato processors require three shipments of ripe/red tomatoes three 
times a week. In contrast, contracted potato growers coordinate with the company 
procurement officer before harvesting and transporting the produce. However, the 
procurement of raw material from traditional spot markets is problematic for institutional 
channels. This is because institutional channels consider consistency in quality and regular 
shipments that involves high transaction costs if they have to procure from spot markets. 
Therefore, appropriate governance structures or high-levels of trust between parties are 
 193 
needed to lower transaction costs. Williamson (2004) suggests the adoption of appropriate 
governance structures according to the level of assets specificity, uncertainty and frequency 
of transactions. They can be in the form of spot markets, hybrids, or hierarchy, but must be 
based on the quantum of transactions (Peterson et al., 2001).  
The next section of the chapter discusses the third objective, which was to determine the role 
of collective action on FFV growers’ participation in institutional channels. 
 Objective 3: Determine the role of collective action on FFV growers’ 
participation in institutional channels 
The current study hypothesised (H15a and H15b) that cooperative membership and experience 
in years would be a statistically significant influencer of FFP grower participation in 
institutional channels. However, there were mixed results. While cooperative membership is 
a significant factor in participation in institutional channels, experience (in years) is not.  
The findings of the current study are partially in line with existing studies that suggest that 
collective action among farmers enhance their chances of participating in high-value crops 
(Berdegué Sacristán, 2001; Boselie et al., 2003; Henson et al., 2005; Minten et al., 2005). 
Similarly, Jagwe (2011) finds that group membership lowers the transaction costs and 
increases smallholders’ market participation in high-value crops in Africa. Indeed, the current 
study finds that collective institutions perform some functions that benefit smallholders. In 
the study area, approximately 81% of farmers were members of either state-run cooperatives 
or farmer organisations. The production and marketing services offered to FFV producers from 
state-run cooperatives were limited in the study area. Researchers have argued that the role 
of collective efforts and farmer organisations should not be limited to just the initial 
establishment, but also in organising them in such a way that they contribute to joint 
marketing and value-adding operations (Barham & Chitemi, 2009; Hellin et al., 2009; Kaganzi 
et al., 2009; Markelova et al., 2009).  
In Punjab state,state-run cooperatives provide credit and input supply services; seemingly the 
only two motivations for farmers to participate in state cooperatives. According to the 
statistical abstract of the government of Punjab for the year 2016-2017, there were 17,902 
cooperatives societies and 5.313 million members and 67,304 rs crore working capital (GOP, 
2016).  While several farmers’ organisations exist in the study region, they mostly exist to 
lobby the government for better staple food prices. Collective actions for marketing and 
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collaborative mechanism were low to non-existent in these farmers’ organisations. Overall, 
there was no evidence of any collective marketing for FFV by cooperatives, either state-run or 
farmer organisations in the sample.  
 
 
Figure 7.2 Services offered by FFV cooperatives in the study region  
  
Even though farmers are cooperative members, these groups offered very limited marketing 
services. Figure 7.2 shows that production services (inputs and credit) are the highest values 
in term of services offered by cooperatives. In the sample region, the Punjab Agro Industries 
Corporation (PAIC), is the premier cooperative organisation. It was established by the Punjab 
government, and is entrusted with the promoting and facilitating FFV production, including 
agro-processing (GOP, 2016). However, the PAIC has a limited impact on FFV collective 
marketing and processing as found in these results. 
From a smallholder’s viewpoint, collective action leads to economies of scale and lowers 
transaction costs (Poole, 2017). The NIE framework suggests that institutions help to lower 
individual farmer’s transaction costs (Alene et al., 2008; Hobbs, 1996; Hobbs & Young, 2000). 
Along with formal institutions (contracting), informal institutions (customs, traditions, 
religious groups) also influence smallholder marketing (North, 1995). The current study 
findings suggest that neighbours and family friends create socio-religious solidarity to help 
each other, especially in relation to small farm credits and agricultural machinery. 
These informal farmer networks are significant in the study region. Farmers help each other 
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help each other with small amounts of microcredit. Neighbours and family friends are 
common forms of informal networks in the farming community.  
Table 7.16 Source of technical assistance for FFV growers in the study region 
Source of technical assistance  Frequency Per cent 
Buyer 61 30.5 
Government department 58 29 
Input supplier 16 8 
Informal cooperatives (Neighbours/friends) 17 8.5 
Sub Total 152 76 
No technical assistance  48 24 
Total  200 100 
 
The current study finds that farmers sometimes share agricultural machinery or help each 
other in varying amounts, share information about the production, product handling and post-
harvest disposal of products. Table 7.16 shows that 8.5% of smallholders access technical 
assistance informally through neighbours/friends. The major component of technical 
assistance includes information about the right quantity and quality of seeds, pesticides and 
fertilisers. These informal groups are connected through social and religious solidarity. 
Similarly, Table 7.17 shows that 23.5% of smallholders share agricultural machinery with 
neighbours and friends.  
Table 7.17 Percentage of FFV growers who share machinery with neighbours/friends 
Share machinery with neighbours/friends  Frequency Percentage 
Yes 47 23.5 
No 152 76 
Total 199 99.5 
 
Interestingly Punjab is a highly mechanised state with an average of one tractor per 8.71 
hectares of the net cultivated area which is much higher compared to the national average of 
one tractor per 62 hectares in India (Singh & Singh, 2016).   There are several reasons in the 
lower percentage of farm machinery shared by study region’s farmers. One reason might be 
the ownership of farm machinery, especially tractor considered as a symbol of social status in 
Punjab. Another reason is the limited period between the crop farmers harvest and the next 
crop they plant. To avoid delay (uncertainty)  in plantation, harvesting and transportation of 
agriculture produce to the market, farmers prefer to own the farm machinery (Singh & Singh, 
2016).   
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While the limited function of cooperatives in FFV marketing in India has been discussed by 
various researchers (Negi, 2018), there are examples of successful marketing by other 
cooperatives in Punjab. The Punjab State Cooperative Milk Producers’ Federation Limited 
(Milk Fed) has been a success story in the sample region in milk collection and value-adding. 
Milk Fed's three‐tier structure comprises of 6,500 producer cooperative societies at the village 
level (VCS – the site of milk procurement every morning and evening), with approximately 0.4 
million farmers that form 11 milk unions (MUs) at the district level. Milk Fed collects an 
average of 0.74 million litres per day, with a peak of one million litres. Kanupriya and Devesh 
(2012) find that many farmers have profited by becoming members of the dairy cooperative 
Milk Fed in Punjab (India). The processing and value addition of milk which meets international 
food safety standards has made Milk Fed a success story. Sadly, this is not true in the case of 
FFV cooperatives in the sample region. 
The current study finds two types of collective action organisations work for farmers in the 
study region. An informal farmer group called the ‘Kisan Union’ unites farmers at the local 
level and offers them organisational services. These informal groups are religiously and 
socially associated and are influenced by political parties to some extent. During the field 
survey, several informal farmers’ organisations were found in the study region, but their 
functions are primarily to act as a pressure group on the government to gain better prices for 
staple foods.    
The second type of farmer organisations are the state-run traditional cooperatives. The state-
run cooperatives focus primarily on providing services to farmers who grow staple crops, 
produce dairy or process sugar but not FFV. Figure 7.3 depicts the major state-run apex 
cooperative federations:  
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Punjab state cooperative bank ltd (PSCB)
The Punjab state cooperative agricultural development bank (PSCADB)
The Punjab state cooperative milk producers federation ltd (Milk fed)
The Punjab state federation of cooperative sugar mills ltd (Sugar fed)
The Punjab state federation of cooperatives house building societies ltd (Housefed)
The Punjab state cooperative labour and construction federation ltd (Labour fed)
The Punjab cooperative of institute training (PICT)
The Punjab state cooperative development federation ltd (Puncofed) 
The Punjab state cooperatives supply marketing  federation ltd (Mark fed)
 
Figure 7.3 Major apex cooperative federations in the state of Punjab  
In the study region, the Punjab State Cooperative Supply and Marketing Federation (Markfed) 
seems to be the most relevant state-run cooperative. Markfed, one of Asia’s most extensive 
marketing cooperative, established in 1954, has over 3,000 cooperative societies at a block-
level, and an annual turnover of INR 11,600 crores (in the year 2013-14). Markfed has emerged 
as a reliable cooperative organisation committed to providing agricultural procurement and 
allied services like insurance, technical assistance, and agrichemical products at reasonable 
rates in Punjab (Singh & Singh, 2016). 
The agribusiness literature discusses various services offered by collective organisations, 
including, production, marketing, financial, education and welfare services (Hellin et al., 2009; 
Markelova et al., 2009; Narrod et al., 2009). Table 7.18 compares the services that have been 
identified by previous research and the current study findings. 
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Table 7.18 Services offered by farmer organisations to members  
Services  Description of services  Study region findings 
Organisational services     Organising farmers, building capacity, establishing 
internal monitoring systems 
Partial, limited only to organising  
Production services         Input supply, facilitation of production activities Provide input supply and agrichemical products  
Marketing services Transport and storage, processing, market 
information, branding, certification 
No 
Financial services Savings, loans, and other forms of credit, financial 
management 
Yes  
Technology services  Education, extension, research Partial 
Education services Business skills, health, production No  
Welfare services Health, pasture, fisheries, forests, soil conservation 
policy advocacy 
Partial, health insurance limited access   
Source: (Kaganzi et al., 2008; Markelova et al., 2009)
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The current study finds that traditional state-run cooperatives only partially work for 
smallholder farmers. Indeed, cooperatives primarily provide production services to 
smallholder farmers: input, fertilisers, credit and farm machineryOverall, cooperatives provide 
limited services for FFV growers. Various researchers have discussed the inefficiencies of 
cooperatives in FFV marketing in India (Negi, 2018; Trebbin & Hassler, 2012). The apex body 
designated for agricultural supply and marketing (Markfed) is not efficient in procuring and 
processing FFV in the study region. Markfed procures wheat, rice, and oilseeds on behalf of 
the Indian government and offers guaranteed minimum support prices. Markfed has a limited 
role in the marketing and supply of FFV; it only provides technical assistance, credit and 
agrichemical products. 
Most of the FFV growers sell directly to either to processors or traditional markets. Many 
farmers choose not to participate in cooperatives because of a lack of transparency and 
political interference. Figure 7.4  shows the factors responsible for FFV growers’ dissatisfaction 
with cooperatives in the study region.  
 
Figure 7.4 Factors responsible for FFV growers’ dissatisfaction with cooperatives 
During the field survey, there were several issues discussed by respondents that restrict them 
to join cooperatives. The cooperatives societies in the study region found under the enormous 
pressure of politicians. The ruling political party local leaders have control over the positions 
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of the board of directors and other decision making positions. It was found in most of the 
cooperative institutions such as cooperative banks and other cooperative societies. The local 
politician uses their power to influence local processors to give priority to their party 
supporter FFV growers’ when they deliver fresh produce ( in case of tomatoes) in Amritsar 
region ( Field survey notes). Therefore political interference becomes major issue farmers 
dissatisfaction with cooperatives in the study region.  These unexpected results could also be 
due to the fragmented nature of farmers in the region and no collective voice. In the sampled 
region, farmers’ unions were found to be ineffective. The collective farmers’ movements are 
highly fragmented. Although there were fifteen active farmers’ unions in the region, none of 
them provides marketing and storage facilities (Singh, 2012b). 
For the solution of this problem, the critics and agribusiness researcher in India have been 
advised new generation cooperatives and farmers producer companies to include smallholder 
farmers in institutional chains (Trebbin & Hassler, 2012). Co-operatives, in general, have 
suffered from the problems globally and failed with some exceptions. In the light of the 
previous experience of the poor performance of traditional cooperatives in India, it was felt 
that there was a need to give more freedom to cooperatives to operate as business entities in 
competitive markets. Producer companies came into existence with the amendment of 
Section 581 of the Companies Act, 1956, in 2003 (Trebbin & Hassler, 2012). A producer 
company operates under the regulatory framework that applies to companies, which is 
distinctly different from that of the cooperatives, which was seen as arbitrary and corrupt. A 
producer company can be registered in India under the provisions of Part IX-A, chapter one of 
the Companies Act, 1956. The objective of the said company can be production, harvesting, 
procurement, grading, pooling, handling, marketing, selling, the export of primary produce of 
the members or import of goods or services for their benefit. Its membership can be 10 or 
more individual producers, or two or more producer institutions or a combination of both. It 
retains the one member-one vote principle irrespective of shares or patronage, except during 
the first year when it can be based on shares. Like traditional cooperatives, it provides a 
limited return on capital but can give a bonus or bonus shares based on patronage (Singh & 
Singh, 2012). 
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 Objective 4: Provide recommendations to enhance market participation 
and maximising FFV growers’ returns 
In India agriculture has always been the most important sector. It currently accounts for more 
than 17% of GDP. More importantly, 51% of the population is dependent upon it for their 
livelihoods (Singh & Singh, 2016). Punjab is known as an agriculturally developed state in India. 
There is good roading infrastructure, the farmers have assured irrigation and produce a 
surplus of staple crops such as wheat and rice (Sidhu, 2016). The favourable climate provides 
a comparative advantage in terms of the production of several FFV crops, and for some crops, 
more than one harvest per season (Birthal et al., 2005). The current study finds that despite 
having a surplus and various agricultural and allied commodities, the level of processing and 
value addition of FFV products is low in the study region. The next section provides some 
recommendations for enhancing market participation and maximising FFV growers’ returns. 
7.1.4.1  Recommendations for Policymakers  
7.1.4.1.1 Enhance the capacity of the food processing sector  
The current rate of post-harvest losses is between 7.5-20% of the volume. Several weak inter-
sectoral linkages contribute to this wastage (Singh & Singh, 2016). The processing of fruits and 
vegetables is minimal in the State compared to more developed countries (Singh, 2012b). 
Indeed, agricultural production is focused on two main crops (wheat and paddy) that 
contribute to the national food basket and food security. In the year 2010-2011, Punjab with 
1.53% geographical land area of India, contributed approximately 39% of wheat and 27% of 
rice to the central pool of food grains in India (Sidhu & Vatta, 2012). While a small proportion 
of FFV products is processed, the current study finds that due to the limited number of food 
processing actors within the industry, there are numerous food losses. Food losses occur 
during harvesting, transportation and as a result of quality rejections (value loss). The current 
study also finds that farmers selling to institutional channels have high rejection rates, 
between 20-30% in the case of potatoes. Table 7.19 shows the main reasons for food losses 





Table 7.19 FFV growers’ major reasons for food losses 
Reason for food losses    N Mean Std. Deviation 
Price does not cover the expenses 195 3.64 0.997 
Quality based rejection 196 3.35 1.147 
Shortage of labour 193 2.91 0.947 
Distance from market 194 2.18 0.971 
Lack of cold storage 194 1.77 0.822 
Quality rejections (x̄ = 3.35), and ‘price does not cover production expenditures’ (x̄ = 3.64) are 
the two major reasons for food losses highlighted in the study region. Due to institutional food 
processors’ specifications, approximately 5% of small-sized potatoes are dropped in the field 
at harvest time because chip grade potatoes must be a minimum of 45 mm size (field survey 
notes). Quality based rejections are high in the case of potatoes because of strict quality and 
grade requirements. Farmers must also test the sugar content at local laboratories before 
transporting their produce to the factory. Rejections at the factory gate remain high, and 
farmers are forced to sell rejected produce at traditional spot markets or to other small less-
organised processors nearby (field survey notes).   
One farmer of Lahdara village said; 
“Sometimes, we face high rejection due to the quality and high level of sugar content. 
Then we sell rejected potatoes at Jalandhar traditional wholesale market. The price at 
the traditional market depends on the supply of crop on that day. After rejections at the 
processor, sometimes we cover the production cost or not even that” (field survey notes).   
Loss can also occur due to the long delivery times at the factory gate. A few tomato farmers 
said it was because of the low processing capacity of the processing firms;  
“We have been reducing the area of tomatoes under cultivation due to lack of 
market arrangements and increasing demand for ‘chilli’s’. Both processors have 
not adequate processing capacity, and we must wait for a long time, which results 
in loss of value and dripping tomato juice” (field survey notes).   
Another farmer said; 
“We have a word of mouth contract with the tomato processing plant. If processing 
plant breakdown and not working for a few days, we forced to sell tomatoes at the 
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open market. It is almost impossible to sell ripe red tomatoes of the final stage at 
the spot market which has strict requirements.”  
Due to low processing capacities and rejections at institutional channels, farmers rely on 
traditional spot markets. The current study finds that FFV growers could produce larger 
quantities of good quality fresh produce, but if they do not have a reliable, fast and cost-
efficient means of getting their produce to consumers, there is no profit in doing so. The 
inefficient marketing system and a lack of processing capacity lead to food losses which are 
reflected in reduced final profits for the farmers.  
The current study recommends that the food processing industry be inter-linked sectorally to 
absorb FFV output. The state of  Punjab should also consider exporting excess produce to 
neighbouring states and/or different countries. Some farmers noted that if the Indian 
government promoted bilateral trade with Pakistan, their livelihood would be improved. 
Pakistan has a high demand for tomatoes and borders the study region.  
7.1.4.1.2 Provide infrastructure for integrated communication systems and temperature-
controlled transportation 
Along with enhancing the capacity of the food processing sector to avoid food losses and 
realise better price for FFV growers, another option includes developing integrated 
communication systems and introducing temperature-controlled transportation of FFV to 
other states. This would be possible with public and private investment in infrastructure (Singh 
(2005) because market access for smallholders depends on; (a) their ability to compete in the 
market and their understanding of the markets; (b) organisation of the firm or operations; (c) 
communication and transport links; and (d) an appropriate policy environment. When FFV 
products are rejected by institutional channels, 70.5% FFV growers sell them at the nearest 
traditional spot market at a lower price (see Table 7.20).  
Table 7.20 FFV growers’ disposal of rejected produce  
Disposal of rejected produce  Frequency  Percentage  
Sell at low price 141 70.5 
Dump 49 24.5 
Eat (family & friend) 4 2.0 
Store and sell later 3 1.5 
Other 1 .5 
Total 198 99.0 
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The second most frequent mode of disposal of rejected produce is dumping (24.5%) the 
rejected/unsold FFV products. Due to the perishable nature and short self-life of these 
products, farmers are left with limited options. In short, dumping the products may be the 
most economical method of disposal. In the case of tomatoes, one farmer said; 
“Sometimes, we wait at the farm gate more than 48 hours to deliver tomatoes. Due to 
hot temperature and perishable nature of tomatoes, produce start dripping and resulted 
in net weight loss to us” (field survey notes).  
The study notes some similarities with the potato supply chain, that is a principal 
vegetable crop in Punjab. During 2012–13, about 70% of the area under vegetable 
cultivation was potatoes (GOP, 2016). In the case of a good harvesting season, the price 
of the potato crop goes down considerably in the wholesale market. In cases like these, 
farmers store potatoes in cold stores and wait for a higher price (like a rise in demand in 
the off-season). Alternatively, if the price stays constant in the off-season and the new 
crop arrives at the market same time, then there is a glut in the market. Left with the 
limited options, farmers must sell at the prevailing price in the market or dump their 
products to clear the cold stores (field survey notes) otherwise storage charges become 
excessive. One farmer referred to the 2016-2017 season; 
“We have the best harvesting season this year, but with cold stores still stocked 
with 25 per cent of last year’s harvest, the wholesale rate of the crop is dropped to 
Rs 2.50 to Rs 3.50 per kg, almost the same as in 2015 and 2016. Consumers, on the 
other hand, are paying retail prices of Rs 15 to 20 per kg in other states. if we have 
an arrangement of temperature-controlled logistics or a coordinated link with the 
buyers of neighbour states of India who are with a high demand of table potato, 
we can at least cover our production cost which is Rs 4.5 to Rs 5 per kg. 
The above discussion highlights the need for integrated logistics infrastructure so that 
FFV growers can realise better prices in neighbouring markets and lower their product 




7.1.4.1.3 Invest in enhancing smallholders’ access to commercial-oriented education 
and technical assistance 
The current study finds that the level of education of smallholder farmers has a significant 
effect on their participation in institutional channels. Their level of education positively 
influences off-farm income, the adoption of new varieties of seeds and the use of new 
technology. This study finds that educated farmers are more likely to adopt contract modes 
of market engagement resulting in higher yields and relatively higher prices in the market. 
Along with school education, this study recommends the establishment of several 
agribusiness technical education centres in the study region to encourage increased skills and 
knowledge among smallholders. This study finds that farmers have better access to 
institutional channels when they have skills and knowledge about post-harvest handling and 
marketing.  
Public-private investment should support extension systems designed to sharpen and improve 
the impact of these services, in particular, by incorporating new technologies and best 
practices from around the world. Extension programmes should be more explicitly linked to 
agricultural research centres and national development plans, and the government should 
provide the private sector with incentives when they work with smallholders. 
7.1.4.1.4 Promote diversification in agriculture  
Diversification offers an attractive option and is a major source of growth in the agricultural 
sector. This study shows that a higher percentage of operational land under FFV is associated 
with greater participation in institutional channels. A higher percentage of operational land 
under FFV production involves two motivations for farmers. First, it brings economies of scale 
and lowers the per-unit transaction cost. Punjab is dominated by wheat (86%) followed by 
other crops (12%) and potatoes (2%) in the Rabi season. The rabi crops are sown around mid-
November, preferably after the monsoon rains are over, and harvesting begins in April/May. 
There are paddy (63%), cotton (14%) and other crops (23%) in the Kharif season (Singh, 
2016b). Kharif crops are those crops which are sown at the beginning of the rainy season; for 
example, between April and May. While agribusiness researchers in the state suggest an 
increase in the area under operational FFV, it is only possible if the market can absorb these 
products. Otherwise, there will simply be an oversupply of FFV that will lead to lower prices 
and greater food loss. Agricultural economists advise farmers to diversify in terms of FFV to 
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gain better economic viability and to control the decreasing groundwater table in the state 
(Singh, 2004). Further, some effort should be made to bring FFV production in the focus area 
to open private companies to buying directly from farmers and provide contract farming and 
farmer producers’ companies to enable participation of fresh produce growers.  
7.1.4.1.5 Promotion and formulation of marketing cooperatives 
The current study finds that collective action only partially works for smallholder farmers. The 
transitioning of agribusiness systems in developing countries offer new opportunities in 
institutional channels (supermarkets) and value-adding food processing (Reardon et al., 2009; 
Reardon & Berdegue, 2002; Reardon, Codron, Busch, Bingen, & Harris, 2000). This study 
strongly recommends that the formulation of marketing cooperatives should be encouraged 
to help create linkages between FFV growers and new market opportunities. Different forms 
of marketing collective action can be encouraged, such as self-help groups, cooperatives, and 
farmer producer associations. The advantages of marketing cooperatives include providing 
central cold storage points for harvested goods, purchasing harvesting and packing supplies 
and materials in bulk, providing proper preparation for the markets and storage when needed, 
facilitating transportation as needed and acting as a standard selling unit for members, 
coordinating marketing programmes, and distributing profits among members. While the 
ownership of farm machinery does not significantly impact market participation, this study 
finds an over-mechanisation of tractors in the study region, and sharing machinery through 
collective action, could reduce farmer debt if sharing becomes a viable alternative to 
individual ownership.  
A new form of marketing-oriented, demand-driven collective action in the form of farmer 
producer associations and new generation cooperatives can also be encouraged to enhance 
farmers’ collective betterment along with the forms mentioned above. Farmer producer 
companies could be a solution to ineffective marketing cooperatives in the region. Farmer 
producer companies are a new organisational form in agricultural production and marketing 
designed to imitate large firms. A key aim would also be to encourage groups of small-scale 
primary producers to connect with corporate buyers. With the amendment of the Companies 
Act 1956 in 2002, the Indian government introduced the concept of `producer companies', 
that constitutes an attempt to establish basic business principles within farming communities, 
to bring industry and agriculture closer together, and to boost rural development (Trebbin & 
Hassler, 2012). While the amended Companies (Amendment) Act (2003) permits the 
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registration of producer companies, there is a general lack of awareness related to this issue. 
There has also been no support from state agencies and non-government organisations in 
establishing such cooperative companies, which means there has been no momentum for it 
(Singh, 2012b). 
7.1.4.1.6 Provide a favourable policy framework for the establishment of large retail 
chains   
Future studies should examine large scale retail supermarkets’ perspectives to offer FFV 
growers more options. The current study suggests that while growers could producer larger 
quantities of good quality FFV if they do not have a reliable, fast and cost-efficient means of 
delivering their produce to the consumer, there is a little point from an economic standpoint. 
The inefficient marketing system and lack of firm processing capacity will only result in further 
food losses and decreased profits.  
In the study region, there is a lack of negotiation between collective farmer organisations and 
institutional channels. The current study reveals that supermarkets are not significant FFV 
buyers in the study region. Supermarkets prefer to buy from the wholesale market and have 
limited quantities of FFV in their stores. Individual farmers sell a small portion of FFV (5% to 
10%) to supermarkets after meeting strict grading and quality checks. The current study 
reports that smallholders prefer to sell their stock to those who offer the highest prices; 
however, this is usually the spot market, buyers at the farm gate or processing firms. 
Supermarkets have a limited presence in the study region( which can be grown in future), and 
negotiating with supermarkets is still considered costly for smallholders. Farmers note that 
even though they get a higher price selling to the supermarket, they also have higher rejection 
levels. Supermarkets prefer to deal with larger farmers because of the high transaction costs 
associated with having contracts with multiple smaller individual farmers.  
7.1.4.1.7 Establishment of new value-adding food processing 
Along with promoting large scale retail chains, the establishment of new value-adding food 
processing and enhancing the capacity of existing units would be beneficial, especially if it 
could overcome scale limitations in the aggregation of dispersed production and distribution 
of inputs and services. According to the World Processing Tomato Council (WPTC), an 
estimated 41.37 million tonnes (MT) of tomatoes (26% of global production) worldwide were 
processed into value-added products in 2015. By comparison, less than 1% of India’s tomato 
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production currently gets processed into such products. An estimated 130,000 tonnes of 
tomato was processed in India in 2015, that is 0.3% of the global tomato processing market 
(WPTC, 2018). In order to make this a reality, there needs to be greater state funding or the 
establishment of public/private partnerships. Policymakers must provide a conducive 
environment for the public/private sector processing units. An example of a successful 
public/private partnership for food processing in India is ‘Mahagrapes’ in the Maharashtra 
state. A similar set-up would ensure better economic viability for FFV growers (Roy & Thorat, 
2008).  
While farmers face substantial marketing risks in the study region, the establishment of food 
processing must be the utmost priority for the State government. It has multiple benefits; 
• It will create employment in regions where the rural population will be involved in the 
processing, transportation, and marketing of food products.  
• It will increase both the adoption of new agribusiness technology and the use of 
improved inputs and higher yield. It will reduce food losses and value losses related 
to a glut in the market.   
• The proximity of primary markets increases the economic viability of smallholder FFV 
growers.  
• It will diminish the influence of intermediaries in traditional markets, which will end 
non-institutional forms of credit and low-quality input supply to farmers.  
With the expansion of international trade in food commodities, food safety and quality issues 
can be addressed by investment in new or improved post-harvest technology. Developing 
countries experience between 20-100% post-harvest losses due to poor post-harvest handling 
and inefficient marketing (Aulakh & Regmi, 2014; Hodges et al., 2011; Kitinoja, Saran, Roy, & 
Kader, 2011) This study finds that, due to assured irrigation, fertile land and favourable climate 
conditions for growing FFV, the study’s region farmers have acceptable production risks. 
However, at wholesale spot markets, price determines everything. One day’s oversupply can 
lower the price. Moreover, the institutional channel’s limited capacity to absorb excess FFV 
produce results in product spoilage and food losses. 
7.1.4.1.8 Provide a policy framework to promote contract farming 
Smallholders cannot participate in institutional channels without an effective policy 
environment that facilitates greater participation. Generally, the poorly developed legal 
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institutions in developing countries contribute to higher transaction costs as a result of the 
legal costs and lack of procedural efficiency for breach of contract and tort litigation. Enforcing 
contracts strains the relationship between farmers and processors or institutional firms, as 
well as between the agribusiness and the community in general. Adding to these high costs in 
terms of financial and community relations is the fact that in many countries, the contracts 
are often viewed as legally unenforceable. Thus, the only real threat at the disposal of the 
contracting firm is to discontinue the contract with those farmers not complying with their 
terms and then to write off lost income. As a result of these costs, firms only deal with growers 
who are trustworthy and less likely to default (often larger growers) and screen applicants. 
These screening and enforcement costs are fixed costs and can be minimised by reducing the 
number of small contract farmers.  
Contract farming performance is determined not only by resources and technology but also 
by the relationships between the state, agribusiness companies, and farmers, who interact 
with formal and informal institutions. In many respects, States don’t want to regulate the 
transaction itself, but rather provide a legal and policy framework where markets can flourish. 
For this reason, the policy framework and environment of contract farming should be 
enhanced. It is challenging to regulate contract farming because of the multiple variables 
involved, including input and output prices, supply, payments and quality standards (Singh, 
2008). In many cases, contracting firms do not honour the contracts because they will incur 
losses and producers are left high and dry. It is necessary that the contractor has a substantive 
stake in the agreement and farmers' produce is only suitable for processing. A dual-purpose 
crop puts buyers, at a disadvantage. It must be realised that sustainable processing cannot be 
based on the producer surplus of consumption purposes available during the glut period only. 
For seasonal crops and perishable products, processing must be a multi-product system and 
directly related to the value signals from the final consumer. 
7.1.4.2  Recommendations for farmers  
7.1.4.2.1 Enhance social solidarity to ensure that agriculture resources are shared  
The current study also finds that informal collective action by farmer groups such as 
neighbours, family friends and local religious groups provide support for participation in 
institutional channels. Smallholder farmers should build their capacities by sharing knowledge 
and information within these existing informal farmer groups. The different farmer unions in 
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the study region must also unite under one banner to strengthen the collective voice of 
smallholder farmers. 
in the sample region, the study discovered a capital intensive form of agriculture. Several 
other researchers have highlighted the overcapitalisation of machinery in Punjab agriculture. 
For example, a study conducted by Sidhu and Vatta (2012) reported that smallholders 
operating less than 2Ha owned more than 30% of the total number of tractors in use in Punjab. 
The lack of full utilisation of agricultural machinery may be a factor in the unexpected results. 
Singh, Kaur, et al. (2009) note that the average use of tractors in Punjab did not exceed 25% 
of their economic threshold level. Similarly, Nair and Singh (2016) found that in the year 1970, 
there was an average of one tractor per 1000 hectare land. This increased to an average of 28 
tractors per 1000 hectares in 1980-81, an average of 68 tractors per 1000 hectares in 1990-
91, and 1,000 tractors per 1000 hectares in the year 2000-2001. 
Many farmers buy tractors through non-institutional moneylenders and, as a result of this, 
tractor-owning farm households in Punjab owe almost 2.5-times more compared to other 
farming households. Where agricultural production has a marketable surplus and markets are 
driven by factors other than transportation, ownership of farm machinery has a non-
significant effect on smallholders’ participation in institutional channels.  
7.1.4.2.2 Initiative to form marketing cooperatives  
The current study strongly recommends the formulation of farmers’ marketing cooperatives 
due to the following antecedents.  
• They increase farmers’ bargaining power. If farmers form a cooperative society, they 
will increase their bargaining strength because their products will now be marketed by 
a single agency. The cooperatives can also obtain data on market prices, demand and 
supply and other related information from the markets regularly and plan their 
activities accordingly. 
• Direct dealings with final buyers: It will decrease the number of intermediaries in the 
supply chain. This will eliminate exploiters and ensure fair prices for both the 
producers and consumers. 
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• The capability of resources: Marketing cooperative societies can provide farmers with 
credit that would mean they would not have to sell their produce immediately after 
harvesting. This will ensure they receive better returns. It may also reduce the cost of 
transporting produce to the market. Cooperative marketing societies could also 
provide storage facilities. Thus, the farmers would be able to wait for better prices. 
Storage facilities would also lower the risk of spoilage or damage to crops as a result 
of natural disasters.   
• Grading and standardisation: This task can be done more easily by a cooperative 
agency than by an individual farmer. For this purpose, they can seek assistance from 
the government or can even create their own grading arrangements. Having a 
cooperative means that farmers will have a greater say in market prices.  
• Provision of inputs and consumer goods: The cooperative marketing societies can 
easily arrange for bulk purchase of agricultural inputs like seeds, manures, fertilisers, 
pesticides, and consumer goods at lower prices and can then distribute them to their 
members. 
• Processing agricultural produce: Cooperative societies can undertake processing 
activities like tomato processing to make ketchup, tomato puree, and pizza sauce as a 




                                                                                                        
Conclusions and suggestions for future research 
 
8.1 Introduction 
Smallholder agriculture is one of the principal economic occupations in the world. It is a major 
source of income and employment for 70% of the world’s poor who live in rural areas. There 
are 570 million farms operated by smallholders around the globe. This figure indicates that 
smallholders operate 75% of the world’s agricultural land (Poole, 2017). India is known as the 
land of small and marginal farmers. Prior studies have shown that smallholders play a crucial 
role in feeding the rising urban population (Singh, 2008), thus it is essential to support 
smallholders so that they can meet the increasing domestic and international demand for 
high-value crops. While smallholders rely on agriculture for their livelihoods, the rapidly 
evolving food systems provide new opportunities for participation in institutional markets for 
smallholders and hence higher returns. Agribusiness markets in the developing countries are 
transitioning from traditional to modern food systems. Several micro-level factors have been 
identified as drivers of this change;     
• The rapid urbanisation of the rural population and income growth in the rising middle 
classes (Reardon & Hopkins, 2006). 
• Changes in macroeconomic policies, trade liberalisation and government investment 
in extension services, improvement of transportation and communication 
infrastructure, upgrading credit services and rural markets (Minot & Ngigi, 2004; Von 
Braun & Kennedy, 1994).  
• Changing lifestyles and increasing female participation in the workplace. Traditionally, 
women have assisted with agricultural production and food preparation, but with their 
increased numbers in the workforce, they often have less time to devote to these 
activities (Pingali, 2007; Reardon et al., 2003). 
• Access to agribusiness technology that allows for the use of different foods and food 
preparation methods (Cook & Chaddad, 2000). 
• Industry-level access to better food packaging technology (Reardon et al., 2009; 
Saxowsky & Duncan, 1998). 
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• Perhaps most importantly, the rapidly changing consumer preferences and awareness 
of food safety (Von Braun & Kennedy, 1994). 
Further, several macro-level factors are responsible for changes in agribusiness systems. 
Notably; the industrialisation of traditional agribusinesses (Cook & Chaddad, 2000), changes 
in agribusiness technology (Reardon et al., 2009; Saxowsky & Duncan, 1998), trade 
liberalisation (Pingali, 2007; Reardon et al., 2003), rising urbanisation (Reardon & Barrett, 
2000), the rising per-capita income of the middle class, changes in consumer tastes and 
preferences (Reardon & Barrett, 2000; Reardon & Hopkins, 2006), increased awareness of 
nutrition, and finally, changes in macroeconomic policies are all significant factors in the 
transition of traditional food systems. These changes have led consumers in developing 
countries to demand a different food basket, such as;  
• The quantity of food per-person and overall demand from urban food markets is 
increasing faster than in rural areas (Delgado, 1999). 
• The composition of the food basket is different, as consumers with more money often 
shift away from grains and consume more high-value products such as fruits and 
vegetables, dairy products, meat, and fish. There is also greater demand for more 
processed food for convenience. 
• The changing requirements of urban consumers lead to a restructuring of food supply 
chains (Gulati et al., 2007). The final food supply chain arrangements are not only 
shaped by these demand factors, but also by conditioning factors such as geography.  
• There is a demand for more choices per product and a greater variety of food products 
in general (Holloway et al., 2000). 
• Urban customers in developing countries are also increasingly concerned about food 
quality and safety issues, especially as safety issues tend to be associated more with 
non-staple foods (Kirsten & Sartorius, 2002). Demand by urban customers is 
transmitted through the marketing sector or supply chain to the rural producer. This 
chain ensures that a primary agricultural product is delivered to the customer in the 
right form, at the right time, and the right location (Henson et al., 2005). 
These changes in the food system have been affecting farmers’ traditional agricultural 
practices, especially smallholder farmers. Farming practices have also been affected by 
institutional channels (supermarkets or processors) procurement modes. While, there is an 
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opportunity for smallholders to participate and compete in institutional channels, a variety of 
factors constrain them from doing so (Reardon & Swinnen, 2004; Reardon & Timmer, 2007; 
Reardon et al., 2003; Reardon et al., 2012). The agribusiness literature suggests that 
smallholders’ economic viability depends on how efficiently they participate in the market. 
There is some evidence to suggest that smallholders who participate in institutional channels 
receive a higher price compared to those who sell at traditional channels (Singh & Singla, 
2011). The current study presented similar results as farmers have a contract with institutional 
processors realised higher price compared to those who sell to traditional markets. The 
institutional channels focus on scale economies, quality, continuity of supply, food safety and 
extending shelf-life. However, these all increase farmers’ overall production and marketing 
costs (Dabas et al., 2012).  
Considering the above factors, the current study’s goal was to identify what drives smallholder 
farmers to participate in institutional channels. The Punjab state of India was chosen for the 
current study. Four specific research objectives were set, and these objectives have been 
examined in the previous chapter in the light of prior agribusiness literature and theories. This 
study has highlighted some interesting findings that have been highlighted in the context of 
the study region and have provided recommendations for both policymakers and farmers. The 
current chapter provides conclusions and suggestions for future research. The next section 
discusses the research objectives of the current study. 
 Research objectives 
The current study is significant as it addresses the question of smallholder participation in 
institutional channels. The current study extracts various factors from the agribusiness 
literature and uses various theoretical perspectives to investigate what drives smallholder 
farmers to participate in institutional markets. Derived from this, the four research objectives 
outlined in Chapter 1 are reiterated as follows:  
1. Identify the factors influencing FFV growers’ participation in institutional channels.  
2. Identify which mode of market participation provides FFV growers with greater 
economic benefits.  
3. Determine the role of collective action on FFV growers’ participation in institutional 
channels.  
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4. Provide recommendations to enhance market participation and maximise FFV 
growers’ returns.  
 Research questions  
Derived from the research objectives, this study investigates various factors that drive 
smallholder farmer market participation in institutional channels. The factors include 
individual characteristics of smallholder farmers such as; gender, age, education, and 
experience of the farmer, as well as farm characteristics, such as land, machinery and 
production costs. Secondly, this study investigates various other marketing, institutional and 
infrastructure variables, such as the role of collective action and institutions in farmers’ market 
preferences. Hence, the following five research questions are formulated to specifically 
address the research objectives, these are: 
 
• RQ1: What is the impact of human capital assets on smallholder FFV growers’ 
participation in institutional channels?   
• RQ2: What is the impact of physical farm assets on smallholder FFV growers’ 
participation in institutional channels?   
• RQ3: What is the impact of transaction costs on smallholder FFV growers’ 
participation in institutional channels?  
• RQ4: What is the impact of collective action on smallholder FFV growers’ 
participation in institutional channels? 
• RQ5: What is the impact of institutional characteristics on smallholder FFV growers’ 
participation in institutional channels?  
To answer these research questions, a total of 18 hypotheses were formulated using 
transactions cost (Coase, 1937; Hobbs, 1996; Williamson, 1979) and collective action (Olson, 
1965) theories as well as the agribusiness supply chain literature. The next section reviews the 
methodology and provides a summary of the findings.  
 Method and findings of the study  
The current study believes that smallholders have a distinct identity. It thus explores the 
drivers of their participation in institutional channels. The theoretical underpinnings discussed 
in Chapter 2 and agribusiness literature discussed in Chapter 3 provide insight into various 
factors that drive smallholders’ participation in institutional channels. The agribusiness 
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literature reviewed highlighted that smallholders’ participation in institutional channels may 
depend on multiple factors. 
As such, a  positivist quantitative approach was considered the most appropriate method for 
this research. The main reason for adopting a quantitative approach was that it has been used 
in the past to measure the effects of different transaction costs and is the best method to 
address the research questions. This study also uses collective action theories, that have also 
been used in studies on market participation in Africa, Latin America and Asia (Alene et al., 
2008; Barham & Chitemi, 2009; Barrett, 2008; De Janvry et al., 1991; Devaux et al., 2009; 
Makhura, 2001b; Narrod et al., 2009; Pingali et al., 2005).  
This research used a survey design because of its ability to produce numeric descriptions about 
various factors that drive smallholder FFV growers’ participation in institutional channels. A 
structured survey instrument was used to obtain information using an interviewee assisted 
(personal face-to-face survey interview) method. The sample was made up of 200 FFV 
growers. Two blocks of the Amritsar district, namely Jandiala Guru and Majitha; and two 
blocks of the Jalandhar district, Bhogpur and Kartarpur of the Punjab state, were selected 
using the same criteria, that is, with the maximum area under potato and tomato crops. A mix 
of snowball and purposive sampling was employed for data collection. These techniques were 
the most appropriate due to the non-availability of secondary data and the lack of a sample 
frame database of FFV growers in the sample region.   
Quantitative data analysis techniques were applied to examine the research questions. 
Descriptive statistics, along with several other methods of quantitative analysis were used, 
including ANOVA, the independent sample t-test, cross-tabulations, and linear regressions. 
Table 6.53 in Chapter 6 provides a summary of the results for the hypothesis testing phase of 
this research. The next section highlights the results of each of these research questions.   
 
RQ1: What is the impact of human capital assets on smallholder FFV growers’ participation 
in institutional channels?   
 
Except for a higher level of education, other human capital asset variables (age, experience in 
farming and a higher percentage of family members involved in farming activities), do not 
have a significant impact on smallholders’ participation in institutional channels.  
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There is no dispute that knowledge of basic agricultural practices and access to inputs is also 
critical, but smallholders must shift their focus from pure production to a commercial focus. 
To mention a few issues, commercially viable farmers can;   
• Estimate production costs.  
• Assess household consumption needs.  
• Plant crops according to the market signals.  
• Select buyers who are offer quality premiums.  
• Meet institutional buyers’ quality, grading requirements and private standards.  
• Identify the factors which increase/decrease market prices and learn how to form price 
expectations.   
• Obtain access to providers of essential agribusiness services. 
• Operate as a valued member of a producer cooperative. 
As a result of the perishable nature of FFV products, farmers require skills and knowledge to 
lower their production risks (Lawal et al., 2004). The application of the right amount of 
fertilisers and agrichemicals require a certain level of training and knowledge to avoid yield 
loss. Post-harvest management includes coordination with the buyer to ensure that crops are 
harvested at the right time. Growers must also have information about market trends and 
know-how to arrange transport to minimise post-harvest losses (Fonseca & Njie, 2014). The 
perishable nature of FFV and their short self-life means that post-harvest management 
requires coordinated linkages between farmers and buyers (Gulati et al., 2007). 
While education can be provided in many ways, given the heterogeneity of smallholders, a 
local approach with a national perspective is best. Long-term partnerships with the private 
sector can be developed to provide practical education as part of agribusiness services. 
However, without support, it is difficult for agribusiness service providers to work with 
smallholders if they must provide both the services themselves and the basic agribusiness 
education needed to make the services truly beneficial to the farmers, for example, in 
planning, FFV quality management and credit management. 
RQ2: What is the impact of physical farm assets on smallholder FFV growers’ participation 
in institutional channels?   
Of the four physical farm assets variables identified, two variables (higher percentage use of 
operational land for fresh produce and off-farm income) were found to support participation, 
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while the other two variables (access to farm machinery and highly variable production costs), 
did not.   
The current study recommends that the area under production of FFV must be increased as 
farmers who use a higher percentage of area under FFV production have better bargaining 
power compared to those who have smaller land use. Institutional channels often avoid 
working with land farmers who have land smaller than 2 ha (Barrett, 2008; Jayne et al., 2005). 
Farmers who sell to institutional channels are five times larger than traditional farmers, 9-18 
ha compared with 1.2 - 2.4 ha (Neven et al., 2009). The larger the operational land size, the 
larger the marketable surplus farmers have to sell. Further, as landholdings increase; (1) FFV 
growers have greater economic viability due to scale economies; (2) with a higher marketable 
FFV, there is a reduction in the farmers’ degree of uncertainty, (3) with fewer risks, farmers 
are more willing to adopt new market channel opportunities. 
Off-farm income empowers farmers to use cash liquidity and time-saving options without 
waiting for credit (Cadilhon et al., 2006). Off-farm income plays a critical role in the 
arrangement of farm inputs, farm labour and agriculture-related daily expenses. In particular, 
farm labour is critical in FFV production, especially in the case of short shelf-life products. The 
farmers in the current research stated that there is often a lack of labour during busy 
harvesting periods. Due to the high demand in the busy season, farm labourers often ask for 
advanced payment. In such cases, farmers rely on informal moneylenders who charge high-
interest rates (Singh, 2016a). Consequently, off-farm income plays a vital role in the 
arrangement of farm labour. 
RQ3: What is the impact of transaction costs of marketing on smallholder FFV growers’ 
participation in institutional channels?  
In terms of the transactions costs, access to, and usage of, market information and visibility of 
buyers variables were not supported, while (a) higher frequency and (b) in multiple sources of 
price information, proximity to the primary market, and meeting quality standards variables 
were seen as supportive of smallholder participation. Interestingly two variables (a) higher 
frequency and (b) in multiple sources of information, and proximity to the primary market 
variable were supported in the case of contract farming with the assured price offered by 
institutional channels. 
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Food system transformations affect the overall transaction costs to produce food products 
according to changing consumer requirements and growers profit margins. The costs incurred 
in the process of delivering food includes handling costs, transaction costs, and potentially 
rents. These differ per channel, as the cost of transportation, handling, processing, storage, 
and traceability vary by product characteristics. The degree of perishability often affects the 
material costs, as higher losses, as well as higher risks, are expected to be reflected in the final 
price of more perishable goods (Singh, 2008). On top of the substantial delivery costs 
(transport and handling), marketing margins are also significant costs incurred in the process 
of conducting transactions between different agents who have imperfect information (Alene 
et al., 2008). 
Due to transaction cost factors such as uncertainty, asset-specific investment and frequency, 
the act of searching, negotiating and monitoring the supply chain partners incurs high 
transaction costs (Hobbs, 1996). Furthermore, the need to fulfil specifications such as grading, 
constant supply and seasonality makes the situation more challenging for smallholder 
producers.  
RQ4: What is the impact of collective action on smallholder FFV growers’ participation in 
institutional channels? 
In terms of the impact of collective action, one of two variables was supported while the other 
one was not. While the cooperative membership variable was supported, the length of 
experience with cooperatives is not supported. Collective action provides smallholders with a 
potential solution for mitigating the challenges of participation in the commercial markets 
(Barham & Chitemi, 2009; Devaux et al., 2009; Hellin et al., 2009; Kaganzi et al., 2009; 
Markelova et al., 2009; Narrod et al., 2009; Staatz, 1987). Institutional arrangements, such as 
farmer cooperatives, enable smallholders to reduce their high transaction costs and meet 
product specifications enforced by institutional channels. They range from spot market 
exchanges to full vertical integration where the stages of marketing, transactions, and 
production are linked through ownership rather than through market exchanges (Swinnen et 
al., 2013). 
From a smallholder’s view, collective action leads to economies of scale and lowers 
transaction costs (Poole, 2017). The NIE framework suggests that certain institutions help to 
lower individual farmer’s transaction costs (Alene et al., 2008; Hobbs, 1996; Hobbs & Young, 
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2000). Along with formal institutions (contracting), informal institutions such as customs, 
traditions, religious groups also influence smallholders’ transaction costs and marketing 
success (North, 1995). The current study findings indicate that informal collective groups such 
as neighbours and family friends use their socio-religious solidarity to help each other, 
especially with the provision of farm micro-credit and agricultural machinery. 
RQ5: What is the impact of institutional characteristics on FFV growers’ participation in 
institutional channels?  
All three institutional variables, access to farm credit, access to logistics (including cold chain 
storage and transport), and access to technical assistance were supportive of smallholder 
participation in institutional channels. Technical assistance includes farm preparation, bed 
width, plantations and optimum use of fertilisers and pesticides, harvesting techniques and 
cold storage. With optimal technical assistance, fresh produce farmers will be well equipped 
with technical knowledge and to understand the delicate process of marketing through 
different channels.  
The current study also finds that technical assistance is highly effective in helping smallholder 
farmers improve their agronomic skills, business and financial skills, and hence facilitate access 
to markets. The study recommends that technical assistance providers should increase 
coordination with one another to establish common standards and measurement systems, 
improve the transfer of knowledge, share best practices and lessons learned, improve quality 
of delivery, and coordinate complementary programmes. At the farm level, technical 
assistance enables fresh produce growers to optimise available agricultural resources. It also 
enables FFV growers to address risky situations more efficiently, such as production and 
marketing uncertainties.  
Along with technical assistance, the current study finds that the arrangement of farm credit 
through formal sources such as commercial banks, cooperative banks and dedicated 
agricultural banks, is vital for agricultural growth, especially in capital intensive forms of 
farming. Besides, farm credit is essential for day-to-day farming activities such as arranging 
inputs, fertilisers, farm labour and repairs/up-grading farm machinery and processes (Goel & 
Kaur, 2008; Hazarika & Alwang, 2003). 
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Similarly, logistics infrastructure, such as temperature-controlled refrigerated transport, and 
access to cold-chains lower the risk of post-harvest losses (Pingali et al., 2005). These elements 
are vital, as institutional channels require a regular supply of quality-assured FFV. Smallholder 
FFV farmers are often excluded from participating in these channels due to limited marketable 
surplus (Gulati et al., 2007; Ruben et al., 2007). In developing countries, a lack of temperature-
controlled refrigerated transportation (Minten et al., 2009; Singh, 2009), and high chances of 
product spoilage (Rienekens, 2011) result in high volumes of post-harvest losses. 
Overall, the study found that assured price, associated with the contract mode of market 
engagement, plays a significant role in farmers’ participation in institutional channels. Also, 
the size of operational land, farmers’ education levels, off-farm income, access to formal 
sources of credit, and technical assistance significantly influence farmer participation in 
institutional channels. Also, membership and experience with cooperatives show partial but 
significant support in smallholders’ participation in these channels.  
8.2 Significance and contribution of the study  
The current study provides several theoretical, policy and practice contributions. Most 
importantly, this research identifies and quantifies the various factors that farmers consider 
before selling their produce to institutional channels. The existence of regulated markets and 
dedicated procurement agencies backed by the minimum support price for cereals, and to a 
large extent, pulses, do not pose many problems for FFV producers. However, problems 
associated with inadequate marketing in terms of poor regulation of markets, a large number 
of middlemen, a lack of infrastructure for packing, storing and transporting perishable crops 
not only results in low returns for producers but also a significant amount of wasted produce. 
Furthermore, price asymmetry and high transportation costs contribute to the disintegration 
of markets.  
Addressing the issue of smallholder farming and participation in new markets is a continuing 
focus for both agribusiness scholars and practitioners. The emphasis seems to be that 
smallholder FFV growers must consider commercialisation if they wish to maximise their 
incomes and increase overall economic viability. As such, this study is significant because 570 
million farms in the world are small and smallholders supply 80% of the overall food produced 
in Asia, sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America (Poole, 2017). The issue attracts further 
attention as food systems transform in developing countries, and institutional FFV channels 
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emerge around the globe. This study is especially significant as it concentrates on smallholder 
FFV growers’ farm operations and livelihoods in some detail. 
Notably, the study region has villages that have access to cemented roads and reliable 
irrigation. They also have a surplus of wheat, rice, cotton, fruits vegetables, meat and poultry, 
mushroom and honey (Sidhu, 2016). This study finds, despite surplus production and various 
agricultural and allied commodities, the level of processing and value addition is low, resulting 
in between 7.5 - 20% losses in the case of FFV. This is because there are a limited number of 
processing firms and they have limited processing capacity. Yet, despite the emergence of new 
markets, farmers still rely on traditional markets. The study highlights that smallholders’ 
participation in institutional channels depends on how educated they are and whether they 
can understand the market’s requirements. The second major factor is an appropriate policy 
environment that involves understanding value chains, networks, and their dynamics from the 
smallholder’s perspective. 
This research is significant from several points of view. First, this research identifies different 
human capital, physical farm, marketing and institutional factors that drive smallholder FFV 
growers to participate in new markets. Second, this research advises policymakers to adopt 
institutional interventions to link smallholder to new market opportunities with changing food 
systems. Collective action is also suggested as a viable way of decreasing transaction costs 
associated with entry into institutional channels.    
 Contribution to theory  
The main contribution to the theory of this research is the application of the NIE framework 
to dynamic changes in the local and global agribusiness systems. Despite the recognised 
advances of the NIE, this research fills the gap that needs for empirical research that supports 
its theoretical assumptions. In this research, the NIE framework has been used to explain the 
economic behaviour of small farmers in developing countries regarding current changes in 
their traditional agribusiness systems. The role of contractual uncertainty, specifically 
transaction costs, and collective action for determining smallholders’ participation in the 
institutional channels has been assessed in a new geographic location that is Punjab region of 
India.  Indeed, the results of this study generally support the NIE framework in the new 
geographic location. By considering asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency factors of FFV 
production, TCE theory suggests smallholder farmers adopt an appropriate mode of market 
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engagement that revolves around contracts. Along with market imperfections, information 
asymmetry forces farmers to choose institutional arrangements in terms of contract farming 
to participate in institutional channels. 
Institutional channels like supermarkets and processors, often aim to control agriculture 
practices to ensure a year-round FFV supply. They also place a greater focus on food safety 
and quality requirements of FFV products to gain a competitive advantage over traditional 
retailers. The TCE approach states that as business transactions increase in complexity, 
institutional channels would tend to adopt vertical integration to bring these transactions in-
house (Hobbs, 1996). This study shows that the conditions necessary for vertical integration 
do not exist in the context of this study, as FFV transactions, while frequent, have only 
moderate levels of specificity and the bargaining numbers are high. Yet, transaction costs for 
firms dealing with smallholders are particularly high for several reasons; the small units of 
output per farming household, low capacity, low levels of information, and other uncertainties 
in dealing with farmers. Also, due to the perishable nature of FFV, product and logistic 
requirements are exceptionally high, making transactions somewhat complex (Blandon et al., 
2009).  
The study also added knowledge in the academic literature of collective action theory by 
identifying the role of informal collective groups in agribusiness activities in the study region. 
Informal farmers collective groups can have the power build upon the social solidarity and 
sharing resources among smallholder farmers that enhance their participation in institutional 
channels.  
To reduce transaction cost, farmer associations can influence the contract characteristics of 
the supply of FFV products by managing the frequency of interaction by coordinating the 
logistics and communication of their members. Also, they can deliver cost-effective inputs 
include training extension and technology acquisition. The study identifies that through these 
collective organisations (specific institutional forms), smallholders can lower transaction costs 
and thus have a greater chance of participating in institutional channels.  
 Contribution to policy 
The current study has several policy implications. The performance of the agriculture sector is 
not only determined by the level of production but also depends on the efficiency of the 
existing marketing system and policy environment for agricultural commodities. In developing 
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economies, the marketing of farm produce plays an equally important role in increasing the 
income of the producers and bringing them out of poverty. However, the marketing of 
produce largely remains ineffective, particularly in the case of perishable crops such as fruits 
and vegetables.  
The policy must be focused on enhancing smallholders’ access to education that focuses on 
the commercial aspects of production planning and marketing for smallholders. Knowledge of 
agribusiness technology, changes in demand patterns and the ability to react to changes in 
the market are major factors in market participation. Commercial education also provides 
farmers with a way to generate income other than through FFV production. Smallholders can 
generate income through the service sector and other allied agricultural services.   
 The policies need to encourage and establish new and larger-capacity food processing units 
in the State and provide support to enhance the capacity of existing units. The current study 
finds that despite having surplus FFV production and various agricultural and allied 
commodities, the level of processing and value addition of FFV products is currently low. 
This research contributes to the policy by recommending the development of integrated 
communication systems and introducing temperature-controlled transportation.  This will be 
resulted in realising higher price and lower the food losses for smallholder farmers. This would 
be possible with public and private investment in infrastructure.  
The policies would also focus on the formulation of marketing cooperatives to encourage 
linkages between FFV growers and new market opportunities. Perishable commodities such 
as FFV incur high transaction costs. The marketing of perishable commodities requires more 
efficient marketing coordination along with suitable infrastructure such as cold storage. 
Currently, the agricultural marketing systems in India are dominated by monopolistic private 
traders who handle approximately 80% of the marketed surplus (Singh, 2009). The private 
traders, driven by self-interest, are not investing in the marketing infrastructure due to 
excessive government regulations and the dominance of the traditional wholesale markets. 
As such, this study recommends that the government invest in critical infrastructures such as 
building cold storage units, dependable roads, railways and other transport assets.  These 
investments will have multiple on-going benefits to the economy beyond just FFV markets. 
The significant and high transaction cost between the supply chain partners are also due to 
the differences in marketing fees, taxes, commission fees, and licenses fees. Thus, there is an 
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urgent need to reform the existing market structure where the actors of the market are 
unconscionably leveraging different fee structures in each market for each commodity. 
The particular form of collective action advocated by the findings of this research is that of 
‘marketing cooperatives’ formed by farmers and farmer organisations. Mobilising producers 
into groups and the establishment of contractual arrangements between farmers and buyers 
can be an important entry point to link farmers with buyers, hence providing farmers and 
buyers with a greater degree of certainty. As opposed to the current (unsuccessful) form of 
state-regulated cooperatives found in the study region that only really focus on securing 
better terms for inputs, the new form of cooperative will focus on the downstream marketing 
and selling activities. Indeed, Kaganzi et al. (2009) indicate that collective action helps farmers 
meet basic market requirements (minimum quantities, quality, and frequency of supply), 
which they cannot achieve as individuals.  
This study suggests policymakers to encourage the formation of these new forms of 
cooperatives to encourage smallholder farmer participation in institutional channels. 
Supermarkets certainly are useful marketing innovation from the smallholder point of view 
and the consumer's point of view. The future growth of supermarkets in the study region will 
likely provide an opportunity to smallholder farmers to establish a supply chain relationship 
through the new form of cooperatives.  
Finally, the key reforms for policymakers would be the strengthening of contract enforcement 
mechanisms (legislation, enforcement agencies), increasing the legal efficacy of the courts 
such as timeliness of proceedings, and reducing legal costs so that smallholders can protect 
themselves.  As such, this research recommends new laws that provide legal protection for 
contract FFV growers to protect them from the harmful effects of some opportunistic 
institutional contractors. 
8.3 Limitations and future research  
 
The researcher acknowledges that this study has many limitations but believes that these 
provide opportunities for further research in this field. The first limitation of this research 
relates to the non-availability of published secondary data. There is no reliable published data 
on the number of FFV growers in the study region, hence a random selection of farmers was 
not possible. Instead, a snowball sampling technique was employed, and this proved 
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reasonably successful. Since snowball sampling does not select units for inclusion in the 
sample based on random selection (unlike probability sampling techniques), it is challenging 
for researchers to determine the possible sampling errors and make statistical inferences for 
the wider population. Snowball sampling techniques also have limitations in terms of time and 
space, and the researcher was dependent on gaining approval and the contacts from the 
village heads (sarpanch) and lead farmers.  
Another limitation relates to the geographic location and the selection of two particular FFV 
crops - potatoes and tomatoes. The survey sample covered a specific geographical area in the 
Punjab state of India. Even though it was the most important and representative, according 
to the research objectives, other areas and FFV crops deserve to be included in the survey. 
Further, the context of the study limits its findings to FFV growers only. Indeed, future 
research still needs to be conducted on other allied agriculture-related supply chains, such as 
milk supply chains, to determine if these findings still hold true. Due to the limited 
geographical focus of this study, researchers should conduct surveys in other geographical 
locations and compare their results with the current study. This will show how far-reaching 
the conclusions are. Similarly, it is recommended that future studies conduct interviews with 
supermarket executives and processing firm managers so that we have a greater 
understanding of their phenomenon and thus can formulate relevant policy. Hence, this study 
does not represent the entire supply chain view, rather that of smallholders only. 
Future research can be conducted on other constraints and challenges smallholders face in 
participating in institutional channels. The cross-comparison of both institutional channels and 
traditional markets may be another specific area for further research. Finally, the current 
study focuses only on smallholder farmers’ participation in institutional channels. A 
comparative study could compare the economic viability of institutional versus traditional 
wholesale markets. Yet given these limitations, it is suggested that this study is still a 
significant contribution to the important research area of smallholder participation in 
institutional channels in order to improve their profitability. Finally, the researchers desire 
that these findings be used to help smallholder farmers, industry agencies, policymakers and 




Respondents’ consent form and survey instrument 
Faculty of Agribusiness and Commerce,  
Lincoln University, Christchurch, Canterbury, New Zealand 
Informed Consent Declaration 
 
This survey is part of a research study titled “Smallholders and Agribusiness Supply Chains: 
Participation and Implications. Mr Gursharan Singh (Gursharan.singh@lincolnuni.ac.nz), a PhD 
student, is conducting the research work under the supervision of Mark M.J. Wilson, PhD. 
Senior Lecturer in Supply Chain Management, Department Global Value Chains and Trade, 
both from Lincoln University, Faculty of Agribusiness and Commerce. The purpose of the 
research is to identify the position of smallholder fresh produce growers in the supply chain 
and the key constraints and motivations for incorporating them into the supply chain. 
Participation in this survey is voluntary, and the respondent is free to withdraw at any time. 
Individual responses will be treated confidentially. In this regard, the identity of the 
interviewee or his/her household will be coded during the analyses to preserve anonymity. 
The survey interview is expected to take about 60 minutes. 
The results of the research will be published without references to the name of the 
respondents or the organisations they work for. Copyright to the thesis resides with the 
researcher and the university. Should you have any questions regarding the nature of the 
survey, please contact the supervisors or the researcher at the e-mail addresses listed above 
or call the researcher at 0064224615575. Please express your full consent to participate in this 
survey by writing your name and signing below. 
I__________________________________ (Full names of participant) hereby confirm that I 
understand the contents of this document and the nature of the research project, and I 
consent to participate in the research project. I understand that I am at liberty to withdraw 
from the project at any time, should I so desire. 
Signature: ________________________________  Date: _____________________ 
 
Village Name______________________________  Tehsil/ District ______________ 
 
If no, what position does the respondent have in the household? 
 
Duration of the interview  Started ___:___  Finished ___:___ 
 





1. Gender ❑Male      ❑Female 
 
2. What is your age group? 
❑16-25     ❑ 26-35    ❑36-45   ❑46-55   ❑56 and above 
 
3. What is the highest educational qualification you hold? ❑No formal education❑ 
Primary School ❑ Middle School ❑ High School ❑ College ❑University  
 
4. Do you have any technical education relevant to farm activities? □Yes □ No 
5. How many of your family members are involved in farming activities? 
Adult Children 
Family details Male Female Male  female 
Total number of family members     
Family members, who help with farm activities?     
 
6. What is the effective area of your farm in acres? 
Type of land  Area in Acres 
Owned land  
Land rented   
Net cultivated area   
 
7. What are your fresh produce crops growing pattern? 
 
Fresh produce crop name 
Area in 
acres 
Current Three years back 
   
 
8. What percentage of land do you use for cultivating fresh produce crops?  
❑Up to 25%      ❑ 25-50%    ❑ 50-75% ❑ 100% 
 
9. How many farmworkers are employed in farming activities other than family members 
(per acre) 
 Full time  Part-time  Seasonal  
Farm labour employed in farming activities other 
than family members (per acre)    
 
10. How many years of experience do you have in the farming of fresh produce crops? 




11. What is your preferred irrigation method? 
Method of irrigation  % of the total cultivated land  
Canal   
Tube well   
Micro-irrigation (Drip/sprinkler)  
Un-irrigated area  
 
12. Do you have income other than farming fresh produce?    □Yes □No if yes, please 
specify the source? 
 





The rental value of land (Rs. /unit of land)  
 
Land preparation 
Rent of tractor/diesel costs   
Hired labour (No. x days x rate)  
Family labour  
Seed purchasing & planting cost Cost (amount x price)  
Hired labour (No. x days x rate)  
Family labour  
Fertilizers (Chemical/Bio-
fertilizer) 
Cost (amount x price)  
Hired labour (No. x days x rate)  
Family labour  
 
Pesticides/Bio-pesticides 
Cost (amount x price)  
Hired labour (No. x days x rate)  
Family labour  
Irrigation charges No. of irrigation x rate  
Total irrigation cost  
 
Weeding 
Cost (amount x price)  
Hired labour (No. x days x rate)  
Family labour  
 
Harvesting 
Harvester rental charges  
Hired labour (No. x days x rate)  
Family labour  
 
14. Are you a member of any farmers’ organisation or cooperative?  □Yes □ No (If No go to 
Q18) 
 
15. How many years have you been a member of a farmers’ organisation? 
 
❑Up to 2years ❑3-5 years ❑6-10 Years ❑above ten years 
 
16. How satisfied are you with cooperatives?  
Not satisfied   
Slightly satisfied   
Moderately satisfied   
Satisfied   
Very satisfied   
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17. What type of farmers’ group/organisation or cooperative are you a member of? 
□Government-regulated cooperative society □ Local-level cooperative society other than 
government-controlled□ Farmer producer’s company □ any other types of local farm-
related association (kisaan Union) 
 
  
18. What benefit do you get through the farmers’ organisation?  











To negotiate better 
prices    
     
Offer storage facilities         
Marketing of your 
product 
     
Offer inputs         
Offer farm machinery      
Offer credit (in cash or 
kind 
     
Another benefit (please 
specify) 
     
 
19. If No to Q14 then what are the following factors which stop you from becoming a 
member of a farmers’ organisation, please specify? 
❑ High subscription fee❑Freeriding by large farmers❑ Non-transparent transactions and 
leadership❑ Political interferences❑ Other reasons  
 
20. How do you get access to the farm machinery? 
❑ You own farm machinery ❑ Farmer organisation or cooperative provide ❑ Buyer 
provides ❑Arrange to rent privately ❑ Farm machinery shared by neighbours and friends  
 
21. List the markets you sell to and what quantity (%) of your product is sold there?  
Types of markets Yes/No % Sold There 
Wholesale market    
Traders at the farm gate   
Processing company    
Supermarkets    
Fast food restaurants/hotels   
Locally open markets    
Others    
 
 
22. Did you change the market channel in the last three years □ Yes □ No (if yes name the 
channel)? 
 
23. What factors do you consider in choosing the market channels? 
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Better price      
Ability to meet 
specifications 
     
Volume of sales      
Time commitment      
Distance from market       
Reliable payment      
Direct interaction 
with the buyer 
     
Access to info mation      
Trust and 
commitment   
     
Any other (please 
specify) 
     
 
24. Which of the following options do you consider most in determining the price of your 
products in the chosen market? 
Options  Circle one 
option that 
applies 
According to the grade (quality) of the produce  
Expected marketed value  
Market price + premium  
Cost of production + margin  
Combination of any two methods or flexible pricing method 
(method chosen by the farmer) 
 
25. Do you receive market information before the sale ❑Yes  ❑No 
26. How frequently are you receiving price information from the relevant market? 
❑ Once in a day ❑Twice in a day morning /afternoon ❑Once a week  ❑Twice a week 
27. Which is the preferred tool of communication you use for accessing price information? 
❑ Smartphone ❑ Radio ❑ Television ❑ Internet ❑ Newspaper ❑ Any other 
28. What is your source of price information? 




Sometimes Never  
Self-enquiry       
Speaking with other 
farmers 




     
Farmer organisation or 
cooperative 
     
Any other (please 
specify) 
     
 
29. What is the mode of engagement to market? 
❑Individual ❑Collectively ❑ Mixed  
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30. What type of relationship do you have with the buyer?  
 Contract  Word of mouth  On the spot transaction  
 
31. How far do you know your buyer at different levels in the supply chain? 
❑ The immediate buyer in the chain ❑ Up to the two buyers in the chain                                                          
❑ Up to the end buyer in the chain  
32. Who makes decisions on the following? (Tick the appropriate) 
Decisions You decide Buyer decides  Joint planning 
Variety of seeds to use    
How much seed to plant    
What chemicals to use    
How and when to water    
How much to harvest    
Which crop/heads/variety to harvest 
first 
   
When to harvest    
 
33. Do you have access to a formal source of credit □ Yes □ No (if yes go to question 34)? 
 
34. If the answer is no, then what is the reason for not having access to a formal source of 
credit? 
❑ Small landholding  ❑ Low collateral ❑ Excessive paperwork ❑ Less marketable 
surplus ❑ Lack of knowledge❑Any other, please specify 
 
35.  What is your preferred source of credit? 






Commercial banks       
Buyer       
Farmers’ 
organisation/cooperatives  
     
Traditional rural money 
lender  
     
Neighbours/friends       
 
36. Please give your response to the following statements  








… increases farm 
productivity 
     
… helps to buy quality seeds      
… helps to buy farm 
machinery  
     
… helps in arranging 
irrigation 
     
…helps in arranging 
transportation 
     
 233 
… helps in paying advance 
labour cost  
     
… improves post-harvest 
practices 
     
37. Do you receive any technical assistance □ Yes □ No, if “No” go Q 38? 
 
38. If yes what is the primary source of technical assistance 
❑ Buyer  ❑ Government department  ❑ Input supplier  ❑Neighbours/friends 
❑Farmer’s organisation or cooperative 
 
39. Do you have access to cold storage □ Yes □ No? 
 
40. What are the advantages of access to a cold storage warehouse? 






Better selling price later       
Less post-harvest loss       
Better marketing options      
Increase in the ability for 
regular supply   
     
Increased bargaining power       
Any other …….      
 
41. How is your product transported to the market point? 
❑ Own transport   ❑Hired privately ❑Vehicle from farmer organisation or cooperative 
(collective) ❑ Public transport ❑ Buyer pick up from farm gate ❑Any other, please 
specify   
 
42. How far is your farm from the road? 
❑ Within 2km  ❑ Between 3-5km   ❑ More than 5km 
 
43. How far is the market point? 
❑Within 10km ❑ Between 10 & 25km❑>25 km &<50 km ❑More than 50 km 












Condition of the road 
to market 
     
Warehouse facilities      
Cold storage      
Transport facilities       
 
45. How much do you spend to sell fresh produce per acre? 
 
The total cost of selling fresh produce Cost (₹INR) 
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Transportation   
Loading & unloading   
Sorting, weighing & packing   
Market fee  
Commission of middlemen  
Any other related expenses (please specify)  
Total:      
 
46. What percentage of post-harvest losses do you suffer approximately? Please specify  
 
47. Are there any standards and grading requirements you need to comply with to supply 
your chosen market? □ Yes □ No 
 
 











Quantity      
Quality      
Frequency      
Variety      
Packing      
Food safety      
Others       
 
49.  If yes how much in percentage (%) of grade A, B, and C do you sell to the chosen market 
 
Grade  Percentage (%)  Market  
   
   
   
 
50. What percentage of fresh produce goes unsold in the chosen market? 
 
❑Up to 10%❑10-20%    ❑ 20-30% ❑ above 30%  
 
51. What are the reasons for unsold fresh produce in the chosen market? 





Lack of cold storage 
facilities 
     
Distance from market      
Unable to meet quality 
standards 
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Price does not cover the 
expenses of production 
     
Lack of labour available to 
harvest, handle and deliver 
     
Any other, please specify       
 
52. If you cannot sell, what will happen to unsold fresh produce? 
❑ Dump ❑ Eat (family & friend) ❑ Sell at a low price ❑ Store and sold later ❑ Any other 
 
53. What is your average yield, price, gross income (per acre)  
 
    In the main 
channel  
In second channel (if sold in 
more than one channel) 
Yield (Kg/Acre)   
Price (Rs/kg)   
Gross income (Rs.)   
 




A.1 Respondents consent form and survey instrument (Punjabi version) 
 ਸਰਵੇਖਣ ਪ੍ਰਸ਼ਨਾਵਲੀ 
 
 ਸਹਿਮਤੀ ਅਤ ੇਘੋਸ਼ਣਾ 
ਇਿ ਸਰਵੇਖਣ, Smallholders and Agribusiness Supply Chains: Participation and Implications: ਹਸਰਲੇਖ ਦੇ ਿੇਠ , ਜੋ 
ਕੇ ਪ੍ੀਐਚਡੀ ਖੋਜ ਹਵਹਦਆਰਥੀ, ਸਰੀ ਗੁਰਸ਼ਰਨ ਹਸਿੰਘ (gursharan.singh@lincolnuni.ac.nz) ਦਆੁਰਾ  ਡਾਕਟਰ ਮਾਰਕ  ਹਵਲਸਨ ((ਪ੍ੀਐਚਡੀ. 
ਸਪ੍ਲਾਈ ਚੇਨ ਮੈਨੇਜਮੈਂਟ, ) ਜੋ ਕੇ ਖੇਤੀਬਾੜੀ ਅਤੇ ਵਪ੍ਾਰਕ ਫੈਕਲਟੀ ਤੋਂ ਸੀਨੀਅਰ ਲੈਕਚਰਾਰ ਿਨ ਦੀ ਹਨਗਰਾਨੀ ਿੇਠ ,ਹਲਿੰਕਨ ਯੂਨੀਵਰਹਸਟੀ ਦੇ 
ਹਡਪ੍ਾਰਟਮੈਂਟ ਗਲੋਬਲ ਵੈਲਯੂ ਚੇਨਜ਼ ਐਡਂ ਟਰੇਡ ਅਧੀਨ ਕੀਤਾ ਜਾ ਹਰਿਾ ਿੈ. ਖੋਜ ਕਾਰਜ ਦਾ ਉਦੇਸ਼ ਛੋਟੇ ਹਕਸਾਨ ਜੋ ਫਲ ਐਡਂ ਸਬਜ਼ੀਆਂ ਦੀ ਪ੍ੈਦਾਵਾਰ ਕਰਦੇ 
ਿਨ ਦਾ ਮਿੰਡੀ ਦੇ ਨਵੇਂ ਮੌਹਕਆਂ  ਹਵਚ ਨਵੀਆਂ ਸਿੰਭਾਵਨਾਵਾਂ ਦਾ ਪ੍ਤਾ ਲਗਾਉਣਾ ਅਤੇ  ਪ੍ਰਮੁੁੱਖ ਰਕੁਾਵਟਾਂ ਅਤੇ ਪ੍ਰੇ ਣਾ ਦੀ ਪ੍ਛਾਣ ਕਰਨਾ ਿੈ  
ਇਸ ਸਰਵੇਖਣ ਹਵਚ ਹਿੁੱਸਾ ਲੈਣਾ ਸਵੈਇੁੱਛੁਕ ਿੈ, ਅਤੇ ਜਵਾਬ ਦੇਣ ਵਾਲਾ ਹਕਸੇ ਵੀ ਸਮੇਂ ਵਾਪ੍ਸ ਲੈਣ ਲਈ ਸੁਤਿੰਤਰ ਿੈ. ਹਵਅਕਤੀਗਤ ਿੁਿੰਗਾਰੇ ਗੁਪ੍ਤ ਰਪੂ੍ 
ਹਵੁੱਚ ਵਰਤੇ ਜਾਣਗੇ. ਇਸ ਸਿੰਬਿੰਧ ਹਵਚ, ਗੁਪ੍ਤਨਾਮ ਨੂਿੰ  ਬਰਕਰਾਰ ਰੁੱਖਣ ਲਈ ਹਵਸ਼ਲੇਸ਼ਣ ਦੌਰਾਨ ਇਿੰਟਰਹਵਓ  ਕਰਨ ਵਾਲੇ ਜਾਂ ਉਸਦੇ ਪ੍ਹਰਵਾਰ ਦੀ ਪ੍ਛਾਣ 
ਕੋਡ ਕੀਤੀ ਜਾਏਗੀ. ਸਰਵੇਖਣ ਦੀ ਇਿੰਟਰਹਵਓ  ਹਵੁੱਚ ਲਗਭਗ 60 ਹਮਿੰਟ ਦਾ ਸਮਾਂ ਲੁੱਗਣ ਦੀ ਉਮੀਦ ਿੈ. 
ਖੋਜ ਦੇ ਨਤੀਜੇ ਉੁੱਤਰ ਦੇਣ ਵਾਹਲਆਂ ਜਾਂ ਸਿੰਸਥਾਵਾਂ ਦੇ ਨਾਮ ਦੇ ਿਵਾਹਲਆਂ ਤੋਂ ਹਬਨਾਂ ਪ੍ਰਕਾਸ਼ਤ ਕੀਤੇ ਜਾਣਗੇ ਹਜਨ੍ਾਂ ਲਈ ਉਿ ਕਿੰਮ ਕਰਦ ੇਿਨ. ਥੀਹਸਸ ਦਾ 
ਕਾਪ੍ੀਰਾਈਟ, ਖੋਜਕਰਤਾ ਅਤੇ ਯੂਨੀਵਰਹਸਟੀ ਦੇ ਕੋਲ ਿੈ. ਜੇ ਤੁਿਾਡੇ ਕੋਲ ਸਰਵੇਖਣ ਦੀ ਪ੍ਰਹਕਰਤੀ ਦੇ ਸਿੰਬਿੰਧ ਹਵਚ ਕੋਈ ਪ੍ਰਸ਼ਨ ਿੈ, ਤਾਂ ਹਕਰਪ੍ਾ ਕਰਕੇ ਉਪ੍ਰੋਕਤ 
ਸੂਚੀਬੁੱਧ ਈ-ਮੇਲ ਪ੍ਤੇ 'ਤੇ ਸੁਪ੍ਰਵਾਈਜ਼ਰ ਜਾਂ ਖੋਜਕਰਤਾ ਨਾਲ ਸਿੰਪ੍ਰਕ ਕਰੋ ਜਾਂ ਖੋਜਕਰਤਾ ਨੂਿੰ  0064224615575' ਤੇ ਕਾਲ ਕਰ.ੋ ਹਕਰਪ੍ਾ ਕਰਕੇ ਆਪ੍ਣਾ 
ਨਾਮ ਹਲਖ ਕੇ ਅਤੇ ਦਸਤਖਤ ਕਰਕੇ ਇਸ ਸਰਵੇਖਣ ਹਵਚ ਹਿੁੱਸਾ ਲੈਣ ਲਈ ਆਪ੍ਣੀ ਪ੍ੂਰੀ ਸਹਿਮਤੀ ਜ਼ਾਿਰ ਕਰ.ੋ ਿੇਠਾਂ. 
I__________________________________ (ਭਾਗੀਦਾਰ ਦੇ ਪ੍ੂਰੇ ਨਾਮ) ਇਸ ਦਆੁਰਾ ਪ੍ੁਸ਼ਟੀ ਕਰਦ ੇਿਨ ਹਕ ਮੈਂ ਇਸ ਦਸਤਾਵੇਜ਼ ਦੀ ਸਮੁੱਗਰੀ ਅਤੇ 
ਖੋਜ ਪ੍ਰੋਜੈਕਟ ਦੀ ਪ੍ਰਹਕਰਤੀ ਨੂਿੰ  ਸਮਝਦਾ ਿਾਂ, ਅਤੇ ਮੈਂ ਖੋਜ ਪ੍ਰੋਜੈਕਟ ਹਵਚ ਹਿੁੱਸਾ ਲੈਣ ਲਈ ਸਹਿਮਤ ਿਾਂ. ਮੈਂ ਸਮਝਦਾ / ਸਮਝਦੀ ਿਾਂ ਹਕ ਮੈਨੂਿੰ  ਹਕਸੇ ਵੀ ਸਮੇਂ 
ਪ੍ਰਾਜੈਕਟ ਤੋਂ ਹਪ੍ੁੱਛੇ ਿਟਣ ਦੀ ਆਜ਼ਾਦੀ ਿੈ, ਕੀ ਮੈਨੂਿੰ  ਇੁੱਛਾ ਕਰਨੀ ਚਾਿੀਦੀ ਿੈ. 
ਿਸਤਾਖਰ: ________________________________________ ਤਾਰੀਖ: ________________ 
 
ਹਪ੍ਿੰਡ ਦਾ ਨਾਮ ---------------------- ਤਹਿਸੀਲ / ਹਜ਼ਲ੍ਾ ---------------------- 
ਜੇ ਨਿੀ,ਂ ਤਾਂ ਜਵਾਬ ਦੇਣ ਵਾਲੇ ਦੀ ਘਰ ਹਵਚ ਹਕਿੜੀ ਸਹਥਤੀ ਿ?ੈ 
ਇਿੰਟਰਹਵਓ ਦਾ ਸਮਾਂ ਸ਼ੁਰ ੂਿੋਇਆ ___: ___ ਪ੍ੂਰਾ ਿੋਇਆ ___: ___ 





1. ਹਲਿੰਗ       □  ਮਰਦ    □ ਔਰਤ  
 
2. ਤੁਿਾਡਾ ਉਮਰ ਗਰੁੁੱਪ੍ ਕੀ ਿੈ?  
                 □  16-25   □ 26-35  □ 36-45   □46-55   □56 ਅਤ ੇਉਪ੍ਰ  
 
3. ਤੁਿਾਡੇ ਕੋਲ ਸਭ ਤੋਂ ਵੁੱਧ ਹਵਹਦਅਕ ਯੋਗਤਾ ਕੀ ਿੈ?  
 
□  ਕਈ ਰਸਮੀ ਹਸੁੱਹਖਆ ਨਿੀ ਂ □  ਪ੍ਰਾਇਮਰੀ ਸਕੂਲ  □ ਹਮਡਲ ਸਕੂਲ  □ ਿਾਈਸਕੂਲ  □  ਯੁਨੀਵਰਹਸਟੀ ਪ੍ੁੱਧਰ           
4.  ਕੀ ਤੁਿਾਡੇ ਕੋਲ ਖੇਤੀਬਾੜੀ ਦੀਆਂ ਗਤੀਹਵਧੀਆਂ ਨਾਲ ਸਿੰਬਿੰਹਧਤ ਕੋਈ ਤਕਨੀਕੀ ਹਸੁੱਹਖਆ ਿੈ? □ ਿਾਂ □ ਨਿੀ 
5.  ਤੁਿਾਡੇ ਪ੍ਹਰਵਾਰ ਦੇ ਹਕਿੰਨੇ ਮੈਂਬਰ ਖੇਤੀ ਦੀਆਂ ਸਰਗਰਮੀਆਂ ਹਵਚ ਸ਼ਾਮਲ ਿਨ?  
 
ਪਰਿਵਾਿ ਦੇ ਵੇਿਵੇ ਮਿਦ ਔਿਤ 
ਪ੍ਹਰਵਾਹਰਕ ਮੈਂਬਰ   
ਮਜ਼ਦਰੂ ਖੇਤੀ ਦੀਆਂ ਸਰਗਰਮੀਆਂ ਹਵਚ ਮਦਦ ਕਰਦ ੇਿਨ?   
 
6. ਖੇਤੀ ਲਈ ਤੁਸੀ ਂਹਕਿੰਨੀ ਕੁ ਜ਼ਮੀਨ ਵਰਤਦੇ ਿੋ? 
 
ਜ਼ਮੀਨ ਦੀ ਰਿਸਮ    ਜ਼ਮੀਨ  ਹੈਿਟੇਅਿ ਰਵਚ 
ਮਲਕੀਅਤ ਜ਼ਮੀਨ  
ਹਕਰਾਏ ਤੇ ਜ਼ਮੀਨ  
ਕੁੁੱਲ ਕਾਸ਼ਤ ਖੇਤਰ  
 
7. ਤੁਸੀ ਂਕੇਿੜੀ ਫ਼ਸਲ ਬੀਜਦੇ ਿੋ 
 
 ਮੌਜੂਦਾ ਹਤਿੰਨ ਸਾਲ ਪ੍ਹਿਲਾਂ 
ਤਾਜ਼ਾ ਉਤਪ੍ਾਦ ਫਸਲ    
 
8. ਫਲ ਸਬਜ਼ੀਆਂ ਦੀ ਪ੍ੈਦਾਵਾਰ ਲਈ ਤੁਸੀ ਂਹਕਿੰਨੀ ਜ਼ਮੀਨ ਦੀ ਵਰਤੋਂ ਕਰਦੇ ਿੋ?   
 
         □  25% ਤੁੱਕ   □   25-50%   □  50-75%   □   100% 
 
9. ਫਲ ਸਬਜ਼ੀਆਂ ਦੀ ਕਾਸ਼ਤ ਹਵੁੱਚ ਤੁਿਾਡੇ ਕੋਲ ਹਕਿੰਨੇ ਸਾਲ ਦਾ ਅਨੁਭਵ ਿੈ?  
 
           □   2 ਸਾਲ ਤੁੱਕ   □  3 ਤੋਂ 5 ਸਾਲ  □  6-10 ਸਾਲ   □  10 ਸਾਲ ਤੋਂ ਵੁੱਧ  
 
10. ਹਕਿੰਨੇ ਖੇਤ ਮਜ਼ਦਰੂਾਂ ਨੂਿੰ  ਪ੍ਹਰਵਾਰ ਦੇ ਮੈਂਬਰਾਂ ਤੋਂ ਇਲਾਵਾ ਿੋਰ ਖੇਤੀ ਸਿੰਬਿੰਧੀ ਕਿੰਮ ਹਵਚ ਲਗਾਇਆ ਜਾਂਦਾ ਿੈ (ਪ੍ਰਤੀ ਿੈਕਟੇਅਰ) 
   
ਵੇਿਵੇ ਮਿਦ ਔਿਤ 
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ਪ੍ਹਰਵਾਰਕ ਮੈਂਬਰਾਂ ਤੋਂ ਇਲਾਵਾ ਖੇਤੀਬਾੜੀ 
ਦੇ ਕਿੰਮਾਂ ਹਵਚ ਲਗਾਏ ਖੇਤ ਮਜ਼ਦਰੂ (ਪ੍ਰਤੀ 
ਏਕੜ) 
   
11.  ਤੁਿਾਡੀ ਹਸਿੰਚਾਈ ਹਵਧੀ ਕੀ ਿੈ?  
 
ਰਸਿੰਚਾਈ ਦੀ ਰਵਧੀ %  % ਿ ੁੱਲ ਿਾਸ਼ਤ ਜ਼ਮੀਨ  
ਨਹਿਰ  
ਹਟਊਬ ਨਾਲ ਨਾਲ  
ਮਾਈਕਰੋ-ਹਸਿੰਚਾਈ (ਡਰਾਇਪ੍ / ਸਪ੍ਰੈਕਲਰ)  
ਅਣ ਹਸਿੰਜਾਈ ਖੇਤਰ  
 
12.  ਫਲ ਸਬਜ਼ੀਆਂ ਦੀ ਪ੍ਰਤੀ ਿੈਕਟੇਅਰ ਤੁਿਾਡੀ ਔਸਤਨ ਉਤਪ੍ਾਦਨ ਲਾਗਤ ਕੀ ਿੈ? 
 
ਲਾਗਤ ਦਾ ਭਾਗ ਫਸਲ 
ਜ਼ਮੀਨ ਦਾ ਹਕਰਾਇਆ ਮੁੁੱਲ (ਰਪੁ੍ਏ ਦਾ / ਯੂਹਨਟ ਜ਼ਮੀਨ)  
 
ਜ਼ਮੀਨ ਦੀ ਹਤਆਰੀ 




ਲੇਬਰ ਦਾ ਖਰਚਾ (ਨਿੰ ਬਰ x ਹਦਨ x ਰੇਟ) 
ਪ੍ਹਰਵਾਰਕ ਹਕਰਤ 
 
ਪ੍ਹਰਵਾਰਕ ਹਕਰਤ  
ਬੀਜ ਖਰੀਦਣ ਅਤੇ ਲਾਉਣ ਦੀ ਲਾਗਤ ਖਰਚਾ (ਹਗਣਤੀ x ਕੀਮਤ)  
ਲੇਬਰ ਦਾ ਖਰਚਾ (ਨਿੰ ਬਰ x ਹਦਨ x ਰੇਟ) 
ਪ੍ਹਰਵਾਰਕ ਹਕਰਤ 
 
ਪ੍ਹਰਵਾਰਕ ਹਕਰਤ  
ਖਾਦ (ਰਸਾਇਣਕ / ਜੈਹਵਕ ਖਾਦ) ਲਾਗਤ ਖਰਚਾ (ਹਗਣਤੀ x ਕੀਮਤ)  
ਲੇਬਰ ਦਾ ਖਰਚਾ (ਨਿੰ ਬਰ x ਹਦਨ x ਰੇਟ)  
ਪ੍ਹਰਵਾਰਕ ਹਕਰਤ  
 
ਕੀਟਨਾਸ਼ਕਾਂ / ਜੀਵ-ਕੀਟਨਾਸ਼ਕਾਂ ਦੀ ਲਾਗਤ 
ਕੀਮਤ (ਹਗਣਤੀ x ਕੀਮਤ)  
ਲੇਬਰ ਦਾ ਖਰਚਾ (ਨਿੰ ਬਰ x ਹਦਨ x ਰੇਟ)  
ਪ੍ਹਰਵਾਰਕ ਹਕਰਤ  
ਹਸਿੰਜਾਈ ਲਾਗਤ ਹਸਿੰਚਾਈ ਦੀ ਹਗਣਤੀ x ਰੇਟ  
ਕੁਲ ਲਾਗਤ  
 
ਨਦੀਨਾਂ ਦੀ ਸਫਾਈ ਖਰਚਾ 
ਖਰਚਾ (ਹਗਣਤੀ x ਕੀਮਤ)  
ਲੇਬਰ ਦਾ ਖਰਚਾ (ਨਿੰ ਬਰ x ਹਦਨ x ਰੇਟ)  
ਪ੍ਹਰਵਾਰਕ ਹਕਰਤ  
 
ਕਟਾਈ ਦੀ ਲਾਗਤ 
ਕਿੰਬਾਈਨ ਦਾ ਹਕਰਾਇਆ  
ਲੇਬਰ ਦਾ ਖਰਚਾ (ਨਿੰ ਬਰ x ਹਦਨ x ਰੇਟ)  
ਪ੍ਹਰਵਾਰਕ ਹਕਰਤ  
 
13. ਕੀ ਤੁਿਾਡੇ ਕੋਲ ਖੇਤੀ ਕਰਨ ਤੋਂ ਇਲਾਵਾ ਿੋਰ ਆਮਦਨ ਿੈ? □ ਿਾਂ □ ਨਿੀ ਂ
                         ਜੇ ਿਾਂ, ਤਾਂ ਹਕਰਪ੍ਾ ਕਰਕ ੇਸਰੋਤ ਦੁੱਸੋ? 
 
14.  ਕੀ ਤੁਸੀ ਂਹਕਸੇ ਹਕਸਾਨ ਦੇ ਸਮੂਿ/ ਸਿੰਗਠਨ ਦੇ ਮੈਂਬਰ ਿੋ? □ ਿਾਂ □ ਨਿੀ ਂ(ਜੇ ਜਵਾਬ ਨਿੀ ਂ ਸਵਾਲ 16 ਤੇ ਜਾਉ) 
 
15.  ਤੁਸੀ ਂਹਕਿੰਨੇ ਸਾਲ ਹਕਸਾਨ ਸਿੰਗਠਨ ਦੇ ਮੈਂਬਰ ਿੋ? 
           □  2 ਸਾਲ ਤੁੱਕ  □   3 ਤੋਂ 5 ਸਾਲ    □   6-10 ਸਾਲ  □   10 ਸਾਲ ਤੋਂ ਵੁੱਧ 
 
16.  ਸਹਿਕਾਰੀ ਸਭਾਵਾਂ ਤੋਂ ਤੁਸੀ ਂਹਕਿੰਨੇ ਸਿੰਤੁਸ਼ਟ ਿੋ? 
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ਸਿੰਤੁਸ਼ਟ ਨਿੀ  
ਥੋੜ੍ਾ ਸਿੰਤੁਸ਼ਟ  
ਔਸਤਨ ਸਿੰਤੁਸ਼ਟ  
ਸਿੰਤੁਸ਼ਟ  
ਬਿਤੁ ਸਿੰਤੁਸ਼ਟ  
 
17.  ਹਕਸ ਹਕਸਾਨ ਗਰੁੁੱਪ੍ / ਸਿੰਗਠਨ ਦਾ ਤੁਸੀ ਂਮੈਂਬਰ ਿੋ? 
          □  ਸਰਕਾਰੀ ਹਨਯਿੰਤਹਰਤ ਸਹਿਕਾਰੀ ਸਿੰਸਥਾ  □  ਲੋਕਲ ਪ੍ੁੱਧਰ ਦੀ ਸਹਿਕਾਰੀ ਸਿੰਸਥਾ  □  ਹਕਸਾਨ ਉਤਪ੍ਾਦਕ   ਕਿੰਪ੍ਨੀ     □ 
ਹਕਸ ੇਵੀ ਿੋਰ ਹਕਸਮ ਦੇ ਖੇਤ-ਸਬਿੰਧਤ ਐਸੋਸੀਏਸ਼ਨ (ਹਕਸਾਨ ਯੂਨੀਅਨ) 
 
18.  ਹਕਸਾਨ ਸਿੰਗਠਨ ਦਆੁਰਾ ਤੁਿਾਨੂਿੰ  ਹਕਿੜੇ ਲਾਭ ਹਮਲਦੇ ਿਨ? 
ਲਾਭ ਿਮੇਸ਼ਾਂ ਹਜ਼ਆਦਾਤਰ ਅਕਸਰ ਲਗਭਗ ਅੁੱਧਾ 
ਸਮਾਂ 
ਕਦ ੇਨਿੀ ਂ
ਹਬਿਤਰ ਭਾਅ ਲਈ ਗੁੱਲਬਾਤ ਕਰਨ ਲਈ      
ਸਟੋਰੇਜ ਸਿਲੂਤਾਂ       
ਤੁਿਾਡੇ ਉਤਪ੍ਾਦ ਦੀ ਮਾਰਕੀਹਟਿੰਗ      
ਬੀਜ ਤੇ ਖਾਦਾਂ      
ਫਾਰਮ ਮਸ਼ੀਨਰੀ      
ਖੇਤੀ ਕਰੈਹਡਟ      
ਿੋਰ (ਵੇਰਵਾ ਹਦਓ)      
 
 
19.  ਜੇਕਰ ਪ੍ਰਸ਼ਨ 12 ਦਾ ਉੁੱਤਰ ਨਿੀ ਂਿੈ ਤਾਂ ਿੇਠ ਹਲਖ ੇਕਾਰਨਾਂ ਹਵਚੋਂ  ਹਕਿੜਾ ਤੁਿਾਨੂਿੰ   ਸਿੰਗਠਨ ਦਾ ਮੈਂਬਰ ਬਣਨ ਤੋਂ ਰੋਕਦਾ ਿੈ, 
ਹਕਰਪ੍ਾ ਕਰਕ ੇਦੁੱਸੋ? 
 
 ਉੁੱਚ ਗਾਿਕੀ ਫੀਸ  
ਵੁੱਡੇ ਹਕਸਾਨਾਂ ਦਾ ਉੁੱਚ ਪ੍ਰਭਾਵ  
ਗੈਰ-ਪ੍ਾਰਦਰਸ਼ੀ ਲੈਣ-ਦੇਣ ਅਤ ੇਅਗਵਾਈ  
ਹਸਆਸੀ ਦਖ਼ਲ ਅਿੰਦਾਜ਼ੀ  
ਿੋਰ ਕਾਰਨ  
 
20. ਤੁਸੀ ਂਹਕਸਾਨੀ ਦੀ ਮਸ਼ੀਨਰੀ ਤਕ ਹਕਵੇਂ ਪ੍ਿੁਿੰਚ ਪ੍ਰਾਪ੍ਤ ਕਰਦੇ ਿੋ  
 
           □  ਤੁਸੀ ਂਮਾਲਕ ਿੋ   □   ਹਕਸਾਨ ਸਿੰਗਠਨ ਪ੍ਰਦਾਨ ਕਰਦਾ ਿੈ   □ ਖਰੀਦਦਾਰ ਮੁਿੁੱਈਆ ਕਰਦਾ ਿੈ    □ ਖੁਦ   ਹਕਰਾਏ 
ਉੁੱਪ੍ਰ ਲੈਂ ਦੇ ਿੋ   □  ਿੋਰ (ਵੇਰਵਾ ਹਦਓ) 
 
21. ਤੁਸੀ ਂਆਪ੍ਣਾ ਤਾਜ਼ਾ ਉਤਪ੍ਾਦ ਹਕੁੱਥੇ (ਮਾਰਕੀਟ ਚੈਨਲ) ਅਤ ੇਹਕਿੰਨੇ ਪ੍ਰਤੀਸ਼ਤ ਉਸੇ ਮਾਰਕੀਟ ਚੈਨਲ ਵੇਚਦੇ ਿੋ? 
ਮਾਰਕੀਟ ਚੈਨਲ ਹਕਿੰਨੇ ਪ੍ਰਤੀਸ਼ਤ 
ਥੋਕ ਬਾਜ਼ਾਰ  
ਫਾਰਮ ਗੇਟ 'ਤੇ ਵਪ੍ਾਰੀ  
ਪ੍ਰੋਸੈਹਸਿੰਗ ਕਿੰਪ੍ਨੀ  
ਸੁਪ੍ਰਮਾਰਕੀਟ  
ਫਾਸਟ ਫਡੂ ਰੈਸਟਰਾਂ ਿੋਟਲ  
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ਸਥਾਨਕ ਤੌਰ 'ਤੇ ਖੁੁੱਲੇ੍ ਬਾਜ਼ਾਰ  
ਿੋਰ  
 
22. ਕੀ ਤੁਸੀ ਂਹਪ੍ਛਲੇ ਹਤਿੰਨ ਸਾਲਾਂ ਹਵੁੱਚ ਮਾਰਕੀਟ ਚੈਨਲ ਨੂਿੰ  ਬਦਹਲਆ ਸੀ?  □   ਿਾਂ □ ਨਿੀ ਂ 
 
23. ਜੇ ਿਾਂ, ਤਾਂ ਤੁਸੀ ਂਮਾਰਕੀਟ ਚੈਨਲਾਂ ਨੂਿੰ  ਬਦਲਣ ਵੇਲੇ ਕੀ ਸੋਚਦੇ ਿੋ? 
 






ਮਿੁੱਤਵਪ੍ੂਰਣ ਬਿਤੁ ਿੀ 
ਮਿੁੱਤਵਪ੍ੂਰਨ 
ਹਬਿਤਰ ਕੀਮਤ      
ਹਵਸ਼ੇਸ਼ਤਾਵਾਂ ਹਮਲਣ ਦੀ 
ਸਮਰੁੱਥਾ 
     
ਹਵਕਰੀ ਦੀ ਮਾਤਰਾ      
ਟਾਈਮ ਪ੍ਰਤੀਬੁੱਧਤਾ      
ਬਾਜ਼ਾਰ ਤੋਂ ਦਰੂੀ      
ਭਰੋਸੇਯੋਗ ਭੁਗਤਾਨ      
ਖਪ੍ਤਕਾਰਾਂ ਨਾਲ ਹਸੁੱਧੀ 
ਗੁੱਲਬਾਤ 
     
ਜਾਣਕਾਰੀ ਤੁੱਕ ਪ੍ਿੁਿੰਚ      
ਭਰੋਸਾ ਅਤ ੇਵਚਨਬੁੱਧਤਾ      
ਕੋਈ ਿੋਰ (ਹਕਰਪ੍ਾ ਕਰਕ ੇ
ਦੁੱਸੋ) 
     
 
24. ਹਜਸ ਮਾਰਕੀਟ ਚੈਨਲ ਹਵਚ ਤੁਸੀ ਂਉਤਪ੍ਾਦ ਵੇਚਦੇ ਿੋ ,ਕੀਮਤ ਹਨਰਧਾਰਤ ਕਰਨ ਲਈ ਿੇਠ ਹਲਖੀਆਂ ਹਵੁੱਚੋਂ ਹਕਿੜੀਆਂ 
ਹਵਕਲਪ੍ਾਂ ਨੂਿੰ  ਮਿੰਨਦੇ ਿੋ? 
 
ਚੋਣ  ਸਰਕਲ ਇਕ ਹਵਕਲਪ੍ ਜੋ ਲਾਗੂ ਿੁਿੰਦਾ ਿੈ 
ਉਤਪ੍ਾਦਾਂ ਦੇ ਗਰੇਡ (ਗੁਣਵੁੱਤਾ) ਦੇ ਅਨੁਸਾਰ   
ਲੋੜੀਦੇਂ ਮਿੰਡੀਕਰਨ ਮੁੁੱਲ  
ਮਾਰਕੀਟ ਕੀਮਤ + ਪ੍ਰੀਮੀਅਮ  
ਉਤਪ੍ਾਦਨ ਦੀ ਲਾਗਤ + ਮਿੰਡੀ ਦੀ ਕੀਮਤ ਦਾ ਫਰਕ  
ਹਕਸ ੇਵੀ ਦੋ ਤਰੀਹਕਆ ਂਜਾਂ ਲਚਕਦਾਰ ਕੀਮਤ ਦੀ ਹਵਧੀ ਦਾ ਸਿੰਯੋਗ 
(ਹਕਸਾਨ ਦਆੁਰਾ ਚਹੁਣਆ ਤਰੀਕਾ  
 
 
25. ਕੀ ਤੁਸੀ ਂਉਤਪ੍ਾਦ ਹਵਕਰੀ ਤੋਂ ਪ੍ਹਿਲਾਂ ਬਾਜ਼ਾਰ ਦੀ ਜਾਣਕਾਰੀ ਪ੍ਰਾਪ੍ਤ ਕਰਦੇ ਿੋ?  ਿਾਂ  ਨਿੀ ਂ
 
26.  ਤੁਸੀ ਂਮਾਰਕੀਟ ਤੋਂ ਹਕਿੰਨੀ ਵਾਰ ਕੀਮਤ ਦੀ ਜਾਣਕਾਰੀ ਪ੍ਰਾਪ੍ਤ ਕਰ ਰਿ ੇਿੋ? 
               □  ਹਦਨ ਹਵੁੱਚ ਇੁੱਕ ਵਾਰੀ  □  ਹਦਨ ਦੀ ਸਵੇਰ / ਦਪੁ੍ਹਿਰ ਦੋ ਵਾਰੀ   □  ਿਫ਼ਤ ੇਹਵਚ ਇਕ ਵਾਰ   □ ਿਫ਼ਤ ੇਹਵਚ ਦੋ ਵਾਰ 
 
27. ਕੀਮਤ ਜਾਣਕਾਰੀ ਨੂਿੰ  ਐਕਸੈਸ ਕਰਨ ਲਈ ਸਿੰਚਾਰ ਦਾ ਹਕਿੜਾ ਸਾਧਨ ਤੁਸੀ ਂਵਰਤਦੇ ਿੋ? 
 
              □ ਸਮਾਰਟ ਫੋਨ   □  ਰੇਡੀਓ   □ ਟੈਲੀਹਵਜ਼ਨ   □  ਇਿੰਟਰਨੈਟ   □ ਅਖਬਾਰ   □  ਕੋਈ ਿੋਰ 
 
28. ਕੀਮਤ ਜਾਣਕਾਰੀ ਪ੍ਰਾਪ੍ਤ ਕਰਨ ਦਾ ਤੁਿਾਡਾ ਸਰੋਤ ਕੀ ਿੈ? 
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ਸਵ-ੈਪ੍ੜਤਾਲ      
ਿੋਰ ਹਕਸਾਨਾਂ ਨਾਲ ਗੁੱਲ ਕਰਨਾ       
 ਕਹਮਸ਼ਨ ਏਜਿੰਟ / ਵਪ੍ਾਰੀ ਨਾਲ ਗੁੱਲ ਕਰਨਾ       
ਹਕਸਾਨ ਸਿੰਗਠਨ ਜਾਂ ਸਹਿਕਾਰੀ ਸਿੰਸਥਾ      
ਕੋਈ ਿੋਰ (ਹਕਰਪ੍ਾ ਕਰਕ ੇਹਨਰਧਾਰਤ ਕਰ)ੋ      
 
29. ਮਾਰਕੀਟ ਹਵਚ ਰਝੁੇਵੇਂ ਦਾ ਤਰੀਕਾ ਕੀ ਿੈ? 
□ ਹਵਅਕਤੀਗਤ  □  ਸਮੂਿਕ  □ ਦੋਵ ੇਤਰਾਂ ਨਾਲ 
 
30. ਖਰੀਦਦਾਰ ਨਾਲ ਤੁਿਾਡਾ ਹਕਸ ਤਰ੍ਾਂ ਦਾ ਹਰਸ਼ਤਾ ਿੈ 
□  ਹਲਖਤੀ ਇਕਰਾਰਨਾਮਾ ਕਰਾਰਨਾਮਾ  □ ਮੂਿੰਿ ਜਬਾਨੀ ਇਕਰਾਰਨਾਮਾ   □ ਮੌਕੇ ਦੇ ਲੈਣ-ਦੇਣ  
 
31. ਸਪ੍ਲਾਈ ਚੇਨ ਹਵਚ ਵੁੱਖਰ ੇਪ੍ੁੱਧਰ 'ਤੇ ਤੁਸੀ ਂਆਪ੍ਣੇ ਖਰੀਦਦਾਰ ਨੂਿੰ  ਹਕਿੰਨਾ ਕੁ ਜਾਣਦੇ ਿੋ? 
                ❑    ਚੇਨ ਹਵੁੱਚ ਤੁਰਿੰਤ ਖਰੀਦਦਾਰ     ❑  ਚੇਨ ਹਵੁੱਚ ਅਖੀਰ ਖਰੀਦਦਾਰ ਤਕ 
 
32. ਿੇਠ ਹਦੁੱਤ ੇਫੈਸਹਲਆਂ ਤੇ ਕੌਣ ਫ਼ੈਸਲਾ ਕਰਦੇ ਿਨ? (ਢਕੁਵੀ ਂਸਿੀ ਦਾ ਹਨਸ਼ਾਨ ਲਗਾਓ) 
 
ਫੈਸਲੇ   ਤੁਸੀ ਂਫ਼ੈਸਲਾ ਕਰਦੇ ਿੋ ਖਰੀਦਦਾਰ ਫ਼ੈਸਲਾ ਸਾਂਝੀ ਯੋਜਨਾ ਬਣਾਉਦੇਂ 
ਿੋ 
 ਬੀਜਾਂ ਦੀ ਹਕਸਮ    
ਹਕਿੰਨੇ ਬੀਜ ਲਗਾਏ ਜਾਂਦੇ ਿਨ    
ਕੀ ਰਸਾਇਣ ਇਸਤੇਮਾਲ ਕਰਨਾ    
ਹਕਵੇਂ ਅਤ ੇਕਦੋਂ ਹਸਿੰਜਣਾ ਿੈ    
ਹਕਿੰਨੀ ਮਾਤਰਾ ਹਵਚ ਵਾਢੀ    
ਹਕਿੜਾ ਫਸਲ / ਹਸਰ / ਹਕਸਮਾਂ 
ਨੂਿੰ  ਪ੍ਹਿਲੀ ਵਾਰ ਵਾਢੀ 
   
ਵਾਢੀ ਕਦੋਂ    
 
33. ਕੀ ਤੁਿਾਡੇ ਕੋਲ ਕਰੈਹਡਟ ਦੇ ਰਸਮੀ ਸਰੋਤ ਤੁੱਕ ਪ੍ਿੁਿੰਚ ਿੈ ? □   ਿਾਂ □ ਨਿੀ ਂ(ਜੇ ਿਾਂ ਪ੍ਰਸ਼ਨ 34 ਤੇ ਜਾਉ) 
 
34.  ਜਵਾਬ ਨਿੀ ਂਿੈ ਤਾਂ ਕਰੈਹਡਟ ਦੇ ਰਸਮੀ ਸਰੋਤ ਦੀ ਪ੍ਿੁਿੰਚ ਨਾ ਿੋਣ ਦਾ ਕੀ ਕਾਰਨ ਿੈ? 
 
            □ ਛੋਟੀ ਜ਼ਮੀਨ ਦੀ ਿੋਲਹਡਿੰਗ  □ ਘਟ ਮੁੁੱਲ ਦੀ ਸਿੰਪ੍ਤੀ ਗਾਰਿੰਟੀ ਵਾਸਤ ੇ □ ਬਿਤੁ ਹਜ਼ਆਦਾ ਪ੍ੇਪ੍ਰ ਵਰਕ  □ ਵੇਚਣ ਯੋਗ 
ਉਤਪ੍ਾਦ ਦਾ ਕਰਜ ਦੀ ਰਕਮ ਦੇ ਬਰਾਬਰ ਨਾ ਿੋਣਾ □ ਜਾਣਕਾਰੀ  ਦੀ ਕਮੀ □ ਕੋਈ ਿੋਰ ਹਕਰਪ੍ਾ ਕਰਕੇ ਦੁੱਸੋ 
 
35.  ਤੁਿਾਡੇ ਕਰੈਹਡਟ ਦਾ ਪ੍ਸਿੰਦੀਦਾ ਸਰੋਤ ਕੀ ਿੈ? 




ਵਪ੍ਾਰਕ ਬੈਂਕਾਂ      
ਖਰੀਦਦਾਰ      
ਹਕਸਾਨ ਸਿੰਗਠਨ ਜਾਂ ਸਹਿਕਾਰੀ ਸਿੰਸਥਾ      
ਰਵਾਇਤੀ ਪ੍ੇਂਡੂ ਪ੍ੈਸਾ ਦੇਣ ਵਾਲਾ      
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ਗੁਆਂਢੀ / ਦੋਸਤ      
 
36. ਹਕਰਪ੍ਾ ਕਰਕ ੇਿੇਠਾਂ ਹਦੁੱਤ ੇਕਥਨਾਂ ਤੇ ਆਪ੍ਣਾ ਜਵਾਬ ਹਦਓ 








ਖੇਤੀ ਉਤਪ੍ਾਦਕਤਾ ਨ      
ਚਿੰਗੀ ਕੁਆਲਟੀ ਦੇ ਬੀਜ       
 ਫਾਰਮ ਮਸ਼ੀਨਰੀ ਖਰੀਦਣ       
 ਹਸਿੰਚਾਈ ਦਾ ਪ੍ਰਬਿੰਧ ਕਰਨ ਹਵੁੱਚ       
ਟਰਾਂਸਪ੍ੋਰਟੇਸ਼ਨ ਦਾ ਪ੍ਰਬਿੰਧ       
 ਅਗੇਤ ਲੇਬਰ ਲਾਗਤ      
ਕਾਸ਼ਤ ਦੇ ਅਮਲ ਹਵਚ ਸੁਧਾਰ       
 
37. ਕੀ ਤੁਿਾਨੂਿੰ  ਕੋਈ ਤਕਨੀਕੀ ਸਿਾਇਤਾ ਪ੍ਰਾਪ੍ਤ ਿੈ □ ਿਾਂ □ ਨਿੀ ਂ(ਜੇ ਜਵਾਬ ਨਿੀ ਂਿੈ ਤਾ ਸਵਾਲ 38 ਤੇ ਜਾਓ)    
 
38. ਜੇ ਿਾਂ, ਤਾਂ ਤਕਨੀਕੀ ਸਿਾਇਤਾ ਦਾ ਮੁੁੱਖ ਸਰੋਤ ਕੀ ਿੈ? 
           □ ਖਰੀਦਦਾਰ  □ ਸਰਕਾਰੀ ਹਵਭਾਗ   □ ਇਿੰਪੁ੍ੁੱਟ ਸਪ੍ਲਾਇਰ  □ ਗੁਆਂਢੀ / ਦੋਸਤ  □ ਹਕਸਾਨ ਸਿੰਗਠਨ ਜਾਂ                       
ਸਹਿਕਾਰੀ ਸਿੰਸਥਾ 
  
39. ਕੀ ਤੁਿਾਡੇ ਕੋਲ ਭਿੰਡਾਰਨ ਲਈ ਵੇਅਰਿਾਊਸ ਦੀ ਵਰਤੋਂ ਿੈ?    □ ਿਾਂ □ ਨਿੀ ਂ
 
40. ਵੇਅਰਿਾਊਸ ਤੁੱਕ ਪ੍ਿੁਿੰਚ ਕਰਨ ਲਈ ਤੁਸੀ ਂਕੀ ਫਾਇਦੇ ਪ੍ਰਾਪ੍ਤ ਕਰਦੇ ਿੋ? 




ਹਬਿਤਰ ਵੇਚਣ ਦਾ ਭਾਅ ਬਾਅਦ ਹਵਚ      
ਵੇਚਣ ਯੋਗ ਉਤਪ੍ਾਦ ਦਾ ਘਟ ਨੁਕਸਾਨ      
ਹਨਯਮਤ ਸਪ੍ਲਾਈ ਦੀ ਯੋਗਤਾ ਹਵਚ ਵਾਧਾ      
ਸੌਦੇਬਾਜ਼ੀ ਦੀ ਸ਼ਕਤੀ ਵਧੀ ਿੈ      
 
41. ਤੁਿਾਡੇ ਉਤਪ੍ਾਦ ਨੂਿੰ  ਮਾਰਕੀਟ ਪ੍ੁਆਇਿੰਟਤੁੱਕ  ਹਕਵੇਂ ਹਲਜਾਇਆ ਜਾਂਦਾ ਿੈ? 
□   ਆਪ੍ਣੇ ਆਵਾਜਾਈ ਦਆੁਰਾ □ ਭਾੜੇ ਵਾਲੇ ਵਾਿਨ (ਹਵਅਕਤੀਗਤ) □ ਭਾੜੇ ਵਾਲੇ ਵਾਿਨ (ਸਮੂਹਿਕ ਹਕਸਾਨ ਸਿੰਗਠਨ) 
□ ਜਨਤਕ ਟਰਾਂਸਪ੍ੋਰਟ □ ਖਰੀਦਦਾਰ ਟਰਾਂਸਪ੍ੋਰਟ □ ਕੋਈ ਿੋਰ ਹਕਰਪ੍ਾ ਕਰਕੇ ਦੁੱਸੋ 
 
42. ਸੜਕ ਤੋਂ ਹਕਿੰਨੀ ਦਰੂ ਤੁਿਾਡਾ ਫਾਰਮ ਿੈ 
    □ 2 ਹਕਲੋਮੀਟਰ ਹਵਚ □ 3-5 ਹਕਲੋਮੀਟਰ ਹਵਚਕਾਰ □ 5 ਹਕਲੋਮੀਟਰ ਤੋਂ ਹਜ਼ਆਦਾ 
 
43. ਮਾਰਕੀਟ ਤੁਿਾਡੇ ਫਾਰਮ ਤੋਂ ਹਕਿੰਨੀ ਦਰੂੀ ਤੇ ਿੈ? 
    □ 10 ਹਕਲੋਮੀਟਰ ਦੀ ਦਰੂੀ  ਤੁੱਕ □ 10 ਤੋਂ  25 ਹਕਲੋਮੀਟਰ ਹਵਚਕਾਰ □ 25  ਤੋਂ  50 ਹਕਲੋਮੀਟਰ □ 50 ਹਕਲੋਮੀਟਰ ਤੋਂ 
ਵੁੱਧ 
 
44. ਤੁਸੀ ਂਮਾਰਕੀਟ ਤਕ ਪ੍ਿੁਿੰਚਣ ਲਈ ਬੁਹਨਆਦੀ ਢਾਂਚੇ ਨੂਿੰ  ਹਕਵੇਂ ਰੇਟ ਕਰਦੇ ਿੋ? 
 
ਵੇਰਵੇ ਬਿਤੁ ਖਰਾਬ ਔਸਤ ਤੋਂ ਥੁੱਲੇ ਔਸਤ  ਔਸਤ ਤੋਂ ਉੁੱਪ੍ਰ ਸ਼ਾਨਦਾਰ 
ਮਾਰਕੀਟ ਤਕ ਸੜਕ ਦੀ 
ਿਾਲਤ 
     
 243 
ਵੇਅਰਿਾਊਸ ਸਿਲੂਤਾਂ      
ਕੋਲਡ ਸਟੋਰੇਜ      
ਆਵਾਜਾਈ ਦੀਆਂ ਸਿਲੂਤਾਂ      
 
45.  ਤਸੀ ਂਪ੍ਰਤੀ ਿੈਕਟੇਅਰ ਹਵਚ ਤਾਜ਼ਾ ਉਤਪ੍ਾਦ ਵੇਚਣ ਲਈ ਹਕਿੰਨਾ ਖਰਚ ਕਰਦੇ ਿੋ? 
 
ਤਾਜ਼ਾ ਉਤਪ੍ਾਦਨ ਲਾਗਤ ਵੇਚਣ ਦੀ ਕੁੁੱਲ ਲਾਗਤ  ਲਾਗਤ (₹ INR) 
ਆਵਾਜਾਈ  
ਲੋਹਡਿੰਗ ਅਤ ੇਅਨਲੋਹਡਿੰਗ  
ਗਰੇਹਡਿੰਗ ਅਤ ੇਪ੍ੈਹਕਿੰਗ  
ਮਾਰਕੀਟ ਫੀਸ  
ਦਲਾਲਾਂ ਦਾ ਕਹਮਸ਼ਨ  
ਕੋਈ ਿੋਰ ਸਿੰਬਿੰਹਧਤ ਖਰਚੇ (ਹਕਰਪ੍ਾ ਕਰਕੇ ਦੁੱਸੋ)  
ਕੁੁੱਲ:  
 
46. ਫ਼ਸਲ ਕੁੱਟਨ ਤੋਂ ਲੈ ਕੇ ਮਿੰਡੀ ਤਕ ਉਤਪ੍ਾਦ ਦਾ ਹਕਿੰਨੇ ਪ੍ਰਤੀਸ਼ਤ ਨੁਕਸਾਨ ਿੁਿੰਦਾ ਿੈ? ਹਕਰਪ੍ਾ ਕਰਕੇ ਹਨਰਧਾਹਰਤ ਕਰ ੋ
 
47. ਕੀ ਕੋਈ ਅਹਜਿ ੇਮਾਪ੍ਦਿੰਡ ਿਨ ਜੋ ਤੁਿਾਨੂਿੰ  ਆਪ੍ਣੇ ਚਣੇੁ ਿੋਏ ਬਾਜ਼ਾਰ ਦੀ ਸਪ੍ਲਾਈ ਕਰਨ ਦੀ ਪ੍ਾਲਣਾ ਕਰਨ ਦੀ ਲੋੜ ਿੈ? 
□ ਿਾਂ □ ਨਿੀ ਂ
 
48. ਜੇ ਿਾਂ, ਤਾਂ ਇਨ੍ਾਂ ਹਮਆਰਾਂ ਦੀ ਅਹਿਮੀਅਤ ਹਕਿੰਨੀ ਮਿੁੱਤਵਪੂ੍ਰਨ ਿੈ? 
 






ਹਗਣਤੀ      
ਗੁਣਵੁੱਤਾ      
ਬਾਰਿੰਬਾਰਤਾ      
ਵੁੱਖ ਵੁੱਖ ਹਕਸਮ      
ਪ੍ੈਹਕਿੰਗ      
ਭੋਜਨ ਸੁਰੁੱਹਖਆ      
ਿੋਰ      
 
49. ਕੀ ਤੁਿਾਨੂਿੰ  ਮਾਰਕੀਟ ਹਵਚ ਉਤਪ੍ਾਦ ਵੇਚਣ ਲਈ ਗਰੇਹਡਿੰਗ ਕਰਨੀ ਪ੍ੈਂਦੀ ਿੈ □ ਿਾਂ □ ਨਿੀ ਂ
        ਜੇ ਿਾਂ, ਤਾਂ ਤੁਸੀ ਂਚਣੁੀ ਿੋਈ ਮਾਰਕੀਟ ਨੂਿੰ  ਵੇਚਦੇ ਿੋ ਹਕ ਗਰੇਡ ਏ, ਬੀ ਅਤ ੇਸੀ ਦੇ ਹਕਿੰਨੇ ਪ੍ਰਤੀਸ਼ਤ (%) ਿਨ 
ਗਰੇਡ  ਪ੍ਰਤੀਸ਼ਤ (%) ਮਾਰਕੀਟ 
   
   
   
   
 
50. ਹਕਿੰਨੇ ਪ੍ਰਤੀਸਤ ਉਤਪ੍ਾਦ ਹਵਕਣ ਤੋਂ ਰਹਿ ਜਾਂਦਾ ਿੈ? 
 10% ਤੁੱਕ        10-20% ਤੁੱਕ     20-30% ਤੁੱਕ   30% ਤੋਂ ਵੁੱਧ 
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51.  ਉਤਪ੍ਾਦ ਹਵਕਣ ਤੋਂ ਰਹਿ ਜਾਨ ਦੇ ਕੀ ਕਾਰਨ ਿਨ? 
ਫੈਿਟਿ  ਸਿਿਲ ਜੋ ਲਾਗੂ ਹ ਿੰਦਾ ਹੈ 
ਠਿੰ ਡੇ ਸਟੋਰੇਜ਼ ਸਿਲੂਤਾਂ ਦੀ ਘਾਟ  
ਬਾਜ਼ਾਰ ਤੋਂ ਦਰੂੀ  
ਗੁਣਵੁੱਤਾ ਮਾਨਕਾਂ ਨੂਿੰ  ਪ੍ੂਰਾ ਕਰਨ ਹਵੁੱਚ ਅਸਮਰੁੱਥ  
ਮੁੁੱਲ ਉਤਪ੍ਾਦਨ ਦੇ ਖਰਹਚਆਂ ਨੂਿੰ  ਸ਼ਾਮਲ ਨਿੀ ਂਕਰਦਾ  
ਵਾਢੀ ਕਰਨ, ਸਾਂਭਣ ਅਤ ੇਵਿੰਡਣ ਲਈ ਉਪ੍ਲਬਧ ਹਕਰਤ ਦੀ 
ਕਮੀ 
 
ਕਟਾਈ ਤੋਂ ਬਾਅਦ ਫਸਲ ਲੋੜਾਂ ਲਈ ਸਿਲੂਤਾਂ ਦੀ ਘਾਟ  
ਕੋਈ ਿੋਰ, ਹਕਰਪ੍ਾ ਕਰਕ ੇਹਨਰਧਾਰਤ ਕਰ ੋ  
 
52. ਜੇਕਰ ਵੇਚਣ ਹਵਚ ਅਸਮਰੁੱਥ ਰਹਿਿੰਦੇ ਤੋਂ ਉਤਪ੍ਾਦ ਨੂਿੰ  ਕੀ ਕਰਦੇ ਿੋ 
 ਡਿੰਪ੍  ਘਰੇਲੂ ਖਪ੍ਤ (ਪ੍ਹਰਵਾਰ ਅਤ ੇਦੋਸਤ)  ਘੁੱਟ ਕੀਮਤ ਤੇ ਵੇਚ ਹਦਿੰਦਾ ਿੈ   ਸਟੋਰ ਕਰਕ ੇਬਾਅਦ ਹਵਚ ਵੇਚ ਹਦਿੰਦਾ ਿੈ  ਕੋਈ 
ਿੋਰ 
53. ਤੁਿਾਡੀ ਔਸਤ ਝਾੜ, ਕੀਮਤ, ਕੁੁੱਲ ਆਮਦਨ (ਪ੍ਰਤੀ ਿੈਕਟੇਅਰ) ਕੀ ਿੈ? 
 
 ਮੁੁੱਖ ਚੈਨਲ ਹਵੁੱਚ ਦਜੇੂ ਚੈਨਲ ਹਵੁੱਚ (ਜੇ ਇੁੱਕ ਤੋਂ ਵੁੱਧ 
ਚੈਨਲ ਹਵੁੱਚ ਵੇਚੇ ਜਾਂਦੇ ਿਨ) 
ਉਪ੍ਜ (ਹਕ.ਗ. / ਿੈਕਟੇਅਰ)   
ਕੀਮਤ (ਰਪੁ੍ਏ / ਹਕ.ਗ.)   
ਕੁੁੱਲ ਆਮਦਨ (ਰਪੁ੍ਏ)   
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